Note : It is not necessary to
agree on the writings of these topics.
Related six points are as follows,
1- The Definition of Insanity Is U.S. AfPak Strategy.
2- Saudi Arabia's Oil War With Russia.
3- Putin Weaves a Tangled Mideast Web.
4- Russian cooperation with Iran and Iraq has broader consequences than saving
Assad.
5- China Ready To Use Military Force If US Violates Its Territorial Waters.
6- Are Cuban Troops Backing Up Putin and Assad in Syria?
(i) The Definition of Insanity Is U.S. AfPak Strategy.
Donald Trump is right: America’s leaders are stupid. They’re nothing but a bunch
of losers. Well, at least when it comes to Afghanistan and Pakistan. That’s the
only conclusion to be reached following two big developments this week.
The first was President Barack Obama’s announcement that the United States will
decelerate its military drawdown from Afghanistan. Instead of preserving only a
small force of about 1,000 troops, the new plan will station 9,800 in the
country until 2016 and 5,500 into 2017. Their mission will be limited to
training Afghan forces and supporting counterterrorism operations. This will
help promote, in Obama’s words, an “Afghan-led reconciliation process” leading
to a “lasting political settlement” that will make Kabul “a stable and committed
ally.”
Sharif offers little help. Anti-government protests engineered by the Army in
2014 forced him to relinquish foreign and security policy to the military, in
what many Pakistani commentators described as a “soft coup.” Today, few
seriously believe that the prime minister calls the shots in Islamabad.
Why does the United States shy away from confronting Pakistan about its
continued export of terrorism? The simple answer is nukes. Pakistan has been
steadily increasing fissile material for its nuclear stockpile and now produces
enough for between 16 and 20 warheads per year. Its justification was initially
New Delhi’s nuclear program, except that India produces material for only around
5 warheads per year. India has a stockpile of an estimated 90 to 110 warheads in
reserve; Pakistan is thought to have between 110 and 130 (though some experts
believe it’s possible “to calculate a number twice this size”). But it’s not an
arms race if only one party is racing.
(ii) Saudi Arabia's Oil War With Russia.
As President Vladimir Putin tries to restore Russia as a major player in the
Middle East, Saudi Arabia is starting to attack on Russia's traditional stomping
ground by supplying lower-priced crude oil to Poland.
At a recent investment forum, Igor Sechin, chief executive of Rosneft, Russia's
biggest oil company, complained about the Saudis' entry into the Polish market.
"They're dumping actively," he said. Other Russian oil executives are worried,
too. "Isn't this move a first step toward a redivision of Western markets?"
Nikolai Rubchenkov, an executive at Tatneft, said at an oil roundtable Thursday.
"Shouldn't the government's energy strategy contain some measures to safeguard
Russia's interests in its existing Western markets?"
European traders and refiners confirm that Saudi Arabia has been offering its
oil at significant discounts, making it more attractive than Russian crude. And,
even though most eastern European refineries are now technologically dependent
on the Russian crude mix, Russia's oilmen are right to be worried.
In the 1970s, Saudi Arabia sent half of its oil to Europe, but then the Soviet
Union built export pipelines from its abundant West Siberian oil fields, and the
Saudis switched to Asian markets, where demand was growing and better prices
could be had. The Saudi share of the European crude market kept dropping; in
2009, it reached a nadir of 5.9 percent. Russia's share peaked at 34.8 percent
in 2011. In recent years, Saudi Arabia slowly increased its presence, reaching a
8.6 percent share in 2013, but it had never tried its luck in Poland.
Like most of central and eastern Europe, Poland has long been a client of
Russian oil companies. Last year, about three-quarters of its fuel imports came
from Russia, with the rest from Kazakhstan and European countries. Poland,
however, is at the center of efforts to reduce the European Union's dependence
on Russian energy. Since Putin annexed Crimea from Ukraine last year, Poland,
Ukraine's neighbor, has increased military expenditures and other efforts to
shore up its security. It's working with its smaller neighbors, too. On
Thursday, it announced an agreement with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia to build
a natural gas pipeline to and from the Baltic States, ensuring their future
independence from Russian gas supplies.
In this context, a new and reliable supplier is a godsend. As for the Saudis,
they need to expand outside Asia where demand is falling.
The Kremlin and Russian oilmen have long sensed Europe's appetite for energy
diversification and have sought new markets. Until the 2000s, almost all Russian
oil exports were to Europe. By last year, that share had shrunk to less than
two-thirds:
In the Asian markets, Russia became a serious competitor to the Saudis. In May,
Russian crude supplies to China even temporarily surpassed those of Saudi
Arabia. Now that the Saudis are involved in a ruthless price war for market
share -- not just with U.S. shale oil producers but with all suppliers who are
not members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting countries -- they are
moving into Russia's traditional market.
