The events of December 27th
2007 when the 3rd Pakistani Prime Minister was assassinated in Rawalpindi makes
this research very poignant. Two decades ago we have read more about who shot JR
and a lot less about who shot one of our greatest freedom fighters of Pakistan.
We all wondered who shot Khan Liaqat Ali Khan? The American press is always
trying to discover who actually planned the assassination of President John
Fitzgerald Kennedy. The media is obsessed with JFKs murder even though the
murderer was captured. The Pakistani media is silent about Liaqat Ali Khan. The
same forces that were responsible for the death of Benazir Bhutto are
responsible for the death of Shaheed Millat.
Liaqat Ali Khan was the liberator of Kashmir. In 1947, Liaqat Ali Khan raised a
fist at India warning it of staying away from Pakistan. As long as the fist was
alive no neighboring country could dare lift a finger at Pakistan.
Colonel Akbar Khan. He adopted the rather ambitious nom de plume “Tariq”, after
Tariq Bin Ziad, Arab conqueror of Spain in 712. He wrote two papers after
ceasefire on January 1, 1949, “What Next in Kashmir?” and “Keep the Pot Boiling
in Abdullah’s Kashmir”. Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan sanctioned Rs 1 million
to arm a “people’s militia” in Indian Kashmir. The Abdullahs have moved into
their third generation, but the blood in that pot has not stopped boiling…India
and Pakistan: What kind of talk makes sense, By M J Akbar, Sunday, 21 February
2010 16:49
SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.
We have researched this issue at length. In the absence of an on the spot
autopsy, the circumstantial and political evidence points to the political
enemies of Khan Liaqat Ali Khana and Mohammad Ali Jinnah. The feudals of many
areas did not support the creation of Pakistan. Urban voters were free to vote,
and the wholehearted supported, Iqbal, Jinnah and Liaqat. If we look at the
political landscape of the Subcontinental politics, we see the following:
Jinnah, Iqbal, and Liaqat were at odds with the anti-Pakistan, pro-Congress
elements who were supported by the likes of Sir Chottu Ram and the Unionist
party. Iqbal and Liquat were responsible for the creation of Muslim League in
every town and village of the Subcontinent, and had transformed the League from
an elitist group to a national party.
Jinnah, Liaqat. Iqbal, and the Muslim League won the day, and destroyed the
Hyatt-Tiwana conspiracies led by their cohorts the Congress and SIr Chouttu Rams
Zamindara party
Hyatt and Tiwana lost to the Muslim League but kept the vengeance in their
harts.
Liaqat Ali Khan did not allow the UK and the US Pakistani facilities to attack
Iran. There is a lot of suspicion on the CIA on this matter. Recent declassified
documents shed light on a lot of information on this.
According to Gauhar Ayub, Liaqat Ali Khan had talked to King Zahir Shah who had
agreed to a confederation with Pakistan.
The Finance Minister and openly defied Liaqat Ali Khan trying to run Foreign
Affairs. He had the most to gain from the death of Liaqat Ali Khan and tried to
come to power.
The Khaksar Tehrik and the Socialist Coalition wanted to to turn Pakistani into
a Socialistic republic.
Liqat Ali Khan was supposed to announce land reforms and a close relationship
with the Muslim world.
There is tremendous suspicious on Mushtaq Muhamamd, and Ghulam Muhammad. Ghulam
Muhammad was supposedly the CIA man.
Both Jinnah and Liaqat faced numerous assassination attempts on thier lives by
the same Unionist party or their fascist supports the Khaksars.
Jinnah escaped the attempts, and Liaqat did not.
LIAQAT ALI KHAN THE DAY DEMOCRACY DIED IN RAWALPINDI: Liaqat Ali Khan was the
able lieutenant of the father of our nation. He was the first Prime Minister of
our nation. He sowed the seeds of democracy and died fighting for democracy.
Liaqat Ali Khan matched the spirit of Nehru and the tenacity of Patel. Liaqat
Ali Khan had the vitality of George Washington, and the vision of Lincoln. He
and Jinnah did for Pakistan what Kemal Ataturk had done for Turkey. Like Mao Tse
Tung Liaqat and Jinnah led the countrymen to nationhood. For a brief shining
moment, our nation glimpsed “Camelot”, where we were led by honest leaders,
who’s only consideration was the task of building the nation. These
incorruptible leaders had character, strength, and the mandate of the people.
Like JFK, Liaqat Ali Khan was a young, popular and charismatic leader who had
led the nation ‘across the read’ sea and was immersed in the task of building an
infrastructure for the new country. But forces opposed to democracy cut him in
half.
WHO SHOT LAK?..CIA CONNECTION
Under headline reading “Is Liaquat Ali Khan’s assassination result of a
deep-laid American conspiracy?”, leftist Urdu daily Bhopal named Nadeem
published article October 24 charging US with responsibility. Summary article
follows:
[...]It was learned within Pakistani Foreign Office that while UK pressing
Pakistan for support re Iran, US demanded Pakistan exploit influence with Iran
and support Iran transfer oil fields to US. Liaquat declined request. US
threatened annul secret pact re Kashmir. Liaquat replied Pakistan had annexed
half Kashmir without American support and would be able to take other half.
Liaquat also asked US evacuate air bases under pact. Liaquat demand was
bombshell in Washington. American rulers who had been dreaming conquering Soviet
Russia from Pakistan air bases were flabbergasted. American minds set thinking
re plot assassinate Liaquat. US wanted Muslim assassin to obviate international
complications. US could not find traitor in Pakistan as had been managed Iran,
Iraq, Jordan. Washington rulers sounded US Embassy Kabul. American Embassy
contacted Pashtoonistan leaders, observing Liaquat their only hurdle; assured
them if some of them could kill Liaquat, US would undertake establish
Pashtoonistan by 1952. Pashtoon leaders induced Akbar undertake job and also
made arrangements kill him to conceal conspiracy. USG-Liaquat differences
recently revealed by Graham report to SC; Graham had suddenly opposed Pakistan
although he had never given such indication. [...] Cartridges recovered from
Liaquat body were American-made, especially for use high-ranking American
officers, usually not available in market. All these factors prove real culprit
behind assassin is US Government, which committed similar acts in mid-East.
“Snakes” of Washington’s dollar imperialism adopted these mean tactics long time
ago.Confidential Telegram No. 1532 from New Delhi Embassy, Oct. 30, 1951
Since article apparently not rpt not widely circulated, Department believes
preferable not rpt not issue public denial. In its discretion, however, Embassy
might informally mention case MEA with comment story so preposterous no rpt no
public denial intended. Would be interesting to know whether this story of
character which led adoption recent press law. Ownership management NADEEM
should be discreetly be investigated. Confidential Telegram from State Dept.,
Nov. 1, 1951
Soviet Press today carried Prague Despatch reporting Rude Pravo article based
Afghan press agency “Bahtar” information re assassination Liaquat Ali. Despatch
states after escaping Afghanistan due murders and other crimes “Said Akbar ran
to India and there under protection British authorities which gave him refuge in
Abbotabad and provided him money. After partition India Akbar remained in
Pakistan where he continued make use protection of certain British circles.”
