Askari Raza Malik
Those were the days when the US was obsessed with pushing Pakistan to ‘do more’.
The US was right. Pakistan hesitated. Pakistan was also right.
An American delegation had called on then K-P Governor Awais Ghani. At a point
the Americans got frustrated. “Governor, you are not playing straight”. “Are
you?”, the Governor replied. The visitor had no answer. At the same time the
mutual distrust did not seem to hamper the growing interdependence that served
both sides well.
General Musharraf had wholeheartedly thrown his lot with the US ‘War on Terror’
with the exuberance of a soldier. After 9/11 his abrupt U-Turn on Taliban policy
and precipitous offensive in Waziristan infuriated the Taliban. Some, not all,
turned against Pakistan.
The initial phase of the Allies’ offensive met with spectacular success. The
Taliban were in a shambles. The victory seemed only a matter of time. Before the
going got tough America had cultivated its own faction of friendly Taliban.
Funds poured in for the Taliban from friends and foes alike, all using them to
advance their own agendas. Pakistan became a hub of terror. Atrocities inside
Pakistan began to assume alarming proportions. Pakistan was being conditioned to
own the war on terror as its own contrary to a widespread perception that it was
fighting a solely American war. Also the fertile American mind had started to
envision the future geopolitical scenario for the region. In this vision the
role of India, their newfound love was inevitable. Any role of India in
Afghanistan can only be that of a spoiler. India’s consulates at Kandhar and
Jalalbad acting as RAW’s outposts to foment trouble in Pakistan is no more a
secret. That must have put caution on general Musharraf. Doubt set in and
duplicity became diplomacy.
General Aurakzai as the K-P Governor was convinced that the dialogue was the
only answer to the problem. He felt confident that he would be able to convert
both the Americans and Afghans to his point of view. His soft corner for the
Taliban helped them emerge much stronger during his tenure in the province.
All this time the Army stayed in parts of Waziristan and Swat sustaining
continued casualties in the absence of firm orders and rules of engagement.
General Musharraf’s lassitude and General Kayani’s ambivalence were adversely
impacting the Army’s morale. The Army in K-P strongly felt that the loss of men
and officers due to emboldened Taliban attacks was aimless and in vain. Even the
Corps Commander Peshawar in exasperation was compelled to say that people beyond
Attock could not care less as to what was going on in K-P.
Despite this pathetic background when the operations in Swat and South
Waziristan were launched in right earnest the Army there responded in its
traditional abandon. General Kayani can claim credit for those operations but
that is where he ran out of steam. His passive appraisal of extending operations
to North Waziristan could not have spurred any civilian leadership into action.
When I went to attend the funeral of a child in Peshawar the distraught father
had accused Kayani of “criminal inaction for six long years of his tenure as the
Army Chief”.
Then came Raheel Sharif. An underdog that he was he must have watched the Army’s
policy and operations from the fence, the best place for a cool headed
appreciation and rationale deductions. He was there but never a part of the
decision making apparatus. He took over with a clear mind with no past baggage
to restrain him. Political brick bating and media abuse could not deter him from
his resolve. He straightaway went hell for the leather. His sincerity and
forthrightness impressed the withdrawing Americans who are left with much fewer
options in the region. The Americans, the Afghans, the nation, the whole
political elite and now the entire world seem to have put all their money on
him.
The December-16 Peshawar mayhem had shaken the nation out of deep slumber and
reinvigorated an already committed Raheel Sharif. The domestic and regional
landscapes hold promise of a healthy change. The narrative of military
antagonists now sounds shallow and toothless. India will have to revise its
propaganda themes as well because its past mantra is failing badly.
Now “consolidating the gains of Operation Zarb-e-Azb, considered to be the game
changer, is very much important otherwise the vicious cycle of gaining and
losing the areas from and to terrorists will continue. The politicians and civil
administration will have to rise above the materialistic approach and assist in
resettlement of the IDPs and maintaining peace and stability in the area. Let us
hope and pray that sacrifices of our Armed Forces bear fruit and peace prevails
in the war torn area.”
Raheel Sharif has proved himself to be the game changer. “The nation as a whole,
the civil society, media and intelligentsia in particular seem to be at the back
of the General. Both the civil and military leaderships, Senate and National or
Provincial Assembly emerge out in harmony; the operation extended to Karachi and
elsewhere has proved to be successful.” Once the southern part of Punjab is
cleaned off the extremist and terrorist elements, the ongoing war against terror
will certainly take to its logical end. “Those who know the Chief of Army Staff
from close understand well that this was only possible under him.”
(The author is a retired officer from Pakistan Army)