This could turn into a more active shoving match between the world's two biggest
oil exporters, which already are at odds over the Syrian conflict. So far, OPEC
and the International Energy Agency predict modest demand expansion next year,
but if the Chinese economy continues performing worse than expected, that market
may become too small for the Russians and the Saudis. Both economies are
oil-dependent and retaining market share is a matter of survival.
Oil competition is a dangerous undercurrent in Putin's Middle Eastern policy.
The Russian leader hopes that when its ally Iran re-enters the global oil and
gas market, Russia will somehow share in the profits, perhaps through new
pipelines across Syria. He also wants to stop the Saudis from establishing
export routes in Syria. Now that Russian energy supremacy in Europe also is at
stake, Putin's determination to resolve the Syrian conflict on his terms can
only grow.
(iii) Putin Weaves a Tangled Mideast Web.
It’s been three weeks of watching Vladimir Putin begin to make his mark on the
situation in Syria. Although it’s still early days, we can already see hints of
how his moves are complicating U.S. calculations, changing the force balance in
Syria and dividing the region.
Syria holds grave risks for anyone who touches it, Putin’s situation does not
yet feel like the “quagmire” U.S. officials have asserted he is heading into. To
be sure, outsiders like Putin can always get sucked into civil wars, but for now
he is deploying small numbers — several thousand military personnel and several
dozen combat aircraft and other weaponry
The real loser in the last three week’s events, though, is Syria. The conflict
is more polarized than ever, the few moderate groups are taking heavy losses,
and the flow of refugees could reach 4.27 million by the end of the year
according to the U.N. (up from 100,000 in 2012).
And of course, though all politics may be local, geopolitics never is. Russia’s
intervention is roiling the entire region. Sunni Arabs worry that Putin’s
alliance with Shiite Iran gives Tehran new clout; Saudi Arabia, on the other
hand, is so far the only nation forcefully speaking out against Russia.
Meanwhile, Egypt, the world’s largest Arab nation, has actually endorsed the
Russian intervention, in part because Cairo faces a strong IS-linked insurgency
in the Sinai Peninsula.
(iv) Russian cooperation with Iran and Iraq has broader consequences than saving
Assad.
The sudden launch of Russia's military operations in Syria late last month
caught the United States and regional players by surprise.
It began with an announcement that defined the primary objective of the mission
as a confrontation with the Islamic State (ISIS) in cooperation with the Syrian
government of President Bashar Assad.
The strategy involves three components. First, Russia is expanding its military
facilities in Syria. Second, Russia remains committed to the survival of Assad's
regime and its fight against ISIS in Syria. Third, Russia announced an
intelligence sharing and flight corridor agreement with Iran and Iraq.
So far Western governments and commentators have focused on the first and second
components of the new Russian strategy. The third part, however, is equally
significant for the course of geopolitical developments in the region and
deserves a more detailed analysis.
The balance of power tilts
This agreement serves two important objectives. It enhances the capability of
all three governments in their fight against ISIS. It also creates a valuable
flight route between Russia and Syria. Since some European countries, such as
Bulgaria, have closed their space to Russian military flights, access to Syria
via Iran and Iraq is crucial for Moscow's Middle East strategy.
Russia has already used the air space of Iran and Iraq not only for flights to
Syria but also to fire cruise missiles from the Caspian Sea at several Syrian
targets.
While so far the objective of this Russian cooperation with Iran and Iraq is
relatively modest, it can have significant implications for US relations with
both countries. It will also be significant for Turkey and the relative balance
of power in the ongoing proxy war between Iran and Saudi-led Sunni countries.
The impact of this Russian strategy in Iraq will be mostly on domestic politics
and the relative balance of power among competing factions in Baghdad. For Iran,
on the other hand, the cooperation with Russia will primarily affect the foreign
policy environment and the dynamics of its ongoing tensions with United States
and Saudi Arabia. Let's look at some of these implications in more detail.
Iraq: a battle of benefactors
Iraq's decision to participate in this agreement was supported by only some
factions in Iraq's fragmented political scene.
The disagreements about joining this accord represented the latest episode of
the struggle between Iraq's Shiite prime minister, Haider Abadi, who seeks
stronger coordination with the United States, and his Shiite rivals, who are
suspicious of the American role and prefer to rely on Iranian (Shiite) support.
These factions believe that the US could have done more to fight ISIS and Sunni
militants. They also advocate closer ties with Iran and now Russia.
During the last couple of months, Abadi sought to strengthen his position by
adopting a reformist agenda and increasing coordination with the US military in
the battle of Anbar. He was getting closer to adopting a version of the US plan
to establish the Provincial National Guards as an autonomous Sunni force.