“These facts adduced by Afghan press supporting position that murder Liaquat Ali
was result intrigue of imperialists in Asian countries.” Secret Telegram from
Moscow Embassy, Nov. 3, 1951 [only first page located]
The Embassy questions the premise stated in the first sentence of the Airgram
under reference (“Lack of spontaneous anti-Indian and anti-Afghan popular
outburst over both July war scare and Liaquat’s assassination suggests feeling
on Kashmir and Afghan disputes mostly government inspired.”) … The anti-Afghan
agigation that spontaneously sprang up on October 16-17 was effectively stopped
by the GOP’s prompt exercise of its official and unofficial powers of censorship
over the press, even to the extent of preventing reference after October 17 to
the assassin’s Afghan origin. Popular Feeling in Pakistan on Kashmir and Afghan
Issues, Nov. 10, 1951
One almost never hears about the culprits in the assassination of Khan Liaqat
Ali Khan…. the first victim of our nascent nation. After his death democracy was
forced to fail and dictators ruled the Pakistani landscape.
Since the autopsies done on the body of the Khan has NOT revealed much, let us
do an autopsy of the politics of our time. There have been several books written
on the man, and a wealth of information is revealed in them.
LIAQAT ALI KHAN, THE MAN, ONE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS, THE FREEDOM FIGHTER, THE
LIBERATOR OF KASHMIR & THE FIRST PRIME MINISTER
Liaqat Ali Khan was a born in a rich family, but he gave up his lands for
freedom and for Pakistan.
All through the forties, Quaid-e-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah had picked patriots
who would lead the nation to freedom. These men were loyal not only to
Quaid-e-Azam and the Muslim League, these men were loyal to the cause of
Pakistan. Both created and led the Muslim League and battled the British and
engaged the Congress for the independent nation of Pakistan. Throughout the
trials and tribulations, Liaqat Ali Khan and Jinnah went through one
constitutional crises after the other and faced the elections. From the Khilafat
movement, to the cause of the separate electorate, through the Cabinet Mission
Plan, through the pre-partition governments, the Khan and Jinnah led the Muslim
League and the nation towards Pakistan.
In little towns and in big villages, the All India Muslim League opened offices
and built a grass roots movement that was supported by the Mussalmans of Bharat.
Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan were painfully aware that the Muslims had no voice in
the press. In order to combat the propoganda of its enemies, the Muslim League
needed a voice. The created from scratch newspapers that would carry the Muslim
League message. In 1945, the created the newspaper called ‘Dawn’. They also
created the paper called “Pakistan Times’ and they created other papers called
Patriots etc.
Here is a message from the Honorable Liaqat Ali Khan, Premier of Pakistan. Dated
Delhi, 5th August, 1947:
” Now that the great day has come when we have not only achieved freedom from
foreign domination but also regained our long lost opportunity for national
development. I wish to convey to our people a message of goodwill and good cheer
on this day when the Muslim state of our dreams has become a reality. Let us not
forget that his has been achieved not by the efforts of Muslims in Pakistan
alone, but even more by the sufferings of millions living in Muslim minority
provinces. I hope that although henceforth the frontiers of the two states will
divide the Muslims of this Subcontinent, the ties of brotherhood will endure,
because the Islamic fraternity knows no political or geographical barriers. I
have no doubt that the Muslims of Pakistan will ever regard the Muslims of
Hindustan as part of themsleves and give them equal opportunities in their own
state. I am confident also that the Muslims in Hindustan will be loyal citizens
of their state and play an important and honorable role in the progress and
prosperity.” Sd. Liaqat Ali Khan.
Liaqat Ali Khan was incorruptible. Here is an editorial printed in the Nation on
Friday, February 28, 1997, Lahore, “Banish the factotums, sir”, written by
Khalid Hasan :
“In the early years of Pakistan, the leaders lived with simplicity. Mr Liaquat
AliKhan, who used to be rich in his own right before independence, lived simply.
He was accessibleand there were hardly any barriers between him and those who
considered him the Quaid-i-Azam’s heir and his most trusted deputy. We all know
that when the Nawabzada died, he had no money in the bank. That is the example
our present-day leaders need to follow and not that of oriental potentates,
colonial overlords and slave plantation kings.”
As Prime Minster of Pakistan Liaqat Ali secured the borders of Pakistan,
LIBERATED one third of Kashmir (and would have liberated ALL of it if HIS plan
had worked), and internationalized (through agreements with the USA) the
boundaries of Pakistan by ensuring that the USSR through its proxies (India or
Afghanistan) could not cross them.
LIAQAT TAKES OVER A PRECARIOUS POLITICAL LANDSCAPE
1947, was a precarious time for Pakistan. The newly won freedom was in jeopardy.
The flame of Pakistani Muslim liberty was in danger of being extinguished.
Liaqat Ali Khan became prime minister of Pakistan when the anti-Pakistan
Unionist loyalists (who had been in cahoots with the Indian National Congress)
landlords and the anti-Muslim League feudals were waiting in the wings to take
over the political machinery of the new country. This was an accident waiting to
happen.
In Sindh the landlords were mostly Hindu and these landlords fled to India. In
the Punjab and Sarhad they were the Badshah Khans and the Khizar Hyatts who had
opposed the Quaid-e-Azam.
After the death of Quaid-e-Azam the feudals wanted to take over the nascent
country. The feudals had opposed Pakistan. For the feudals the only roadblocks
to power were the patriots who had led the Pakistan movement. I.I. Chundrigarh,
Feroze Khan Noon and Khan Liaqat Ali Khan. Once the Bengali leadership of the
Muslim League was harassed and removed, then it was necessary to begin removing
the political infra-structure of Pakistan that had been built by the
Quaid-e-Azam himself. The Muslim League leaders faced the wrath of the feudals.
The Quaid and Khan Liaqat Ali Khan had defeated the feudals in their Unionist
party which was in an alliance with the Indian National Congress (INC). Now the
feudals were out to take revenge from the leadership of the Muslim that had
shepherded the nation to freedom.
Mohammad Ali Jinnah had terminal cancer and he died an early death. The actual
circumstances of the death of the Quaid are shrouded in mystery, confusion and
perhaps even conspiracy.
Several Pakistani prime ministers tried to illegally take over the reigns of
government through extra-constitutional means, but the machinations of the
feudals did not allow them to rule. These machinations were the earliest seed of
discontent sown into the minds of the Bengalis because they saw the Bengali
leadership of the Muslim League harassed and shunted out of the Muslim League.
Pakistan was born under the Mountbatten-Indian premise that the country would
last a few weeks and the Muslims would learn their lesson and then come begging
back to India to take them back. In fact Lord Mountbatten had offered and
insisted on becoming the joint Governor General of both India and Pakistan. This
unique head of both the states would have facilitated the early demise of the
state of Pakistan. Quaid-e-Azam and Liaqat Ali Khan saw through the ruse and
asked Lord Mountbatten whose anti Pakistan and anti-Muslim stand had already
been proven several times over not to become the governor general of Pakistan.
