The US Special Forces also
created terrorist groups while the CIA enhanced capacity of contractors (who are
also double agents). We keep on talking about US defeat. Well wherever US has
been its objective in to create anarchy, to de-stabilize. Which is the objective
in Somalia, Sudan, Kurdistan-Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Lebanon, Syria and Pakistan.
The US uses people from inside, and plans this well. Why would one guy be
heading Pentagon and the other CIA and then flip them the other way. The Obama
Administration has to be accused directly for enhancing terrorism (Noble Peace
Prize?). None of our scholars could write to the Norwegian Nobel Committee.
The US control in Latin America has been to perform rubbish under the guise of
drug re-enforcement in Colombia etc. In Cuba it never succeeded, then the attack
was on Venezuela.
What all the "educated" American Analysts fail to notice, is that the US
occupying forces have a time-limit to kill the soul of the poor, weak nations
and then walk away triumphantly. Incidentally, Vietnamese, Iraqis, Afghans and a
dozen other nations' ability to remain defiant outruns the time-limit of the
invaders. Besides, in grossly asymmetric wars, the poor people have nothing to
loose. The greatest possession is their life, which they are willing to
sacrifice so that the soul of their compatriots may remain high and
un-vanquished. The day the Americans understand this, that they cannot subjugate
the soul, pride and freedom of poorer nations, they will truly emerge as the
superpower. Till then they are merely an imperial tyrant no better than the
Roman, Tartar or Nazi hordes!
https://www.counterpunch.org/2012/10/31/afghanistan-the-smell-of-defeat/
Afghanistan
The Smell of Defeat
Mike Whitney, November 1, 2012
“These two visions, one of tyranny and murder, the other of liberty and life,
clashed in Afghanistan. And thanks to brave US and coalition forces and to
Afghan patriots, the nightmare of the Taliban is over and that nation is coming
to life again.”
– George W. Bush, The War College Address, 2004
Not so fast, George.
The United States hasn’t liberated Afghanistan. It hasn’t rebuilt Afghanistan.
It hasn’t removed the warlords from power, curtailed opium production,
established strong democratic institutions, or improved life for ordinary
working people. The US hasn’t achieved any of its strategic objectives. The
Taliban are stronger than ever, the central government is a corrupt farce, and,
after 11 years of war, the country is in shambles.
This is what defeat looks like.
The US military has been defeated by a poorly-armed militia which has
demonstrated a superior grasp of modern warfare and asymmetric engagement. The
Taliban has shown that they are more adaptable, more motivated, and smarter.
That’s why they prevailed. That’s why they beat the world’s most celebrated
army.
Americans don’t like to hear that kind of talk. They’re very proud of their
military and are willing to pay upwards of $1 trillion per year to keep it
outfitted in the most advanced weaponry on earth. But weapons don’t win wars,
neither does propaganda. If they did, the US would have won long ago, but they
don’t. What wins wars is tactics, operations, and strategy, and that’s where the
emphasis must be if one expects to succeed.
Here’s an excerpt from an article by William S. Lind explaining why the US
mission in Afghanistan failed:
“A general rule of warfare is that a higher level trumps a lower, and technique
is the lowest level of all. Our SEALs, Rangers, Delta, SF, and all the rest are
vastly superior to the Taliban or al-Qaeda at techniques. But those opponents
have sometimes shown themselves able at tactics, operations, and strategy. We
can only defeat them by making ourselves superior at those higher levels of war.
There, regrettably, Special Operations Forces have nothing to offer. They are
just another lead bullet in an obsolete Second Generation arsenal.” (What’s so
special about Special Ops?),
- William S. Lind, The American Conservative)
The US military’s high-tech gadgetry and pilotless drones merely disguise the
fact that America is still fighting the last war and hasn’t adapted to the new
reality. Here’s more from Lind expanding on the same theory:
“The greatest intellectual challenge in Fourth Generation war—war against
opponents that are not states—is how to fight it at the operational level. NATO
in Afghanistan, like the Soviets three decades ago, has been unable to solve
that riddle. But the Taliban appears to have done so….
The Soviet army focused its best talent on operational art. But in Afghanistan,
it failed, just as we have failed. Like the Soviets, we can take and hold any
piece of Afghan ground. And doing so brings us, like the Soviets, not one step
closer to strategic victory. The Taliban, by contrast, have found an elegant way
to connect strategy and tactics in decentralized modern warfare.
What passes for NATO’s strategy is to train sufficient Afghan forces to hold off
the Taliban once we pull out. The Taliban’s response has been to have men in
Afghan uniform— many of whom actually are Afghan government soldiers or
police—turn their guns on their NATO advisers. That is a fatal blow against our
strategy because it makes the training mission impossible. Behold operational
art in Fourth Generation war……
The Taliban know this technique is operational, not just tactical. They can be
expected to put all their effort into it. What counter do we have? Just order
our troops to pretend it is not happening—to keep trusting their Afghan
counterparts. That order, if enforced, will put our soldiers in such an
untenable position that morale will collapse.” (“Unfriendly Fire”, William S.
Lind, The American Conservative)
Lind does not underestimate the Taliban or dismiss them as “ignorant goat
herders”. In fact, he appears to admire the way they have mastered 4-G warfare
and routed an enemy that has vastly superior technology, communications and
firepower. It helps to prove his basic thesis that tactics, operations, and
strategy are what matter most.
