Comparison of Performance of
Anti-corruption Agencies in Pakistan and
Lately the idea of having one central anti-corruption agency has caught the
imagination of the anti-corruption strategists. This interest in central
agencies is result of tremendous success achieved by these kinds of agencies in
two Asian countries Hong Kong and Singapore. Singapore was the first to
establish a central anti-corruption agency, Corrupt Practices Investigation
Bureau. Hong Kong established Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC)
in 1974. Success of Hong Kong model initiated a trend of single anti-corruption
agencies. By now 30-40 countries have this kind of single agencies (Meagher
2004). Pakistan followed suit by establishing National Accountability Bureau
(NAB) in 1999. But this lesson drawing has not served Pakistan well. Recently
there has been increasing realization of the failure of NAB, both within and
outside the agency. The agency’s 2006 annual report terms its efforts as “losing
battle against growing mass of corruption” (p-1) . The present essay will
compare the performance of Pakistan’s National Accountability Bureau to its
counterpart in Hong Kong, ICAC. The reason for the comparison is outstanding
success of ICAC which will help us to find out some of the causes for failure of
NAB. The essay contends that strong popular support and interactive patterns of
working has made ICAC a success whereas lack of political will, democratic
legitimacy and secretive style of working have contributed to NAB’s failure. It
is important to note that ICAC and NAB are performing many functions related to
anti-corruption. For example ICAC is performing three functions: prevention,
education and investigation. NAB also performs all these three and some more
functions. But due to limitations of the study (time constraint and word limit)
we will limit our discussion only to the investigative function of these
agencies. The reason for selecting investigative function out of three is its
fundamental role for creating deterrence against corruption.
For comparing the performance of agencies we need to have some sort of criteria
for assessment of performance. The essay will use the performance indicators
developed by The New Public Management. These performance indicators can be
divided as resource management criteria and social right criteria (Mulgan 2006).
Resource management criteria as economy, efficiency and effectiveness have been
drawn from private sector managerial practices where bottom-line goals of
organization are always very clear. Assessing performance of public
organizations on these criteria poses two types of problems. First public sector
organizations often work with ambiguous organizational goals where bottom-line
is constantly mobile. Secondly data necessary to measure performance against
these criteria is not always available. Especially for anti corruption agencies
it is inherently complex to have any sort of objective assessment due to
complexity of goals and mission. For example the criterion of ‘economy’ reflects
the desire that public dollar should go further (Wanna et al 1992). For a
private sector enterprise it is very easy to translate and measure economy in
terms of lowering cost of production per unit. In public sector too it can be
helpful in assessing the performance of agencies who are dealing with purchase
and provision of goods and services for public consumptions. Purchasing the
goods of similar quality and in same number in fewer prices is being economical.
However measuring the performance of an anti corruption agency in these terms
would mean comparing the budget allocated to total number of arrests made or
convictions achieved by the organization. In this sense rate of convictions per
dollar or rate of arrests per dollar will be used as performance indicator: the
higher the rate of convictions per dollar the better the performance. But is it
reasonable to see the performance of an anti-corruption agency in these terms?
Are prosecutions and arrests an end in themselves for an anti-corruption agency
or means to an end? It is crucial for any sort of performance criteria to be
both measurable and relevant because “not everything that counts can be counted
and not everything that can be counted counts. ” Rates like arrests per dollar
or convictions per dollar are easy to measure but they do not tell us anything
about level of deterrence achieved by these arrests and convictions. Infact
similar sort of questions can also be raised about the other two resource
management criteria. ‘Efficiency’ is concerned with relationship of inputs and
outputs. Instead of monetary inputs here we can use number of complaints as
inputs and number of cases filed or number of convictions achieved as outputs.