EXTERNAL THREAT TO PAKISTAN NULLIFIED THROUGH STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
Many Hindus and Gandhi did not oppose Pakistan. Some like Patel did. The
opponents were fierce vitriolic and vociferous. Right after Pakistan was
created, some of the radical Hindus considered this a temporary situation and
called it a temporary partition of the country of India. When the new country
lasted for a few months, India began flexing its muscles. One of the first test
of Pakistani sovereignty came when India devalued her currency and wanted
Pakistan to do the same. Liaqat Ali Khan refused, and angry India tightened the
screws and imposed a trade embargo against Pakistan. All cross border trade came
to a halt. This was the initiation of cessation of trade that has still not been
really revived, even in modern times.
With China still embroiled in its communist struggle, Asia was recognized as
India. In British eyes, India was the major power in the India. In the early
nineteenth century, America proudly proclaimed that “it was manifest destiny
that the USA should span from the Atlantic to the Pacific.” The Soviet Union
extended from the Pacific to the Atlantic. With British imperial might, and
India the crown jewel of the empire, India too saw her destiny as great as the
superpowers.
THE NEHRU DOCTRINE FACES LIAQAT ALI KHANS PATRIOTIC FIST
The Nehru doctrine was a natural extension of Indian nationalism. Nehrus dreams
of India as one of hte major nations of the world are elequently quoted in his
letters to his daughter “Glimpses of World History”, a very welll written book
on the history of the world. The stature of Nehrus intelligence can be judged
from the fact that Nehru wrote the book from memory while he was in jail.
To many Indians religion was a personal matter and did not want the state to
interfere in it. Rightly or wrongly they saw Jinnah using the ruse of religion
to gain power. Some Indians felt that Indian nationalism and dreams had run
aground by the creation of Pakistan. “Partition” had stopped the land routes to
Europe and divided the focus of its attention. Had she been cut down to size?
Reeling from partition, Patel started to consolidate the rest of the “nation”.
Nehru would not allow 550 Indias. Nehru and Patel wanted to create the Indian
nationality by creating a contiguous Subcontinent. She had taken over Kashmir,
Junagarh and had taken over Hyderabad. India was threatening Pakistan. Pakistani
nationalism now tested the limits of Indian consolidation. Liaqat Ali Khan
looked for cracks in the consolidation. Liaqat Ali Khan saw what was coming and
used the tribesmen to take advantage of the rebellion in Kashmir and liberate
the state. All Kashmiris remember Liaqat Ali Khan with fondness because he is
the real liberator of Azad Kashmir. Were it not for Liaqat Ali Khan ALL of
Kashmir would today be part of India.
Like Nehru, Khan was also embroiled in the task of nation building. Like Nehru,
Khan also faced daunting odds. Unlike Nehru, Khan was the ruler of a state with
very powerful feudal enemies. These enemies had sworn the destruction of the
country. These feudals saw Khan between them and their allies and friends the
Indian National Congress. Khan Liaqat Ali Khan began to create a sovereign
nation. He saw the vision to create natural and artificial boundaries around the
country. He ordered the digging of the BRB canal along the Wagah border. The
Indians were to learn the importance of what they call “Khawjal Canal” during
the 1965 war because this canal provided Pakistan a natural defense barrier
against the advancing Indian army. When things got too hot for India in Kashmir
and Pakistani troops under Tikka Khan and the freedom fighters were only 35
miles away from Srinagar, India wanted to cross the international border at
Batapur and Run of Katch. The Americans in 1965 had guaranteed to Pakistan that
Kashmir was disputed territory and India would not cross the international
border. India tired to but the rangers kept them at bay along the BRB canal that
was designed and built during the reign of Khan Liaqat Ali Khan
It was under these circumstances that Khan Liaqat Ali Khan took the reigns of
office. He struggled to do the following:
1) Guard Pakistan against a belligerent India which wanted to reintegrate
Pakistan into India
2) Watch the back of Pakistan against the Indian ally Zahir Shah of Afghanistan
3) Tried to create an external strategic alliance with the USA and sold the idea
to the West that Pakistan would be a reliable bulwark against the socialistic
India-USSR nexus
LIAQAT ALI KHAN NEGATES THE SOVIET THREAT
Liaqat Ali Khan saw the growing menace of the Soviet threat. He had been
monitoring the expansion of the Russian empire into the six Muslim states, and
he had watched the integration of independent Muslim republics into the USSR. He
has also seen the forced deportation of the Chechnyans and Tartars to Siberia as
reprisals for resisting the Sovietization of the Muslim peoples.
Liaqat Ali Khan saw the growing relations of the USSR with Afghanistan as a
clear threat to Pakistan’s sovereignty. Khan went to the US and laid the
foundation of a very log term alliance with the USA. This alliance immediately
opened up the flood gates of American aid to Pakistan. The initial aid came in
the form of German war crime reparation that were given to Pakistan. This put
money in the treasury. The next step was UN and Direct USAID to Pakistan. With
American protection the existence of Pakistan was guaranteed, or else the
nascent nation may have succumbed to the twin USSR-Indian and Sino-Indain
threat.
INTERNAL THREAT SUPPRESSED THROUGH STRATEGIC COALITIONS
Jinnah and Khan had generated a cadre of loyal politicians that supported the
Muslim League. Liaqat Ali Khan wanted to bank on the traditional allies that
both he and Mohammad Ali Jinnah had created across the land of Pakistan. However
these were hard to come by because many of the Aligarh led student movement
leaders were now back to the grind earning a living. Liaqat Ali Khan was in the
process of forming alliances in the Punjab and the NWFP. He trusted the leaders
that had supported the Muslim League and he trusted the leaders that had
supported Pakistan. Liaqat Ali Khan did not trust the leaders that had opposed
Pakistan. Liaqat Ali Khan did not trust the leadership of the Unionist party
that was in alliance with the Indian National Congress.
Khan through a series of steps tried to create consensus within the boundaries
of Pakistan:
1) Tried to germinate local pro-Muslim leadership in Bengal by supporting the
pro-Pakistani Bengali leaders against the pro-Indian and United Bengal
nationalist leaders who wanted an independent Bengal.
2) Watched the antics of G.M. Syed whose off again and on again loyalties to the
Muslim League and/or Gandhi rendered him un-trustworthy.
3) Tried create Muslim League alliances in two provinces where there was the
anti-Muslim League parties playing on the sentiments of the people. Namely it
was the Khizar Hyatt led Unionist government in the Punjab and a Ghaffar Khan
led government in NWFP.
Liaqat Ali Khan formed the constituent assembly and set upon the task of
creating serious structures which would assist the country in the future. All
Pakistani constitutions were based on the work of the first constitution. The
original 1953 constitution was the basis of the 1973 constitution that is
preserved more or less by our courts today.
