Oman: A country with balanced foreign policy promoting peace and tolerance II
Dr. Syed Mehboob
Economic and Political Analyst
Qaboos was recognized as the regional figure who could be turned to with confidence on security issues. After Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, Omani forces participated in the UN liberation effort, and Oman granted the United States access to prepositioned supplies and facilities in Oman via the Facilities Access Agreement (renewed in 1990). At the same time, Qaboos retained his nation's diplomatic ties to both Iraq and Kuwait, attempting to create opportunities for crisis resolution. When his efforts failed, he broke with his former foreign policy principle of nonalignment, reasoning that the rule of law necessitated formal alignment against an Arab government.
In this period Qaboos also persevered (to no avail) in trying to bring Iran and Iraq into negotiation after their war.
Qaboos has achieved much during his first 25 years. His "idea of Oman" has been realized, as have other goals aimed at long-term security, most notably the 1981 creation of the GCC and the 1993 signing of the last of the border treaties with Oman's neighbors. In support of another primary objective, Oman's internal development, Qaboos has negotiated with many countries to obtain the diverse forms of aid needed to tap Oman's domestic assets and upgrade Omani living conditions. Although Oman has remained an autocracy, Qaboos has opened paths to citizen participation in government, most notably by establishing the Majlis Al-Shura [State Consultative Council] in 1991. Two members of this council are women; Qaboos has called upon women to take a serious role in Oman's social and political evolution, saying they should not be relegated to subservient positions. "Women and men are companions," he has declared, in yet another show of independence from the other Arab rulers. Again, pragmatism is at work: He does not want to exclude 50 percent of the country's potential. If Oman is to prosper, domestic harmony must be maintained and all internal strengths must be drawn upon.
Today's Oman is internally stable, economically prosperous, and established as a nation integral to foreign relations in the Middle East and the world. Qaboos's pragmatic, independent approach in bringing Oman to this point owes much to the Ibadi interpretation of Islam practiced there. In his 1994 National Day Speech, Qaboos once again asserted Ibadi virtues, asking Omanis to reject momentary causes and religious fanaticism, and to be tolerant and forward-looking: "Obstinacy in religious understanding leads to backwardness in Muslims, prevalence of violence and intolerance." From this Ibadi heritage comes the underlying principle of Qaboos's approach: Steadily and consistently seek security and prosperity through nonviolent means.
Experts in the diplomatic world often refer to Oman as the “Switzerland of the Middle East”, but that label is reductive. Oman’s neutrality is not a lack of opinion; it is a deliberate, highly calculated strategic asset known as “Strategic Quietism”.
Unlike the Sunni-Shia divide that fuels regional proxy wars, Oman is predominantly Ibadi. This provides a theological buffer, allowing them to talk to both Riyadh and Tehran without being seen as a sectarian partisan.
Established by the late Sultan Qaboos, the doctrine on which they based their foreign policy is: “ Friend to all, enemy to none”. This provides the deniability and safe space required for clandestine talks.
Furthermore, Muscat shares control of the vital chokepoint of the Strait of Hormuz with Tehran. Stability is not a preference; it is an existential necessity for its economy.
There have been specific instances where Omani intervention changed the course of regional security. During the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), while other Gulf states funded Saddam Hussein, Muscat maintained diplomatic ties with Tehran. This allowed Oman to serve as the primary channel for ceasefire negotiations and prisoner exchanges.
Still, the crown jewel of Omani mediation has been the JCPOA (The Iran Nuclear Deal, 2013–2015). Starting in 2011, the Gulf country hosted secret meetings between US and Iranian officials (a secret channel often referred to as the “Muscat Channel”). The Oman succeeded because it provided a venue away from the prying eyes of the press and even its own neighbors (who were skeptical of the deal).
In the case of the Yemeni Civil War (2015), Oman is the only GCC member that did not join the Saudi-led coalition. They serve as the literal physical bridge for Houthi negotiators to meet with Western and UN envoys. Moreover, Muscat leverages its neutral ground status to facilitate medical evacuations and hostage releases, favouring humanitarian logistics.
