Indo-Pakistan relations are so
deeply mired in history that moving them away from the stated positions and
expressing willingness to tread a middle path requires a deep political
conviction, which is most often lacking whenever diplomatic parleys have taken
place between New Delhi and Islamabad.
Coming on the heels of meetings between both countries' commerce and
interior/home ministers and to top it all Mohali encounter between the Prime
Ministers of both countries, the recently concluded talks between foreign
secretaries, Salman Bashir and Nirupama Rao, in Islamabad on July 23-24 broke no
new ground except churning out worn-out diplomatic clichés. While the Joint
Communiqué issued at the end of three sessions during two days of interaction
did indicate the meetings of working groups on Nuclear and Conventional CBMs and
cross LoC CBMs, both countries largely repeated what has already been known to
the world.
The agenda of the post-Mumbai included a wide array of points such as Peace and
Security including CBMs, Jammu and Kashmir and promotion of friendly exchanges.
No concrete movement was discernible on any of the issues except the usual lip
service to taking the dialogue process forward in 'a constructive and forward
looking manner.'
The interaction between the foreign secretaries again highlighted the vast
disconnect that characterises the approaches of both countries. While Pakistan
favours conflict-management and conflict-resolution mechanism, India is more in
favour of confidence building measures, which in its view, would lead to
building of mutual trust and sufficient space to address the complex issues
bedevilling the relations between the nuclear-armed neighbours. While Pakistan
believes that the composite dialogue framework is a means to an end ie
resolution of all issues, India attaches more importance to normalisation of
relations and that too achieved through CBMs incrementally and uses process ie
composite dialogue framework as an end in itself.
In a joint press conference with her Pakistani counterpart Salman Bashir, Indian
Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao, when asked about progress on the Kashmir issue,
made no bones about her country's stated position. She said "we must do away
with the shadow of the gun and extremist violence because it is only in an
atmosphere free of violence that we can discuss the resolution of such a complex
issue (Kashmir)."What she actually meant by this remark was that the Indian
establishment looked at protracted Jammu and Kashmir issue as the one marked by
terrorism and violence. This remark is consistent with the Indian attempt to
portray the indigenous freedom struggle as terrorism in total disregard of the
UN resolutions and civilised norms. What the Indian foreign secretary failed to
explain is the fact as to why the Kashmiris have been brutally beaten and killed
at the hands of the Indian security forces and why the last two summers were
characterised by complete shutdown of the valley.
Pakistan's India policy in general and the Kashmir policy in particular suffer
from basic drawbacks and may have run out of steam. There is an urgent need to
revisit these policies and seek a fresh national consensus on its broad contours
in light of the ground realities and the UN resolutions on the issue. India has
been quick to exploit the general mood after 9/11, which blurred the lines
differentiating between freedom struggles and terrorism. The various U-turns
taken by General Musharraf during his stint in power proved destructive for the
Kashmir cause. The various options presented by the military dictator for
resolution of the Kashmir issue not only lacked support of Pakistan's mainstream
opinion but also flew in the face of the essence of the UN resolutions passed in
1948. They also failed to win any favourable concession from the Indian side as
well.
Pakistani foreign secretary also failed to take up matters of serious concern
for the country during the three sessions of talks with his Indian counterpart
such as water dispute and its subversive activities in Balochistan and
Afghanistan aimed at inciting unrest in Pakistan. If one had any doubts about
the Indian intentions, her vetoing of the waiver at the World Trade Organisation
should be enough to get rid of this doubt. The European Union struck a deal with
Pakistan after the devastating floods in 2010 which, under Generalised System of
Preferences (GSP) needed a country-specific waiver to come into effect. Indian
that had been raising multiple objections to it finally vetoed it. Likewise,
India also conveyed its objections to the Asian Development Bank over Pakistan's
efforts to seek international funding to build Diamer-Bhasha dam, which is so
crucial for meeting Pakistan's energy needs. The latest reflection of the Indian
intentions came from the top when during interaction with a select group of
newspaper editors, Dr Manmohan Singh advised Pakistan "to leave Kashmir alone"
and "do more to tackle terrorism."
If India is really serious about pursuing peace with Pakistan, relatively less
complex issues such as Sir Creek and Siachen have been waiting for resolution
for a long time. The previous progress on these issues would definitely have
prepared ground for resolution of these disputes thereby injecting fresh energy
and meaning into the diplomatic engagement.
In the absence of any concrete achievement, can a process be sustainable? The
past experience suggests to the contrary. A time soon comes when a small
incident is able to de-track the entire engagement and dialogue. It is about
time that the political leaderships of both countries revisited the composite
dialogue framework and invested political capital in taking the process forward.
By Sahibzada Hussain Mohi-ud-Din Qadri