Recommend Department ignore article summarized in Delhi’s 1532. It is
compilation of utter falsehoods whose vituperation is some degree worse than
articles that appear from time to time in Bombay’s Commie-line “Blitz”. To issue
any statement labeling the facts in the article as lies will only give Nadeem an
importance it does not merit. The investigation into background of Liaquat’s
assassination is being conducted with extreme care and well guarded secrecy.
Gurmani tells me an intercept has been obtained which if backed up by further
material may reveal the assassination had some inspiration and followed the
pattern of Razmara’s assassination in Teheran. Confidential Telegram from
Karachi Embasssy, Oct. 31, 1951
FORTIES: THE FEUDAL UNIONISTS HAD OPPOSED PAKISTAN AND THE MUSLIM LEAGUE
The Unionist Party had opposed Pakistan, had opposed the Muslim League, had
opposed the Quaid-e-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah and had opposed Liaqat Ali Khan.
After the death of Jinnah their wrath turned to Khan Liaqat Ali Khan. How could
the Unionist oppose a trusted lieutenant of the Quaid? How could they oppose one
of the greatest freedom fighters of the struggle for Pakistan? How could the
Unionists oppose the leader of the Muslim League—the party that created Pakistan
and opposed the Unionists in the Punjab? The Khan had many friends and
supporters in the Punjab. The Khan was responsible for creating and nourishing
the Muslim League in the Punjab. He had counted on and got the support of the
people of Punjab. The Muslim League had defeated the Unionists in the polls.
Here is a quote from the book “HAD THERE BEEN NO JINNAH” (@1989 by Salahuddin
Khan Printed by: PanGraphics (Pvt) Ltd. Islamabad. Pages 14-15.
“From this stage, conflict between the Congress and the Muslim League became
increasingly sharp. The Muslim League under the skilful leadership of Jinnah set
itself to strengthen its organization, extend its basis of supportamong the
Muslim masses, and consolidate the various Muslim groups and organizations so as
to make the Muslim League the main Organization of the Muslims in India. During
the period 1937-45 a decisive change took place in the position and relative
strength of the Muslim League, as it won increasing mass support among the
Muslims. The 1946 elections reveal the changed position.In the Central and
Provincial Legislative Assemblyelections the Muslim League won 460 out of 533
Muslim seats. There can be no doubt, that during this period the Muslim League
had established its position as the major political organization among Muslims
in India. It had been the original aim of the Congress to include equally Hindus
and Muslims. But, in practice, this aim was never realised in the proportions of
membership won.In January 1938, according to a press statement issuedby Nehru,
out of 3.1 millions members of Congress, only1,00,000, that is 3.2% were
Muslims; overwhelming majority of the newly awakened sections of the Muslims
turned to the Muslim League as their political organization.”
The victories in 1946 were at the expense of the pro-Congress Unionists in the
Punjab. In the face of very strong popular grass-roots political support for
Pakistan, the Muslim League and Liaqat Ali Khan the Hyattis were trying to
figure to how to oppose Quaid-e-Azam and the Muslim League. The Khizar Hyatt
political machinery could not find anything against Liaqat Ali Khan, so they
used the race card. The Khizar Hyatt Unionist Party propaganda had painted
Liaqat Ali Khan as an opponent of Punjabis. Nothing could be further from the
truth. Liaqat Ali Khan opposed the feudal Unionist leaders like Khizar Hyatt who
had opposed Pakistan. Liaqat Ali Khan had many friends in the Punjab who had
helped him defeat the Unionists at the polls. It is little known that L.A Khan
was born in Karnal East Punjab. Here are some notes on the origins of Liaqat Ali
Khan. I quote from p.27 of book by Prof. Ziauddin Ahmad ,Liaquat Ali Khan:
builder of Pakistan.
“The family, Before settling down in Karnal in thePunjab in the 19th century,
lived on the other side of the Jamna in Muzaffarnagar (U.P., India) for some
generations, where they owned bigestates. Even after he settled down in Delhi,
he took keen interest in the amelioratin and betterment of the Muslims of
Muzaffarnagar.”
The Unionist element tried to rally support against Khan Liaqat Ali Khan by
playing up the ethnic race card. Liaqat Ali Khan was born in Karnal East Punjab
with friends and relatives on both sides of the border. The Khan had very strong
ties to East Punjab. However this fact was concealed and many Khizar Hyatt Khan
supporters falsly labeled him.
THE ASSASSINATION OF DEMOCRACY IN RAWALPINDI—A CIA PLOT?
Liaqat Ali Khan was killed in broad daylight in Rawalpindi. This is what Zeba
Zubair in Mutiny to Mountbatten says about the assassination:
“On 16 October 1951 at a Public Meeting in Rawalpindi, ‘a blind shot from the
blue’ silenced the voice of Quaid-e-Millat, Nawabzadah Liaqat Ali Khan. Another
epoch of history was at an end. On a sad day for this new nation it was as if a
mighty powe in heaven was also reacting in anger at the cowardly act of mankind.
The sky of Karachi had a peculiar and ominous orange-yellow colouring and the
people felt resltell at the starnge weather…”
This is what the Daily dawn of October 17th, 1951 said:
‘With the kalima on his lips, Liaqat , Successor of the Quaid-e-Azam Prime
Minister. Leader unparalleled, is dead. The man who killed him was not just an
individual he was the symbol of that deadly enmity of the enemies of Islam who
have always wanted to destroy Pakistan. We name only one but we feel this in our
heart with the certain flash and convinced truth. We grieve for Liaqat–martyr to
Pakistan and Islam; but we proclaim over Liaqat’s still unburied body: Pakistan
shall live, and whoever of her servants may fall in her service, this citadel of
Islam guarded by 70 million worshippers of Allah will never fall. Begum Liaqat,
Ashraf and Akbar, we shall not try to console you in your grief in consolable,
but know this, that you beloved husband and father had died in glory and as
comes only to the chosen of God. Pakistan Zindabad (Dawn Editorial, 17 October,
1951)”
Even in his last moments he was thinking of his nation. Other then remembering
God and reciting the kalima, his last words were “Allah Pakistan ko apni amaan
mai~n rakhay “(God save Pakistan). Every Pakistani of that generation absolutely
remembers where he was and what he was doing when that fatal shot was announced
on Radio Pakistan. Every patriotic Pakistani cried that day.
” A few yards away for the body of the founder of the Pakistan now rests its
eternal sleep the body of the builder of Pakistan. Both died in harness and both
died for Pakistan. The Quaid-e-Azam worked his body way to waste; the
Quaid-e-Millat fearlessly exposed his body to danger for his love of duty and
country. The master and the disciple, the twin servants of Islam who in this
century added perhaps the most glorious chapter to Islam’s temporal history, now
meet heaven. Like twin stars, unseen but their presence always felt, their
blessings will be continually showered on the land which the one founded, and
the other built up to a state of stability and strength form which progress
forward is inevitable because of its own momentum. It is now for the nation
which they served so well, to carry on their work, and in particular make the
blood of martyred Liaqat blossom to all of us. But upon the new leader who has
been chosen by the team left behind by Liaqat the main burned if it will fall,
the choice has been will and wisely made..