Efficiency in this case will be measured by such indicators as number of cases
filed per complaint or convictions achieved per complaint. Similarly
‘effectiveness’ of an organization is measured by the assessment of quality of
out put and whether pre-determined goals are achieved (Wanna et al 1992). For an
anti-corrution agency pre-determined goal is to achieve deterrence against
corruption. Quality of the out put will be judged against this criterion of
deterrence. Obviously arrests and prosecutions are means to the end of creating
deterrence against corruption. But the crucial question is to measure the degree
of deterrence a particular arrest or conviction or a number of arrests or
convictions have achieved. It is almost impossible to relate the number of
arrests or convictions to more or less deterrence. Arrest or conviction of one
‘big fish’ might be able to achieve more deterrence than hundreds of arrests or
convictions of ‘small fry’. Annual reports by these agencies tend to see their
performances in the light of same resource management criteria. Following table
compares the performance of NAB and ICAC in the light of quantitative data given
by the agencies in their annual reports for 2005. It is important to admit that
the data given by these agencies is not consistent and many times incomplete.
Year 2005 ICAC NAB
No of graft reports 3685 12255
Complaints addressed 3685 10356
Investigations authorized Not Available 721
Investigation finalized 3274 317
Money recovered Not applicable 882.9 million PRs
Arrests made 839 1115
Cases file Not Applicable 144
Conviction rate 81 % 48.1%
It is easier to compare common available figures and draw our conclusions. For
example ICAC has received 3685 complaints this year. It has been able to address
all of them. Out of 3022 pursuable complaints only 77 are pending. As compared
to this NAB is able to address 84.50 percentage of complaints hence performance
of ICAC is better or ICAC has arrested 839 persons while NAB has arrested 1115
persons hence NAB’s performance is better. But this sort of comparison does not
seem reasonable because of at least two reasons. First the data given by these
agencies is often both incomplete and inconsistent. Moreover there is no
independent evaluation of data hence it may be inaccurate too. Secondly despite
being anti-corruption agencies the nature of job for agencies is different in
some respects. For example there is separation of investigation and prosecution
in ICAC but NAB performs both these functions. Hence ICAC’s greater rate of
conviction can be attributed to ICAC’s good quality of investigation or good
work by another agency that is Secretary of Law and his prosecutors. Neither of
the agencies gives any information about the nature of cases filed and the
nature of convictions achieved. Hence we do not know what contribution these
activities have made towards achievement of the ultimate mission, creating
deterrence against corruption. Similarly NAB seems to be more focused on
recovering looted money by using its powers of plea bargain . Its annual report
presents the amount of money recovered as an indicator of success (p-27). There
is no similar provision in ICAC law. Due to this kind of practical difficulties
of measurement and relevance it does not seem possible to achieve any meaningful
comparison using resource management criteria.
What then can serve our purpose of comparison? According to our view social
right or social outcome measures can better serve our purpose of comparison. The
qualitative nature of the mission of these agencies is better suited to be
assessed by these social indicators. Social right or social outcome criteria
include equity, accountability and electability. The ultimate end for any
anti-corruption effort is to enhance accountability and promote equity. Absence
of accountability is one key factor promoting corruption (Klitgaard 1988). If an
agent believes that he can use his powers without being accountable to principal
he will tend to indulge in corruption but if he has to be accountable for his
actions he will not tend to indulge in corruption.
‘Equity' involves treating everyone equally with out any sort of favour or
prejudice. Corruption is bad because it creates incentives for being
in-equitable. Hence anti-corruption effort is naturally believed to promote
equity. Wanna et al (1992) believe that ‘electability’ (promoting chances of
incumbent government to get re-elected) is ‘informal and unstated’ performance
indicator for any government organization. This is not true for an
anti-corruption agency. Any sort of link with electoral politics is fatal to
credibility of any such organization. Hence ‘electability’ can serve and should
serve as negative performance indicator for any anti-corruption agency.
The social right criteria are certainly relevant but are they measurable too?
How can we know that anti-corruption effort in particular country by a
particular agency is able to achieve equity or accountability? According to our
view there can be no definitive quantitative measures to gauge existence or
non-existence of equity or accountability or changes in them. They are more of
intangible states of mind than tangible quantities. They exist in perceptions of
the people. For knowing that equity or accountability exists or have improved as
result of anti-corruption effort we have to rely on perceptions of the people.
