Iraq Development Road: Türkiye’s initiative for peace and prosperity for a brother Muslim country I

(Dr Mehboob Syed, Karachi)

Iraq Development Road: Türkiye’s initiative for peace and prosperity for a brother Muslim country I
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Dr. Syed Mehboob
Senior Research Editor
The News Lark, political and economic analyst

Brother country Türkiye and its visionary leadership is promoting peace and development in the world. The Middle East is a very sensitive region, and peace in the Middle East means peace and development in the world. Iraq is an important Arab Muslim country, and for several decades it was under pressure and stress from war and foreign invasion, extremism, and terrorism, which badly affected its economy. Now Türkiye has come forward to contribute to the development, progress, and connection of Iraq with modern infrastructure with the rest of the world.
The Iraq Development Road is a US$ 17 billion mega project linking the Grand Faw Port (GFP) in southern Iraq to Türkiye, acting as a modern trade corridor to Europe. Iraq and Türkiye formally agreed to launch and accelerate construction on the 1,200 km highway and rail network. Recent high-level diplomatic talks between Iraqi leadership and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan finalized new cooperation frameworks covering transit, energy flows, and security.
This project would help transform Iraq from a strict oil-rentier economy into an international transit hub, while Türkiye would gain access to a diversified East-West supply network. Türkiye, and foreign oil companies working to supply 180,000 -190,000 barrels per day (bpd) of crude from Kirkuk to Türkiye’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. Turkish officials anticipated an eventual rise to about 230,000 barrels per day, close to the level before the 2023 shutdown. Under the new deal, all crude from KRG fields will be sent to Ceyhan. The arrangement will effectively restore Iraq’s export capacity to nearly 3,600,000 barrels per day. Turkey is also a major beneficiary. Before March 2023, Turkey earned $200-300 million per year in transit revenue from the pipeline. Turkish Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar has emphasized that the 970-kilometer-long line can carry up to 1.5-1.6 million barrels per day. With the revival of exports, Turkey not only recovers lost fees but also reinforces its role as an energy hub between East and West. If all goes according to plan, Iraqi oil will have a new route to world markets, reducing global reliance on potential chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz and the congested Persian Gulf.
In addition to the pipeline deal, Turkey has reached out to other Arab states for energy partnerships, deepening ties with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in particular. In 2023, on a visit to the Gulf, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan signed 13 deals worth $50.7 billion, of which $29.7 billion were dedicated to energy projects, including solar and wind power, green hydrogen and ammonia production, natural gas, and nuclear energy cooperation. Around $27 billion of the UAE package targets the clean energy sector, aligning with Turkey’s 2053 net-zero goal.
Deals signed with Saudi Arabia include cooperation on refined petroleum products and petrochemicals, as well as 4-5 gigawatts of renewable generation capacity in Türkiye. Saudi utility developers could fund new wind and solar parks in Anatolia, while Turkey could benefit from the kingdom’s expertise in mega-project execution. Strategic infrastructure is also on the table: Saudi Arabia is moving to connect its electric grid to Iraq’s, a link that could extend to Turkey in the future.
The UAE’s Masdar, a major clean energy company, and Saudi Arabia’s ACWA Power have both signaled interest in the Turkish renewable venture Fiba. Their potential entry, through equity stakes or joint ventures, could accelerate Turkey’s renewable rollout, helping Ankara meet its target of 65% renewables in installed capacity by 2035. Green hydrogen is another promising arena for cooperation. Turkey aims to produce up to 10.5 million tons of hydrogen annually by 2053 under its climate pledges, and the Gulf nations are also racing to become top hydrogen exporters. Joint hydrogen projects — using Turkish wind power and Gulf solar to produce ammonia fuel for export — could marry each side’s advantages.
These developments intersect with other projects promoting Eurasian connectivity, including China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and, in particular, the Middle Corridor or Trans-Caspian International Transport Route — a network of railways, roads, and ferry links that conveys goods from China to Europe via Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, and Turkey. The Middle Corridor bypasses sanctioned areas, boosting its relevance since the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022.
China has worked with Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkey to improve infrastructure and streamline customs along this path. Turkey, sitting at the corridor’s western end, hopes to integrate the plans with its own logistical investments. As Turkey cements its role as an oil and gas conduit — via pipelines from Azerbaijan, potentially Iraq and the Gulf, and maybe Turkmenistan in the future — China could leverage this for secure energy transport to and from Eurasian markets.
Kazakhstan’s oil is already shipped across the Caspian to Baku and on to Ceyhan, Turkey, for Mediterranean export, and discussions are underway about Turkmenistan sending gas to Turkey’s TANAP pipeline. The planned Development Road through Iraq (supported by Turkey, the UAE, and Qatar) could interface with the Middle Corridor to create a more extensive lattice of trade routes and reduce transit times by ten days compared to the Suez Canal. Chinese officials have publicly noted that the Iraq-Turkey Development Road “stands to complement the Belt and Road Initiative.” However, China has not been a direct stakeholder in funding or building the Development Road so far, leaving Gulf investors and Turkey to take the lead.
The confluence of these trends is reshaping the geopolitical map. Europe and global markets are gaining alternative oil and gas supply routes, while the Middle East’s producers have more export options. By hosting key oil pipelines, negotiating gas deals, and sitting astride both the Middle Corridor and the Development Road, Turkey gains influence that can be leveraged in diplomacy with both East and West. The Gulf states, through strategic investments, are extending their economic influence into Turkey and Iraq, tying the region together. All these playrs are effectively weaving a new East-West trade architecture that is less dependent on traditional nodes like the Suez Canal or Russian railroads.
The reopening of the Iraq-Turkey pipeline, Gulf-Turkey energy partnerships, and the Middle Corridor’s expansion point to an emerging infrastructure network across West and Central Asia that diminishes traditional bottlenecks and empowers regional middle players. Energy flows and trade routes are the sinews of power; as they realign, so, too, does influence. The next few years will test how well these ambitious plans materialize. If they do, the Eurasian continent could see a historic re-routing of commerce, with Ankara, Basra, Dubai, and beyond forming the nodes of a new Silk Road for the 21st century.
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Since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s government by the United States and its allies on April 9, 2003, it is possible to say that the relations between Turkey and Iraq have undergone significant changes with ups and downs along with the changes taking place in the Middle East. In fact, when Turkey’s foreign policy towards Iraq is evaluated, it is possible to state that from 1991 to 2007, Turkey’s foreign policy towards Iraq was solely security-oriented and focused on the PKK terrorist organization. Since 2008, however, Turkey’s Iraq policy has emphasized economic and commercial relations in addition to the fight against terrorism.
However, it should not be forgotten that if the diplomatic sphere is pushed to the background in the relations between the two countries, the economic, trade, and security strategies will be at risk. In this context, a “High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council” agreement was signed in 2008 to increase cooperation in Ankara-Baghdad diplomatic relations. These are important steps that later turned into inclusive relations with 48 memorandums of understanding between Turkey and Iraq in the fields of energy, environment, health, water, border gates, renewal of the Kirkuk oil pipeline, railway and canal connection, agriculture and forestry. ( continued )

 

Dr Mehboob Syed
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