Iranian-backed militias in the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) rejected this
initiative and even issued a common statement opposing further American
involvement in the military effort against ISIS.
In this context, the agreement seems to have challenged the course that Abadi
has recently taken, which raises serious questions about the extent to which the
prime minister controls major military decisions. A report published on
September 30 by the Lebanese newspaper al-Akhbar, which is known for being close
to Iran-backed Hezbollah, confirmed the escalating tension between Abadi and his
rivals.
According to the report, Abadi was trying to minimize the scope of cooperation
in this agreement and reduce it to the exchange of intelligence. He also
insisted on having full authority in appointing Iraq's representatives in the
common committee that was established in Baghdad and included military
representatives from the four countries (Russia, Syria, Iraq and Iran).
This report also claims that the committee will be headed by Iran's military
consul in Baghdad. In turn, powerful groups within the PMF, such as the Badr
Organization and other Iranian-backed Shiite militias demanded to have the right
to choose their own representatives.
Russia itself has long sought to restore its strategic and military relationship
with Iraq.
In recent years Russia has offered a large array of military hardware to Iraq
that the US has refused to sell it (such as military helicopters in 2013 and
Su25s fighter aircraft). If Russia proves effective in enhancing Iraq's security
against ISIS and Sunni militants, its military and economic ties with Iraq will
be strengthened at the expense of pro-Western factions of the Iraqi political
elite.
Furthermore, if the conflict escalates and Russia demands more logistical and
ground force support from Iraq, the ability of the government to accommodate
both US and Russian military involvements and maintain a coordinated anti-ISIS
strategy would be greatly weakened.
The Shiite-dominated government might use the Russian involvement, which comes
without obligations on its internal politics, to confront US pressures to adopt
a more inclusive policy towards the Sunnis. But if Iraq increase its dependence
on Russian support, Abadi's pro-US position may be weakened and so his ability
to survive politically. Hence, if this coordination does not yield quick
results, it might well cause further internal divisions.
Iran: growing leverage over Russia and the region
Differences exist between hardline conservatives and the more pragmatic faction
led by President Hassan Rouhani over the extent of cooperation between Iran and
Russia. Yet there appears to have been little opposition to the agreement to
share intelligence and permit Russian military aircraft access to Iranian
airspace.
Through a number of high-ranking military visits in recent months, Iran
encouraged Russia to take a more active role in support of the Syrian regime. It
was also instrumental in securing Iraq's cooperation.
If Russian involvement in Syria intensifies, which seems to be the case, it will
have to expand its military cooperation with Iran. This will give Iran more
leverage in its economic and military relations with Russia.
There are already indications that Russian air operations against opponents of
the Assad regime will be complemented by additional ground troops that Iran and
its regional allies will provide. Under these circumstances, Russia will be more
likely to accept Iran's long-standing request for the S-300 air defense system
and other advanced systems.
Access to advanced Russian (and perhaps Chinese) weapons reduces Iran's risk of
facing a surprise military strike by its regional adversaries (Israel and Saudi
Arabia).
Furthermore, if the US concludes that Iran has violated the recent nuclear
agreement, it will find it more difficult to seek Russian support for a new
round of international sanctions as long as Russia relies on Iran for the
success of its operations in Syria. For the same reason, Russia is likely to
boost Iran's defenses against any attempt by the US to carry out military
operation against Iran's nuclear assets if the deal fails.
Iran's cooperation with Russia will also strengthen its position in the ongoing
proxy war with Saudi Arabia and its allies. Not only will it become more
difficult for Saudi Arabia and Turkey to remove the Assad regime, but they will
be more hesitant to escalate the level of current tensions with Iran.
Previously, if the proxy war with Saudi Arabia was to escalate into a direct
military confrontation, the Saudis would have had the upper hand militarily by
relying on the support of the United States against an isolated Iran.
It is for this reason that Iran has carefully avoided an escalation with Saudi
Arabia and refrained from confronting its military operations in Bahrain and
Yemen.
Closer military ties with Russia and access to advanced Russian military
hardware might, however, alter the balance of power and make Iran more willing
to challenge Saudi operations against its allies.
Finally, Iran might also be able to secure Russian support for several other
demands.
For more than a decade, for example, Iran has sought to join the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) as a full member, but Russia and China have only
accepted it as an observer nation. Russia now is more likely to support Iran's
bid for full membership. If Iran is admitted as a full member, then it will be
able to rely more on strategic support from Russia and China in future tensions
with the US and its European allies.
The bottom line
For as long as Russia's military operations in Syria continue, it will have to
rely on the cooperation of Iran and Iraq. As a result it will have to be more
sensitive to these countries' demands for diplomatic and military support.