Measuring the success or otherwise of anti-corruption effort is very similar to
measuring the existence or non-existence of corruption. Larmour et al (2004)
have rightly noted that “The amount of corruption is in principal hard to
assess….The amount of corruption is also partly a question of perception….Like
crime, the rate is hard to assess from police reports and successful
prosecutions.” Hence the existence or non-existence of corruption is measured by
measuring the perceptions of people. Transparency International‘s corruption
perception index uses surveys to measure the perceptions about corruption.
Similar sort of perception indices can be used to gauge the success of any
anti-corruption agency. Mark Schacter has tried to develop one such set of
indicators to measure the success of accountability agencies which are quite
similar in type to those used by Transparency (Schacter 1999). An alternate
method of measuring the success of anti-corruption effort can be to measure it
in a negative way by using the falling corruption perception index as indicator
of success of anti-corruption effort. Here the comparison of corruption
perception index scores of the countries can serve the purpose of comparing the
success of anti-corruption agencies. Infact for our discussion of social out
comes changing perceptions are more important than the hard figures about
prosecutions and convictions. If an anti-corruption agency is successful in
changing perceptions about the level of corruption in a country the hard part of
work is done. According to these criteria ICAC has been tremendous success.
Performance of NAB is not up to expectations in this regard too. Following table
gives a comparison of corruption perception indices calculated by the
Transparency international regarding both the countries for years 1995-2005 .
Year CPI score for Hong Kong CPI score for Pakistan
1995 7.12 2.2
1996 7.01 1.00
1997 7.28 2.5
1998 7.8 2.7
1999 7.7 2.2
2000 7.7 Not available
2001 7.9 2.3
2002 8.2 2.6
2003 8.0 2.5
2004 8.0 2.1
2005 8.3 2.1
The continuously rising score in corruption perception index for Hong Kong
reflects the rising confidence of people in ICAC .This serves as a kind of
independent confirmation of figures given in annual report of ICAC about rising
number of non-anonymous complaints which is also an expression of confidence in
the organization. In the case of Pakistan there is no change in score of
corruption perception index. Infact for last two years the score is falling
further down. This decrease in corruption perception index score means that NAB
has failed even in arresting the growth of corruption, not to talk of decreasing
it. The comparison would have been more appropriate if the data about the
formative years of ICAC have been available. Because it can be argued that ICAC
has become of age while NAB is “still a sibling” (NAB annual report 2005, p-1).
It is true that organizations take time to establish but six years is not that
short a period. At least for arresting the growth of corruption six years should
be enough. Most importantly it is impossible to find any excuse for rise in
corruption which is shown by the Transparency’s data.
Another important issue related to the performance of these agencies is their
ability and success in promoting culture of good governance in the country.
Controlling their own officials and observing good governance values in their
own set up is the minimum expected of these agencies. The goal for them is to
promote a culture of good governance in their respective countries. Such an aim,
infact, is part of the very rationale for having an anti-corruption agency.
Corruption is not despised mainly for the amount involved but for the vicious
cycle of undesirable consequences it generates. Similarly the success of
anti-corruption agencies should not be measured by numbers and amounts but by
their ability to generate a virtuous cycle of socially desirable consequences.
An assessment based on this criterion can be helpful in making a meaningful
comparison of performance of the agencies. The world wide governance indicators
developed and published by the World Bank can serve the purpose of such a
comparison . The World Bank uses six aggregate indicators for measuring the
quality of governance. Following tables compare the data produced by the World
Bank regarding all the six indicators for Hong Kong and Pakistan.
