Pakistan Saudi Arabia Defence Agreement: A great honor and trust in Pakistan II
Dr. Syed Mehboob
Economic and Political Analyst
http//: www.thenewslark.com
Among the key highlights was the Shahpar III combat drone, capable of operating at altitudes of up to 35,000 feet while carrying heavy payloads, including bombs, cruise missiles, and torpedoes. Global Industrial Defense Solutions (GIDS), the Pakistani state-owned defense conglomerate that developed the drone, already supplies its systems to approximately 14 countries, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE. With Shahpar-III set to join both Pakistan’s and Gulf countries’ air forces, Pakistan’s defense industry demonstrates its growing strategic significance for regional militaries.
Second, in August, Pakistan established the Army Rocket Force Command (ARFC), a new formation tasked with developing a long-range conventional strike capability. The ARFC will oversee the operation of conventional missile systems — including ballistic, cruise, and potentially hypersonic platforms — designed to engage targets deep beyond the front lines. This emerging force creates significant potential for future collaboration with Gulf militaries, particularly under existing defense cooperation frameworks, where joint integration of Pakistani missile and strike systems could substantially enhance the region’s collective deterrence posture. However, the concrete ways in which Pakistan’s alliance with Saudi Arabia might translate into military cooperation with the broader GCC remain to be seen.
The Saudi-Pakistani defense pact represents a strategic recalibration for Pakistan, elevating its role in the Arab world while reinforcing its global standing as a middle power and reliable security provider. Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar noted that other countries have since expressed interest in similar arrangements, implicitly signaling that Pakistan is willing and able to project its strategic influence further by building additional defense partnerships with wealthy Arab states that lack comparable security capabilities. He also said that Pakistan’s defense pact with Saudi Arabia could ultimately develop into an “Eastern NATO” if additional countries decide to join, underscoring Pakistan’s role in leading and shaping the collective security framework of 57 Islamic nations. Moreover, the pact with Saudi Arabia reinforces Field Marshal Munir’s vision of Pakistan as a “resilient fortress of the Muslim world.” This is a concept once articulated by his predecessor, General Pervez Musharraf, who described Pakistan as the “Citadel of Islam,” emphasizing that the nation must first be strong to serve the wider Islamic world effectively.
The alliance with Riyadh also has a crucial economic dimension. Geo-economics is central to Pakistan’s foreign policy, including concerning the Gulf, as illustrated by Field Marsha Asim Munir’s 2023 commitment to attract $75-100 billion in investments from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait. In light of that commitment, a mutual defense agreement with the largest GCC member is of additional strategic relevance for Pakistan. Namely, by combining security guarantees with economic incentives, the pact not only strengthens bilateral ties but also provides a pathway for Pakistan to address its severe domestic economic challenges through strategic engagement with resource-rich Arab partners.
The recent trajectory of Pakistani-Saudi economic relations highlights the strategic logic behind Pakistan’s approach. Saudi Arabia has provided billions of dollars in support to stabilize Pakistan’s foreign exchange reserves. In October of last year, Pakistan signed MoUs for Saudi investment worth $2.8 billion, alongside a $3 billion loan to bolster its reserves. Pakistan also relies on Saudi oil supplies and financial support to meet its energy needs. This February, it signed an agreement with the Saudi Fund for Development (SFD) to defer a $1.2 billion payment for oil imports by one year, easing fiscal pressure. Saudi Arabia is a key partner in upgrading Pakistan’s refining infrastructure, including a $ 6 billion brownfield refinery project to produce cleaner fuels, although plans for a $10 billion greenfield refinery in Balochistan have faced practical challenges. The defense pact, thus, critically reinforces Pakistan’s economic security by enabling it to leverage military ties to attract Saudi investment and provide protection guarantees for Saudi stakeholders willing to operate on Pakistani soil.
A final major gain for Pakistan to come out of the defense pact with Saudi Arabia would seem to be in the enhanced deterrence this alliance provides it against India. The alliance puts New Delhi in a difficult position as Islamabad has now effectively become the security guarantor of one of India’s key energy suppliers. Saudi Arabia is India’s third-largest source of crude oil, and together with Iraq and the UAE accounts for 60% of its imports. The kingdom and the other GCC members also collectively form India’s largest trading bloc, exceeding $100 billion annually. Logically, this should make Indian military action against Pakistan less likely, as it would turn a heretofore dependable Saudi economic partner into an adversary.