Khawaja Nazimuddin, our new Prime Minister and Liaqat’s successor as leader of
this nation……”(Dawn editorial October 1951)
This is what Javed Jabbar says about the assassination in Rawalpindi in an
article in the Nation (Feb 26th, 1997) entitled Accountability: history and
truth.
“Distortions in our relationship with accountability have an even more historic
dimension. During the lifetime of the Quaid-i-Azam himself, within weeks and
months of the creation of Pakistan, reports began to emerge about corruption at
high levels in government. One of the major figures who despaired at this early
neglect of accountability was Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. Then came the
assassination of our first Prime Minister Quaid-i-Millat Liaquat Ali Khan. A man
who was so financially incorruptible as to leave only a paltry sum in his bank
account deserved to have his killers held to account for their heinous crime.
Over the past forty-five years, speculative interpretations name prominent
individuals as suspects in the Liaquat assassination. The official inquiry was
not received as a credible analysis. In addition to the original stain of
financial corruption on the white and spotlessly clean garment of accountability
were now added the red stains of blood: people could actually get away with
murder.”
The Shaheed-e-Millat was so scrupulously honest that when he died, he had holes
in his socks. This was the man that presented the Crescent and Star “Khanjar
hilal ka hai qaumi nitaa~n hamaara” to the constituent National Assembly of
Pakistan. His famous closed fist remained a symbol of defiance to India, and it
remained a symbol of our sovereignty.
Right after the assassination of Khan Liaqat Ali Khan, the patsy—actual murderer
(the man who pulled the trigger) was caught and killed immediately (lest he
spill the beans). Lee Harvey Oswald suffered the same fate when he actually
started talking. However the real murderers the people who ordered the death of
a the first prime minister of Pakistan not only remained at large, they actually
benefited from his death. As a final insult to the slain freedom-fighter Liaqat
Bagh (the site of his assassination) was turned into a bus stop and the promised
garden to this date remains a commercial cess pot.
The day Liaqat Ali Khan died , democracy died in Pakistan. Dictators took over
the reigns of the government and abrogated the constituent assembly. On 23rd
October, Ghulam Mohammad dissilved the Constituent Assembly and with it, any
semblance of constitutional legitimacy. Altaf. This is what the Daily Dawn said
in one of its editorials, and it gives a brief synopsis of the events leading to
and the events that occurred right after the death of the Shaheed-e-Millat:
“Since birth Pakistan has had four major nights of crisis. On the night of
September 11. The Father of the nation died. On the night of October 16, 1951,
the nation held its breath, dazed by the murder of its builder, Liaqat. On the
night of April 17, 1953,a Government headed by the President of the Muslim
League was flicked off the ash from a cigar-tip. On the night of October 23,
1954 (because it was then, we think that the decision was taken) the constituent
Assembly of Pakistan was believed to be sovereign body, was wiped off the
country’s political map like one wipes spilt milk form a table….(Dawn: 27
October, 1954)”
This abrogation kept Pakistan without a real constitution till 1973 The 1956 and
1963 constitutions were abrogated and martial laws imposed in 1958 and 1969. A
lack of constitutional protection to the Bengalis and other citizens of Pakistan
led to the creation of deep suspicions in the minds of the common Pakistanis,
specially the Bengalis.
THE BENEFICIARIES FROM LIAQAT ALI KHANS DEATH
It is obvious that the assassins of Khan Liaqat Ali Khan were the parties and
leaders who benefited from his death. After removing the elected prime minister
from office through murder, the feudals tried to marginalize the Bengalis. As a
result of the conspiracy the constitution was abrogated and the military feudal
complex took over Pakistan. The feudals and their sentries the army took over
the reins of the country and never let go.
It is based on these grains of truth that Ayesha Jalal and the Indian text books
claim that the Muslim League was supported by the landlords. Before the creation
of Pakistan these feudals opposed the Muslim League tooth and nail. It is
unfortunate for our country that these feudals became the rulers of Pakistan
after Liaqat Ali Khan. The rest as they say is history. For a list of Muslim
League enemies, one does not have to go far. A directory of officers of the
Unionist Party along with the list of the Khaksars (who actually did make many
attempts on Muslim League leaders). For details on the Muslim League-Unionist
animosity please see my article called “The Fifth Column” posted on
soc.culture.pakistan.history.
This is what Javed Jabbar says about the assassination in Rawalpindi in an
article in the Nation (Feb 26th, 1997) entitled Accountability: history and
truth.
“When the black gowns of the superior judiciary joined the blood-stained garb of
accountability, a decisive turning point was passed. The legitimisation of the
dissolution of the Constituent Assembly by Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad and
his dismissal of Prime Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin established a new ground norm
that went beyond the justified and unavoidable dismissal of Dr Khan Sahib’s NWFP
government in August 1948, when the provincial regime declined to accept even
the symbolic elements of the new state of Pakistan.”
THE KHAKSARS FASCISTS ATTEMPTED MANY ASSASSINATIONS ON THE QUAID-E-AZAM. DID THE
UNIONISTS-KHAKSARS WITH THE HELP OF THE CIA ASSASSINATE LIAQAT ALI KHAN?
Vacuity of ideas did not prevent losers from forming parties. There are many
inconsequential movements in the Subcontinent, whose mention is but a footnote
in the historical records. The Khaksars are but one of the failed movements that
achieved nothing. Being proud of the Khaksars is like being proud of the KKK or
being proud of the Nazis of German or the Fascists of Italy. The only difference
is that the Nazis and the Fascist caught the imagination of the Italians and the
Germans. The Khaksars only caught the imagination of the demented few in the
Punjab. Their claim to fame was repeated assassination attempts on the
Quaid-e-Azam, Mohammad Ali Jinnah.
The fundamentalist militia group calling itself the Khaksars were led by their
mouse-hearted salar Agha Zaigham in 1938-40. They got their inspiration from the
brown shirts of Italy. They patterned their uniforms and their marching style
from Mousolinni and his Fascist Party. They were anarchists who wanted total
control over everything.
I quote Stanley Wolpert (Jinnah of Pakistan, Page 180):
” Paramilitary Muslim Khaksars were as hostile towards the Muslim League as they
were anti-Hindu and anti-Sikh……..As a whole however, the Khaksars never
reconciled to Jinnah’s leadership and tried more than once in the next few years
to assassinate him”
The Muslim League led by the Quaid-e-Azam and their march towards Pakistan was
an impediment to their fascist dreams. I quote the incident from Jinnah of
Pakistan by Stanley Wolpert: Page 224.
“Jinnah returned to Bombay from his tour of Baluchistan on Friday, July 23.
