Rehan Mushtaq
The ongoing Indian hostility on the Line of Control and the Working Boundary is
the third major escalation after the 2003 ceasefire. The first one was in 2008
after the Mumbai attack while the second one occurred during 2012-13 when India
alleged that the Pakistan Army had killed two soldiers and beheaded one. In all
the three confrontations, the pattern of escalation however remained singular.
In 2008, after the Mumbai attack, the Indians won sympathies of the world
community; so its main reliance was on the international diplomacy aimed at
pressurizing Pakistan to accept the Indian demands. It nevertheless failed
despite sympathies, and the incident still haunts the Indian ego.
During the 2012-13 escalation, the India army escalated hostilities on the
border in order to provoke the Pakistan army and put pressure Islamabad, and it
went to the extent of warning the people of Kashmir of a possible nuclear attack
through newspaper advertisement suggesting precautionary measures. However,
practically India kept the escalation restricted to LoC and that too to a
specific sector.
The situation deescalated after the talks between the two countries’ respective
DGMOs but India remained visibly unsatisfied. The BJP (Bharatya Janata Party)
that was not in the government then put a lot of pressure on the ruling Congress
coalition and yelled as if it were in the government, it would have launched
attack on Pakistan.
With this background, the present escalation is different from the earlier two
escalations, both in character and scope. Until this time, the escalation has
mainly confined to the Working Boundary in which the Indians are targeting the
civilians and they are disproportionately aggressive.
Interestingly, the Indians have not come up with any specific reason other than
saying that Pakistan first started the crossfire. Similarly, though, on the
Pakistani side, the Director General of the Punjab Rangers has termed the
present escalation a “mini war” but has not given a rationale of the Indian
hostilities. The question is what are the drivers of current Indian
belligerency?
Of late, the Indian strategic community is increasingly presenting a view that
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons do not prohibit New Delhi from initiating military
operations in response to the aggression traced back to Pakistan. The Indians
insist that Pakistan’s dissatisfaction with the status quo in Kashmir and its
negative conventional force differential with India might lead it to use nuclear
weapons as a shield, challenging the territorial division of Kashmir without
fear of an all out-retaliation.
Simultaneously, the Indian lobbyists blame that Pakistan uses the crises
resulting from its provocative behavior to attract outside attention to its
dispute with India. Therefore, it was not a surprise when on October 12, 2014 an
Indian retired Lieutenant General, Raj Kadyan, told the Capital Talk show host,
“…the world is not any more interested in Kashmir and India needs to call
Pakistanis’ bluff that there is no space for war between the two nuclear armed
nations.” He was parroting the same viewpoint with visible frustration, knowing
Pakistan is in no mood to acknowledge his fallacies.
So the current escalation needs to be seen in four different ways. Firstly, the
BJP, being from hyperrealist’s school, prefers dealing with the security threats
by flexing military muscles – India is in search for a position of military
advantage.
Secondly, domestic politics, elections in Maharashtra and Haryana, require BJP
to show highhandedness in its dealing with Pakistan.
Thirdly a strategic signaling, that India can handle Pakistan irrespective of
international consequences. Fourthly, this could be a plot to divert Pakistan
army’s attention from Operation Zarb-e-Azb, which is fast leading to successful
outcomes, in order to dent the decisive phase of war against terrorism.
Normatively, these drivers sound coherent but experience suggests that such a
behavior could lead India to an Escalation Trap. These military actions like
other Compellence efforts by India since 2008 will fail and with it, Indian
deterrent postures will succumb to “progressive entropy of threat” and
eventually these acts will be perceived as empty rants.
Besides, India must stop breeding its people over staple of hatred with
Pakistan. The Gujarat Model will not work here. Pakistanis are not like
downtrodden Gujarati Muslims, who after getting severe beating came around and
voted for BJP. Modi must read Sheikha Gakkar, Dulla Bhatti, Chakar Khan and
Khushal Khan Khattak to understand Pakistan’s “rationality of being irrational”.
India, under BJP, is fast undergoing transformation in its strategic thinking –
from Gandhian to Kautilayan school of thought. The emerging parabellum culture
will encourage the Indian strategic community to perceive force as the preferred
route to security. India, in future is expected to leverage military power
differential vis-à-vis Pakistan to operationalize its Compellence strategy;
current escalation along Working Boundary is a material dimension of such a
capability demonstration.
India’s inability to understand that such a Compellence strategy does not ensure
ready-made desirable outcomes. Sniffing space-for-war in such a manner will
pilot India towards unintended consequences. Its obsession to dominate Pakistan,
like its other neighbors, is a strategic naivety at best, projecting India as a
destabilizing factor in South Asia.
(The writer is student of strategic studies at the NDU, Islamabad)