For Saudi Arabia, the security agreement with Islamabad also satisfies multiple strategic objectives. First of all, it aligns closely with Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 planning program, which, among other socio-economic development goals, prioritizes self-reliance in the defense sector by expanding military capabilities and developing a domestic arms industry. This reflects a growing realization within the kingdom that economic strength alone cannot secure lasting influence; true power requires credible military capacity. To assert its dominance and counter regional rivals, Saudi Arabia feels it must demonstrate military prowess alongside its economic weight.
A closer defense-sector and military relationship with Pakistan can help Saudi Arabia fulfil its goal of developing a domestic defense-industrial base. The Pakistan-Saudi Arabia Bilateral Defense Industrial Forum serves as the primary institutional framework for joint initiatives aimed at achieving self-sufficiency in defense production. Both countries held their seventh meeting in Riyadh last October. Saudi Arabia is also a member of a trilateral defense-industry partnership with Turkey and Pakistan, a collaborative framework aimed at pooling technical, financial, and human resources to achieve shared defense objectives. Together with Pakistan and Turkey, Saudi Arabia is interested in the joint production and acquisition of the Turkish KAAN fifth-generation fighter. Additionally, Saudi Arabian Military Industries has signed technology-transfer agreements with leading Turkish defense firms, making both Islamabad and Ankara central to Riyadh’s goal of localizing over 50% of military procurement by 2030. Saudi Arabia’s transition from importing defense equipment to domestic production and maintenance will be showcased at the third World Defense Show (WDS) in 2026, highlighting a defense ecosystem increasingly oriented toward co-production and technology-transfer collaborations.
The second critical consideration for Saudia is to diversify its international defense relationships. Like other Gulf states, Saudi Arabia’s security remains heavily reliant on the United States, a dependence that constrains its strategic autonomy. During President Donald Trump’s visit to Riyadh in May, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman sought a formal security pact with binding US guarantees. However, this effort failed to materialize, and instead, Trump and the crown prince signed a $142 billion arms deal, an agreement that fell short of a mutual defense treaty obligating Washington to defend Saudi Arabia in the event of an attack.
Underscoring this fact, President Trump essentially taunted the Gulf states by portraying the United States as their indispensable security guarantor. He declared, “All of those countries — Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and others — we keep them safe. Without us, they probably wouldn’t exist right now.” At the same time, the US-Saudi relationship is complicated by Washington’s unwavering support for Israel, its closest ally in the Middle East. This has created sharp divergences with Saudia, particularly over Trump’s backing of Prime Minister Netanyahu during Israel’s offensive in Gaza. The US not only vetoed calls for a ceasefire, which Saudi Arabia and other Arab states urgently sought, but President Trump also plans to sell US$ 6.4 billion worth of arms to Israel, in addition to the roughly $12 billion in military assistance already provided this year.
American military support for Israel in its confrontation with Iran has sent a clear signal to the Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, that they cannot directly challenge or confront Israel. As a result, Gulf leaders increasingly question whether the US military presence on their soil is not so much a guarantor of their defense but instead is intended to deter them from opposing Israel, ultimately serving Israeli security interests. This dynamic explains why, despite publicly condemning Israel’s escalation in Gaza and voicing support for Palestine, Riyadh’s options to tangibly counter Israel remain highly constrained. Instead, US security support to Saudi Arabia had until now largely been limited to bolstering capabilities for deterring Iran. Yet Tehran is no longer perceived as a critical threat by Riyadh. Iran’s late security chief, Ali Larijani, who met in the Saudi capital with Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman to discuss strengthening bilateral security and defense cooperation.
Reducing the kingdom’s security dependency requires investing in military power and diversifying security partnerships, enabling Riyadh to pursue its strategic interests more independently of Washington. A partnership with Pakistan directly supports this goal. Pakistan not only offers assistance in strengthening Saudi Arabia’s defense industry and military capabilities but also could provide something the United States has thus far been unwilling to offer — a nuclear deterrent. ( Continued )
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