Three days later, on the afternoon of Monday, July 26, a fanatical young Muslim
Khaksar from Lahore, Rafique Sabir Mazangavi, entered the Quaid-i-Azam’s Mount
Pleasant Road house and appealed to Jinnah’s secretary, Mr. M.H.Saiyed for an
interview with the great leader. Just then Jinnah entered his secretary’s office
and asken who Tafiq was and what he wanted ‘I was very busy’, Jinnah testified
later in Bombay’s high court. My whole mind was on my correspondence and I was
trying to get out of the room. Just as I was about to leave the room, in the
twinkling of an eye, the accused sprang on me and gave me a blow with his
clenched fist on my left jaw. I naturally reeled back a bit when he pulled out a
knife from his wrist….It was an open knife….Instinct of self-defence made me put
out my hand and catch his wrist, with the result that the momentum of the blow
was broken but in spite of this the knife touched the left side of my jaw. I got
a cut near my chin and my coat near the left-shoulder…I also got a wound on my
left finger.
The last meeting of the All India Muslim League was held on June 10, 1947…..Here
is another incident narrated by Wolpert in Jinnah of Pakistan on Page 329:
“Khaksars rushed in through the once-tranquil garden, entering the hotel lounge
‘brandishing belchas, or sharpened spades…shouting get Jinnah!’ half way up the
staircase leading to the ballroom where Jinnah and the Council were ….in session
before…League National Guards could grapple with them and turn them back. It
took police with tear gas to bring the disturbance to an end. Some fifty Khaksar
would-be assassins were arrested….
The movement ended without achieving any results. The Muslim League routed them
at the polls and eliminated their attempts at arson and carnage. Their
assassination attempts on the Quaid-e-Azam were unsuccessful. Liaqat Ali Khan
however did get assassinated.
CRITICISM OF KHAN LIAQAT ALI KHAN
No Pakistani leader can be put on a pedastal and worshipped. Liaqat Ali Khan was
a politician, and he faced the political wrath of his opponents. The purpose of
presenting his criticism is to learn from history. Could he have formed better
alliances with the Unionists? Could he have curried favor with the Hyatts? Could
he have practised more inclusion? Could he have have created more consensus
politics? The answer to all the questions is yes. But he lived under enormous
pressure. He was a freedom fighter. He was unable to enjoy the fruits of his
victories like Fidel Castro. He was unlucky for he did not have the life of
Boumediene who was able to lead Algeria to victory, and then was able to give
stability and direction to the new nation. Like the Indonesian Sukarno, Liaqat
did not survive to enjoy his victories. Like Hazrat Usman, Liaqat Ali Khan faced
the charge of nepotism, and like Usman, he too was murdered by his opponents. If
a man is known by the stature of his opponents, then Liaqat Ali Khan indeed was
a great man.
The Khan was brutally honest, and he was a patriot till his last breath. He had
no bank accounts and he built no empires for himself. After his death, his wife
Rana Liaqat Ali Khan, had to work as government servant to support the family
till she died. The ahtishab commission would have absolved him, for he was never
charged with any personal crime of corruption. His struggle with the feudals was
the struggle for Pakistan. Shaukat Hyatt has criticized the Quaid and the Muslim
League in his ‘memoirs”. Hyatts agenda is clear. Demonize the Khan and demonize
Jinnah. Rock the foundations of the leadership of the Muslim League and this
will crumble the history on which the country stands. The opponents point of
view has to be understood and rebutted. Here is the criticism of the Khan by his
greatest enemy.
Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan, the last of the prominent Muslim League leaders, has
this to say in his Memoirs, “The nationa that lost its soul”, p. 178.
“He (Liaqat Ali Khan) delayed the completion of the Constitution to
avoidelections which he could not win because he had no seat in Pakistan and had
to be elected by East Pakistan. He, on the advice of officers belonging tothe
United Provinces, broke the Liaqat-Nehru Pact about the agreed areas for
migration from India to Pakistan, requiring the record of property to
beexchanged officially. He, quite against the agreement permitted inhabitantsof
UP and Rajasthan to enter via Khokhrapar – thus opening floodgatesendangering
the stability of the already overloaded boat of Pakistan. Iobjected to this in
the assembly. This action of Liaqat was quite partialallowing only people from
his old Province and the adjoining areas tomigrate unfairly into Pakistan in
order to create a seat for himself in Karachi. The people of the rest of the
India were left to stew in their own juice. This act of his created a lot of
confusion with people getting allotments in Sindh, without records on each
other’s dubious evidence. This led to the problems of MQM and their hatred by
Sindhis. These refugees got a monopoly of jobs in the cities and deprived local
Pakistanis of their rightful share. The political instability still
persists.”(source: Page 178 from the “Nation that lost its soul”, enclosed as
Vol 2.5 in the document)
Unable to find any flaws with the character and strategy of the freedom fighting
Khan, Hyatt uses the race card to discredit the Shaeed-e-Millat. The above
criticism of the Khan is invalid due to the following reasons:
In 1947 Forty percent of Pakistan was Hindu and Sikh, and more than 60% of
Lahore was Hindu and Sikh. If Pakistan had remained a state with these
population ratios, the viability of the fledgling state was at stake. A
Pakistani nation with 40% Hindus and Sikh could hardly be called Islamic and
could hardly have any laws that would allow the propagation of Islam.
The bulk of migration into Pakistan occurred across the Punjab border and
involved the Muslim Panjabis headed West to West Punjab, and the Hindu and Sikh
Punjabis headed East to East Punjab (and Haryana). Lahore, Rawalpindi, Sargodha
and Sialkot and other major cities of the Punjab were actually all Hindu or
Hindu dominated cities.
Most of the Muslim migration was not into Sindh and it was not out of the UP. In
the period right after independence, five Million East Punjabis were exchanged
with five million West Punjabi Hindus and Sikhs. About 1.5 million Kashmiris
migrated to Lahore. The families of Muslim Leaguers like Nawaz Sharif are
progeny of that Kashmiri Muslim migration.
The Nehru-Liaqat pact was not adhered to. The Nehru-Liaqat pact died the day,
India refused the transfer of the assets to the government of Pakistan–planes,
cars, chairs, gold and bullion. It also died the day, Patel sent his police
action into Hydrabad. It died the day Junagarh was denied its right to accede to
Pakistan. It died long before Hari Singh acceeded to India.
5) Gurdspur was a Muslim majority area in East Punjab. Gurdaspur was in the
natural line of demarcation to be in Pakistan. It was on the Pakistani side of
the river. The Radcliff commission gave away Gurdaspur to India because it
provided an Indian road link to Kashmir. Gurdaspur had Pakistani flags
fluttering everwhere. It was given to India. Read Minto to see the details of
the massacre and the rape Muslims in Gurdaspur. The majority of the Muslim
majority Punjabi inhabitants were now set on the “Pakistan specials” bound for
Lahore and Pakistan. The same story went on in many many town and villages. For
details please see Collins (Freedom at Midnight). The Nehru-Liaqat pact faced
these types of human tragedies.