For more than a decade, the Taliban have been carrying out an impressive
guerrilla war frustrating attempts by the US to establish security, hold ground
or expand the power of the central (Karzai) government. In the last year,
however, the militia’s efforts have paid off as so-called “green on blue”
shootings–where coalition troops have been killed by Afghan soldiers or
policemen–have dashed US plans to maintain a client regime in Kabul when US
combat operations end and American troops withdraw.
The Taliban found the weak-link in the Pentagon’s strategy and has used it to
full advantage. As American Security Project Central and South Asia specialist
Joshua Foust puts it, ‘The training mission is the foundation of the current
strategy. Without that mission, the strategy collapses. The war is adrift, and
it’s hard to see how anyone can avoid a complete disaster at this point.’” (“The
Day we lost Afghanistan”, The National Interest)
TIME TO CUT AND RUN?
The persistent green on blue attacks have convinced US and NATO leaders that the
war cannot be won which is why President Barack Obama has decided to throw in
the towel. Here’s a clip from a speech Obama gave in May at a NATO confab in
Chicago:
“I don’t think that there is ever going to be an optimal point where we say,
this is all done, this is perfect, this is just the way we wanted it and now we
can wrap up all our equipment and go home…Our coalition is committed to this
plan to bring our war in Afghanistan to a responsible end.”
The political class is calling it quits. They’ve decided to cut their losses and
leave.
Here’s how the New York Times summed it up:
“After more than a decade of having American blood spilled in Afghanistan…it is
time for United States forces to leave Afghanistan ….. It should not take more
than a year. The United States will not achieve even President Obama’s narrowing
goals, and prolonging the war will only do more harm….
Administration officials say they will not consider a secure “logistical
withdrawal,” but they offer no hope of achieving broad governance and security
goals. And the only final mission we know of, to provide security for a 2014
Afghan election, seems dubious at best ……the idea of fully realizing broader
democratic and security aims simply grows more elusive….More fighting will not
consolidate the modest gains made by this war, and there seems little chance of
guaranteeing that the Taliban do not “come back in..Post-American Afghanistan is
likely to be more presentable than North Korea, less presentable than Iraq and
perhaps about the same as Vietnam.
But it fits the same pattern of damaging stalemate. We need to exit as soon as
we safely can.
America’s global interests suffer when it is mired in unwinnable wars in distant
regions.” (“Time to Pack Up”, New York Times)
Notice how the Times fails to mention the War on Terror, al Qaida, or Bin Laden,
all of which were used to garner support for the war. What matters now is
“America’s global interests”. That’s quite a reversal, isn’t it?
What happened to the steely resolve to fight the good fight for as long as it
takes; to liberate Afghan women, to spread democracy to far-flung Central Asia,
and to crush the fanatical Taliban once and for all? Was it all just empty
posturing aimed at ginning up the war machine and swaying public opinion?
And look how easy it is for the Times to do a 180 when just months ago they were
trying to persuade readers that we should hang-in-there to protect Afghan women.
Take a look at this August 2012 editorial titled “The Women of Afghanistan”:
“Afghanistan can be a hard and cruel land, especially for women and girls. Many
fear they will be even more vulnerable to harsh tribal customs and the men who
impose them after American troops withdraw by the end of 2014.
Womens’ rights have made modest but encouraging gains over the past decade. But
these could disappear without a strong commitment to preserve and advance them
from Afghan leaders, Washington and other international partners….
…all Afghans should be invested in empowering women. As Mrs. Clinton has argued,
there is plenty of evidence to show that no country can grow and prosper in
today’s world if women are marginalized and oppressed.” (“The Women of
Afghanistan”, New York Times)
Ahh, but lending a hand to “marginalized and oppressed” women doesn’t really
hold a candle to “America’s global interests”, now does it? As one might expect,
the Times most heartfelt feelings are shaped by political expediency. In any
event, the Times tacit admission proves that the war was never really about
liberating women or spreading democracy or even killing bin Laden. It was about
“America’s global interests”, particularly, pipeline corridors, mineral
extraction and the Great Game, controlling real estate in thriving Eurasia, the
economic center of the next century. That’s why the US invaded Afghanistan, the
rest is propaganda.
There’s one other glaring omission in the Times article that’s worth noting. The
editors tiptoe around the one word that most accurately summarises the
situation: Defeat. The United States is not leaving Afghanistan voluntarily. It
was defeated. The US military was defeated in the same way that the IDF was
defeated by Hezbollah in the summer of 2006, by underestimating the tenacity,
the skill, the ferocity, the adaptability, and the intelligence of their
adversary. That’s why Israel lost the war in Lebanon. And that’s why the US lost
the war in Afghanistan.
There’s a reason why the media won’t use the term defeat however applicable it
may be. It’s because your average “Joe” understands defeat, the shame of defeat,
the sting of defeat, the anger of defeat. Defeat is a repudiation of leadership,
proof that we are ruled by fools and scoundrels. Defeat is also a powerful
deterrent, the idea festers in people’s minds and turns them against foreign
interventions, police actions and war. That’s why the Times won’t utter the
word, because defeat is the antidote for aggression, and the Times doesn’t want
that. None of the media do.
But the truth is, the United States was defeated in Afghanistan.
If we can grasp that fact, then maybe can stop the next war before it gets
started.