Oman tried its best to resolve Palestinian issue and urge Israel to stop war and join hands to restore peace with International community and to adhere UN resolutions. Its stance was Pro-Palestinian stance and simultaneously maintain ties with Iran.
Unlike the UAE or Bahrain, it refuses to sign the Abraham Accords until there is a clear “two-state” path. This makes Muscat the only place where Israeli intelligence (Mossad) and Iranian officials can potentially share a zip code without an immediate diplomatic explosion. The country provides “active disengagement” services—allowing enemies to coexist in the same space to prevent accidental escalation.
According to the diplomat, the parties had reached a consensus to irreversibly halt nuclear stockpiling and enrichment—a milestone never achieved and a key demand of US President Donald Trump. Following the attack, Albusaidi urged the United States to reconsider its strategy, highlighting that the conflict was not theirs.
Oman has three strategic pillars: it provides plausible deniability, an intelligence hub, and stability as a product.The country offers a “black box.” Global powers can fail at the negotiating table in Muscat without losing face publicly. In contrast, European capitals like Vienna or Geneva pose higher risks of media exposure, diplomatic interference, and intelligence surveillance.
Moreover, because everyone talks to Muscat, the Omani Internal Security Service (ISS) possesses one of the most comprehensive human intelligence maps of regional intentions. Although the Omani ISS maintains close intelligence and security ties with both the United Kingdom and the United States, acting as a key partner in regional counterterrorism, Iran still considers it a partner with red lines that doesn’t leak.
Lastly, it “exports” stability to protect its own fragile transition under Sultan Haitham. Sultan Haitham is more focused on the economy than Qaboos was; a regional war would be fatal to Omani Vision 2040.
The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most critical maritime choke points, with roughly a fifth of global oil and a significant share of LNG exports transiting its narrow waters each day, linking Gulf producers to Asian, European, and global markets. Because any disruption can immediately shock energy prices and global supply chains, control or closure of the strait has become a powerful geopolitical lever, enabling regional actors to exert disproportionate strategic pressure on major energy-importing powers.
Therefore, the real strategic shift has been Oman’s attempt to decouple its economy from the Strait. The country has poured billions into the Port of Suqm which strategically sits outside the Strait on the Arabian Sea. This allows the country to offer a “back door” for global trade (and potentially oil exports via future pipelines) that bypasses Iranian or Emirati chokepoints. This is the economic insurance for their neutrality—they are making themselves too useful to the West, India, and China to be ignored, even if the Strait is closed.
The strategic landscape shifted violently following the February 2026 US-Israeli strikes on Iranian infrastructure. The attack on the Skylight, a US-sanctioned tanker, might mark the end of immunity by association. Oman’s strategic quietism was built on the premise that being a “friend to all” provided a physical shield. The attack on a ship with an Iranian crew in Omani waters might prove that things might change.
Another important actor involved is New Delhi. In late 2025/early 2026, India significantly increased its naval footprint in Duqm to protect its mission-based deployments and bypass the high-cost, high-risk Persian Gulf. If Oman allows the US or India to use Duqm for retaliatory logistics, it will lose its “Switzerland” status with Tehran.
Prior to this escalation, the region had been benefiting from the 2023 Riyadh Tehran normalization mediated by Beijing This period of pax sinica had ushered in an era of rare de-escalation, allowing for joint economic projects and the stabilization of the region.
Despite being located in one of the world’s most unstable regions—characterized by persistent tensions, turmoil, and conflict—the Sultanate of Oman has successfully maintained a policy of neutrality and adeptly assumed the complex role of mediator, both within the Arabian Peninsula and more broadly across the Middle East. Middle-power diplomacy is typically associated with foreign policy activism, particularly in a constrained international environment. Given their limited resources, middle powers often adopt niche diplomacy by concentrating on specific issue areas.
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