The Hyatt criticism fails to mention the alliances Liaqat Ali Khan had with many
other Non-Unioninst, independent and Muslim League Punjabi leaders. Liaqat Ali
Khan founded the Punjab Muslim League, nurtured it and used it to defeat the
Unionists. The League struggle against the Congress allied with the Unionists is
not mentioned by the Hyatt memoirs. The Khan and the League were popular in the
Punjab, he had electoral victories in the Punjab to prove this fact. The
creation of Pakistan was indeed possible because the Congress-Unionist alliance
was defeated in the Punjab.
The Khan formed alliances and chose pro-Pakistani elements. It is obvious that
he did not promote the likes of Hyatt because he did not want pro-Congress
sympathizers in his government. Many/most of the early Muslim Leagers from the
Punjab were the allies of the Khan. These very leaders formed the intelligentsia
of the Punjab and Pakistan today.
The instability in Sindh is a complex issue created by many mistakes. Some of
these mistakes are being rectified by the PML-MQM government in power.
The battles in the streets of Karachi are ethnic and religious in nature, all
conflicts have that element, but the main cause of friction is Karachi and Urban
Sindh is ECONOMIC. To brand the problems as ethnic is dismissing a phenomenon
that has to do with the evolution of South Asian society.
Here is a more credible historian who paints us a realistic picture of the
events of Pakistani freedom. The book is “HAD THERE BEEN NO JINNAH” (@1989 by
Salahuddin Khan Printed by: PanGraphics (Pvt) Ltd. Islamabad.pages 14-15
In a letter to Jinnah, in January 1937, Nehru declared,
“In the final analysis, there are only two forces in India today- British
Imperialism, and the Congress representing Indian Nationalism, the Muslim
Leaguerepresents a group of Muslims, having no contact withthe Muslim masses.”
This statement was indeed a great victory for the League for Jinnah and for
Liaqat Ali Khan. It defeated the Unionist-Congress alliance in the Punjab and
the Badsha Khan-Congress alliance in Sarhad. Both alliances would have defeated
Pakistan if allowed to flourish.
I quote from Reference which is very Anti-Liaqat, but this gives us a very deep
insight into the politics of the time:
“Punjabi chauvinism and Liaqat Ali Khan’s favoritism was at each others throat.
The fight was furious and Mr. Khan was not a gentleman either. Mr. Khan was
desperate to build his political base in the newly formed state. He could go to
any length to achieve his personal goals” .
Political History of Pakistan, Vol. 4, edited by Hasan Jafar Zaidi,
Idara-Mutala-i-Tarikh. pp 185-187
Liqat Ali Khan was a philanthropist, who took keen interest in developing the
Muslims of East Punjab the place of his birth. He supported many institutions in
Karnal and assisted as many Muslims as he could. Details of his philanthropy are
clearly listed in Professor Ziauddin’s book Liaqat Ali Khan: Builder of
Pakistan. He chose the old Muslim Leaguers who had supported the Quaid and had
fought for Pakistan. It did not matter where the supporters originated—–the test
was loyalty to Pakistan.
Charging Liaqat Ali Khan with nepotism, and commenting on the appointments
Liaqat Ali Khan had made, here is another quote from the Political History of
Pakistan:
Hashim Raza, administrator Karachi; his brother Kazim Raza, IG police;
Aal-e-Raza, also brother of Hashim, Public Prosecutor; Superintendent CID; Home
Secretary Punjab, all of them from UP. Liaqat Ali Khan did all this to secure
his political success from Karachi at least.
Here is Hasan Jafar Zaidi defending Liaqat Ali Khan:
It doesn’t mean that Punjab was being suppressed. The then chief secretary East
Bengal, Aziz Ahmad was from Punjab. The commander of army in Bengal was (you
guessed it right) Maj. General Ayub Khan was from Hazar…. They never gave the
respect to political leadership of Bengal either.
This incorrect sentiment against Liaqat Ali Khan (planted by the antagonist of
the Muslim League, the great feudal Mr. Khizar Hyatt and the pro-Congress, and
anti-Pakistan, Unionist Party ) has been uprooted in our historical records and
died in the feudal stronghold of Rawalpindi and the Potowar region (the
Hyatt-Tiwans stronghold). After the creation of Pakistan the pro-Congress/Gandhi
Unionist Party of Punjab went extinct but the remnants of the old political
guard still oppose the Muslim League or what it stood for. Shaheed-e-Millats
anniversary cannot be ignored. It is the anniversary of the victory for
Pakistan. Liaqat Ali Khan has been given his rightful place in history. The
ablest lieutenants of the Quaid has his place next to the the Quaid. The nation
calls him shahed-e-millat. Pakistani patriots call him shaheed-e-millat. If
Quaid-e- Azam was the founder of nation, Quaid-e-Millat, Liaqat Ali Khan was the
builder of the state.
Preservation of our history is our sacred duty. This site would be a very boring
place without the interactive dialogue and the criticism of our leadership.
Criticism of our leaders is an essential part of the dialogue. More criticism of
the Khan and of the Muslim League will be rebutted in the columns.
THE END
APPENDIX A
Recently declassified documents regarding Liaqat Ali Khan’s assassination
return to Paul Wolf’s home page
Pakistan: Partition and Military Succession
Documents from the U.S. National Archives
POLITICAL INTRIGUEJinnah met Mahatma Gandhi on equal terms for negotiation to
resolve the political stalemate at home on Malabar Hill in Bombay from September
9 to 29, 1945, and rejected his formula. He took to task the three Premieres,
Sikander Hayat Khan of Punjab, Fazl-ul-Haq of Bengal, and Saadullah of Assam,
for joining the National Defence Council by subverting the Muslim League
resolution of September 29, 1940.
By 1945, the Muslim League succeeded in setting up its party ministry in four of
the provinces, and in the fifth, it held a strong position by putting pressure
on the dispirited and shrinking Unionists party in Punjab.
This work is more an exchange between Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan on matters
relating to the radicalisation of Muslim politics when both were engaged in a
life-and-death struggle for the creation of Pakistan. It throws more light on
Jinnah than on Liaquat Ali Khan.
There is nothing personal in these letters, despite Liaquat Ali Khan’s efforts
to engage Jinnah in it. Jinnah was a hard nut to crack, icy cold, reserved,
taciturn, who praised or complimented none, and yet showed no tension. He was
secretive. Even though he drew up his will in 1939 and appointed Liaquat Ali
Khan his trustee for it, he never told him so, and it was only after his death
that the latter learnt of it.
An utterly lonely man, Jinnah was incapable of maintaining a loving relationship
with anyone. It would have been a treasure trove to read Jinnah’s love letters
to his wife Rattenbai Petet or to anyone, but such a document nowhere exits.
Jinnah’s relationship with his colleagues was not the kind that the Mahatma
shared with his party workers. He chose no heir, though he regarded Liaquat Ali
Khan as his right hand. The correspondence shows that Jinnah lived like an
Englishman.