This Russian support, in turn, will strengthen the regional position of Iran and
its allies in Iraq, and is likely to weaken prime minister Abadi and reduce his
influence in domestic and foreign policy decisions.
(v) China Ready To Use Military Force If US Violates Its Territorial Waters.
As the U.S. mulls sending warships within 12 miles of the artificial islands
built by China in the South China Sea, Beijing has issued a stern warning to
Washington. On Tuesday, the U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter said the U.S.
will sail and fly wherever international laws allow, and the South China Sea is
no exception.
China will not tolerate U.S. violations
On Thursday, Chinese media slammed the U.S. for its “ceaseless provocations.”
The Global Times, a mouthpiece of the Communist Party, said in an editorial that
China will not “tolerate rampant U.S. violations” of its territorial waters and
skies over the “expanding islands.” Tensions have mounted between the two world
powers since China started transforming submerged reefs into artificial islands
in the disputed waters.
The artificial islands are large enough to support military facilities. The U.S.
says Chinese activities in the disputed waters threaten freedom of navigation.
Brunei, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Taiwan have overlapping claims
in the waters over which China claims full sovereignty. U.S. has responded by
telling its Asian allies that it doesn’t recognize artificial islands, and will
sail warships past disputed islands.
U.S. responsible for militarization of the South China Sea
Global Times said Chinese forces should be ready to “launch countermeasures”
based on the level of U.S. provocation. If the U.S. sails within the 12-mile
territorial limit, it will be a “breach of China’s bottom line.” Chinese
military will stand up and use force to stop it if the U.S. encroaches on
China’s core interests. The Community Party mouthpiece’s editorial comes just a
day after the Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Hua Chunying accused the U.S.
of flexing military muscle far away from its shores.
Chunying said the U.S. presence in the region was the “biggest cause of
militarization” in the South China Sea. Last week, Beijing confirmed that it had
finished work on two lighthouses on the artificial islands and pledged to build
more. Last month, when Chinese warships entered the U.S. territorial waters
around the Aleutian islands, the Pentagon said it was an “innocent passage.” It
would be interesting to see how Beijing reacts when the U.S. warships sail near
the disputed islands.
(vi) Are Cuban Troops Backing Up Putin and Assad in Syria?
The armed conflict in Syria has become more complex in recent weeks, with Russia
launching waves of air strikes against rebel forces, some backed by the U.S.
Various rebel groups have fought government forces and each other, as the
Turkish military watches nervously on the northern border. And now there may be
a new player on the battlefield: Cuba.
Earlier this week, Fox News reported that Cuban military personnel are in Syria
to advise the government’s soldiers and assist Russian forces.
Related: Putin Is Learning a Hard Lesson in Syria, but Pretends Easy Victory
The report cites information received by the University of Miami's Institute for
Cuban and Cuban-American Studies that shows the chief of Cuba’s Armed Forces
recently visited Syria with the idea of striking a military alliance, a claim
backed by an unnamed U.S. official.
The report set off alarm bells throughout the conservative media, with
additional reports claiming, among other things, that Havana has thousands of
soldiers in Syria serving in tank crews.
The White House flatly rejected the notion that the Cuban military is in Syria.
“Let me just state unequivocally we've seen no evidence to indicate that those
reports are true,” press secretary Josh Earnest said Thursday.
Related: Here's Why Obama Is Refusing to Meet with Russia to Discuss Syria
But that explanation isn’t going over well with Senate Judiciary Committee chair
Chuck Grassley (R-IA).
"It’s disconcerting that in light of your new relationship with Cuba, the Castro
regime has chosen to align with Russia and Iran in supporting Assad in Syria,”
Grassley wrote Friday in a letter to President Obama.
He asked the president to answer a serious of questions, including if the
administration has had any conversations with Cuba officials over the reported
military action, and if Obama is “disappointed” by Havana’s decision to back
Russia’s efforts to prop up the regime of Bashar al-Assad.
“Just months after your ‘historic step forward’ the regime of Raúl Castro has
essentially thumbed its nose at the U.S. by aligning with Russia, Iran and Assad,”
Grassley wrote. Along with most Republicans, the senator opposed the
administration’s decision to restore diplomatic ties with Cuba.
Related: Human Rights Group Blasts Putin for Using Cluster Bombs in Syria
On Friday, Obama predicted any military intervention by Russia or Iran in Syria
would fail.
“Iran is going to send more people in, but it’s not going to work,” he said
during a White House press conference. “Their basic premise … about Syria has
not worked and will not work.”
Obama said that while officials in Washington and Moscow have an agreement on
“de-conflicting” with each other’s military in Syria, there is “no meeting of
the minds in terms of strategy” with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
“They’re not going to be able to bomb their way to a peaceful solution.”