A: Voice and accountability
Country Year
1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005
Hong Kong 0.49 -0.30 -0.52 0.16 0.41 0.22 0.26
Pakistan -1.06 -0.68 -1.57 -1.12 -1.18 -1.31 -1.23
B: Political stability
Country Year
1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005
Hong Kong 0.08 0.64 0.99 0.91 0.97 1.20 1.19
Pakistan -1.41 -1.21 -0.88 -1.51 -1.58 -1.67 -1.68
C: Government effectiveness
Country Year
1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005
Hong Kong 1.93 1.55 1.13 1.38 1.40 1.56 1.63
Pakistan -0.39 -0.74 -0.53 -0.57 -0.56 -0.52 -0.53
D: Regulatory quality
Country Year
1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005
Hong Kong 1.75 1.44 1.72 1.43 1.75 1.88 1.89
Pakistan -0.54 -0.20 -0.81 -0.83 -0.78 -0.89 -0.60
E: Rule of law
Country Year
1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005
Hong Kong 1.67 1.52 1.44 1.17 1.33 1.38 1.50
Pakistan -0. 49 -0.79 -0.75 -0.75 -0.69 -0.83 -0.81
F: Control of corruption
Country Year
1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005
Hong Kong 1.64 1.67 1.43 1.45 1.49 1.56 1.68
Pakistan -1.04 -0.82 -0.94 -0.85 -0.76 -1.06 -1.01
Data clearly shows the huge difference in governance indicators for both the
countries. Pakistan is conspicuous by negative performance in all the
indicators. Notably the corruption control indicator is also negative despite
six years of work by NAB.
After looking into dwindling performance by the anti-corruption icon in
Pakistan, it is pertinent to look into some of the causes of this dismal
performance.
According to Professor Qua (1999) political will is pre-requisite for success of
any anti-corruption agency. Without backing from the highest political echelons
these institutions can not work effectively. ICAC came into being as result of a
popular demand and it is able to build upon this popular base through elaborate
systems of checks and balances. Infact winning popular support is one basic
element of strategy of ICAC (Speville 1997). The simple fact that over the years
number of non-anonymous complaints is increasing speaks volumes about the public
confidence in the organization. This is one example of positive social outcomes.
Instead of acquiescence people now are prepared to take corruption upfront. One
key factor for this soaring confidence is organization’s willingness to fry the
big fish. Unfortunately NAB lacks the political will and democratic legitimacy.
Instead of popular demand it was established by a new government. People tend to
associate this sort of organizations with their creator government rather than
with their agenda. Infact this legitimacy crisis is two fold for NAB because it
is established by a military government who by definition is illegitimate.
Moreover lack of political will to fry the big fish has badly tarnished the
credibility of the institution. In order to enhance ‘electability ’ of the
government some big fish were set free (Khan et al 2004).
Equity is achieved in ICAC through its ability to address all complaints. NAB
however is able to investigate only less than 10 percent complaints (Annual
report 2005, p-1). Complaints are selected according to a prioritisation policy
(DG’s policy conference 2006). This prioritization policy is known only to the
organization itself. Infact NAB was doomed to selectivity from its very
inception because it is selectively empowered to investigate corruption cases.
Two important organizations military and judiciary are outside its purview.
Similarly ICAC’s structure and working is more accountability friendly. It is
responsible to Chief Executive, Executive Council and The Legislative Council.
Its operations are under effective civil society checks through four committees
of citizens. These committees produce their own reports. An internal monitoring
wing, L group caters all the complaints against ICAC officials. Reports of this
group are discussed in operations review committee headed by a citizen and then
the Secretary of law examines these reports. Another independent committee
headed by a member of legislative council also entertains complaints against
staff of ICAC. In addition to this separation of powers of investigation and
prosecution also ensures the accountability of ICAC investigators .
NAB, in complete contrast, is answerable to none. The law only binds it to
produce an annual report and present it to the President . There is no
separation of powers. The organization both investigates and prosecutes. Infact
there is serious attempt to weaken the judicial accountability too by creating
special accountability courts under the same law which has established this
organization. Specially empowered judges are appointed to these courts. This
obsession with ‘unity of command’ has created working cultures which is
secretive. Decision making is internalized and there is no mechanism for
feedback. Recently announced policy statements profess to make decision making
more inclusive . But the decision boards announced all comprise of officers from
the agency. Infact the structure and working pattern of the agency represent the
colonial mind set of ‘patriarchal benevolence’ rather than democratic
responsibility.
Analysis of our case studies clearly shows that ICAC’s superior performance is
result of political commitment, popular support and its interactive working
pattern. Pakistani agency lacks in all these areas, hence its performance is
dismal.
References
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