He was fabulously rich and invested a great deal of money in shares and
property. On several occasions, the Muslim Legaue borrowed money from his
personal coffers. It is incredible that by addressing his huge audience in
English who did not understand what he was saying, he captured their hearts and
imagination and fired them with a passion to throw in their lot with him.
Belonging to the well-known aristocratic family of Punjab and being son of the
Nawab of Karnal, Liaquat Ali Khan inherited a huge property in Meerut. After
taking BA from Oxford and Bar-at-law, he returned to India at the end of 1922
and joined the Muslim League in 1923. As an Independent, he served as Deputy
Speaker in the UP Council in 1931. As a member of the United Provinces National
Agricultural Party, he represented the landed interests and opposed the separate
electorate before the Joint Statutory Commission which came out of the Round
Table Conference in the early 1930s.
He became the General-Secretary of the Muslim League in 1936 and held this
office till 1947 and slaved for the success of its mission. He became the
Finance Member of the Viceroy’s Executive Council in 1946 and the first Prime
Minister of Pakistan in 1947. Scrupulously honest, he refused to accept property
in Pakistan in exchange for his land holdings in India, and after his death, his
son and his wife, a Christian, Ranana Sheila Irene Pant, had to live in a house
donated by the government.
This work projects Liaquat Ali Khan as a mild, well-meaning man of moderate
disposition who shunned controversies. Mediocre in intellect, his sincerity of
purpose and dedication made it easier for him to inspire confidence among his
party workers. This work shows how the Muslims felt threatened by Hindu
majoritarianism and feared that the Federation as envisaged under the Government
of India Act (1935) would complete their disaster.
By mobilising the Muslim mass support, Jinnah widened his political base to
fight the Congress. One is tempted to conclude from this work that the Congress
was outmanoeuvred by Jinnah’s brilliant strategy and leadership, and Liaquat Ali
Khan’s famous budget speech on February 28, 1947, in the Legislative Assembly,
which hit the business magnets supporting the Congress, turned the tide in the
Congress in favour of Partition. On March 3, 1947, Khizar Hayat Khan was forced
to resign as Chief Minister due to Muslim League pressure, and the way was clear
for the creation of Pakistan.
The editing and annotation of Long’s work is superb and the explanatory notes
are suavely perceptive. However, Long’s praise of Stanely Wolport’s studies of
Nehru and Jinnah is unjustified; he completely ignores S. Gopal’s comprehensive
biography of Nehru. He also tends to ignore the Congress viewpoint on important
political situations.
The period (1937-1947) chosen by Professor Long is momentous in the making of
Pakistan. In the pre-1937 period, the Muslim League was a weak and inert
organisation, destitute of leadership, funds and the press. It was seen as a
coterie of toadies and sycophants basking in the sunshine of British patronage,
passing stereotyped, mild resolutions for the protection of Muslims interests
and making speeches in the Assemblies and at the Muslim League annual sessions.
Mohammad Ali Jinnah then counted nowhere. He was rebuffed by the stalwart Muslim
leader, Fazl-I-Husain in Punjab, and distrusted by the Congress. The British
ignored him.
By 1939, the Muslim League became a strong and spirited organisation, and in
March 1940, it demanded a separate homeland, an independent, sovereign Pakistan
State, and by 1945, Jinnah emerged as the sole spokesman of the Muslims, who
made high bids and vetoed all constitutional proposals suggested by the Congress
and the British government. He scuttled the Simla conference in June-July 1945
and asked for parity with the Congress in the Viceroy’s executive council.
Jinnah met Mahatma Gandhi on equal terms for negotiation to resolve the
political stalemate at home on Malabar Hill in Bombay from September 9 to 29,
1945, and rejected his formula. He took to task the three Premieres, Sikander
Hayat Khan of Punjab, Fazl-ul-Haq of Bengal, and Saadullah of Assam, for joining
the National Defence Council by subverting the Muslim League resolution of
September 29, 1940.
..Belonging to the well-known aristocratic family of Punjab and being son of the
Nawab of Karnal, Liaquat Ali Khan inherited a huge property in Meerut. After
taking BA from Oxford and Bar-at-law, he returned to India at the end of 1922
and joined the Muslim League in 1923. As an Independent, he served as Deputy
Speaker in the UP Council in 1931. As a member of the United Provinces National
Agricultural Party, he represented the landed interests and opposed the separate
electorate before the Joint Statutory Commission which came out of the Round
Table Conference in the early 1930s.
He became the General-Secretary of the Muslim League in 1936 and held this
office till 1947 and slaved for the success of its mission. He became the
Finance Member of the Viceroy’s Executive Council in 1946 and the first Prime
Minister of Pakistan in 1947. Scrupulously honest, he refused to accept property
in Pakistan in exchange for his land holdings in India, and after his death, his
son and his wife, a Christian, Ranana Sheila Irene Pant, had to live in a house
donated by the government.
This work projects Liaquat Ali Khan as a mild, well-meaning man of moderate
disposition who shunned controversies. Mediocre in intellect, his sincerity of
purpose and dedication made it easier for him to inspire confidence among his
party workers. This work shows how the Muslims felt threatened by Hindu
majoritarianism and feared that the Federation as envisaged under the Government
of India Act (1935) would complete their disaster.
By mobilising the Muslim mass support, Jinnah widened his political base to
fight the Congress. One is tempted to conclude from this work that the Congress
was outmanoeuvred by Jinnah’s brilliant strategy and leadership, and Liaquat Ali
Khan’s famous budget speech on February 28, 1947, in the Legislative Assembly,
which hit the business magnets supporting the Congress, turned the tide in the
Congress in favour of Partition. On March 3, 1947, Khizar Hayat Khan was forced
to resign as Chief Minister due to Muslim League pressure, and the way was clear
for the creation of Pakistan.
By 1945, the Muslim League succeeded in setting up its party ministry in four of
the provinces, and in the fifth, it held a strong position by putting pressure
on the dispirited and shrinking Unionists party
Professor Roger D. Long with a foreword by Stanely Wolpert. Oxford University
Press, Karachi. Pages 328. V.N. Datta
This fantastic transformation of the Muslim League would not be possible without
Liaqat Ali Khan–the forgotten hero of Pakistan. Today PTV does not show the
Liaqat fist, and there is no national holiday for this hero. All this is based
on pre-independence politics when Liaqat rubbed many the wrong way. It had not,
there would have been no Pakistan.
Assassination of Liaquat Ali KhanG-2 BID Report No. R-91-48, June 15,
1948Subjects Touched on by Liaquat Ali Khan in Speeches During His Tour of
Western Pakistan, Oct. 5, 1948Congen Lahore reports Liaquat shot this afternoon
while attending meeting of Muslim City League at Rawalpindi. Operated on due two
shots in chest. Hospital reports wound serious but not rpt not necessarily
fatal. Assailant killed by crowd not rpt not yet identified. Information not rpt
not yet confirmed by GOP Karachi. Confidential Telegram from Karachi Embasssy,
Oct. 16, 1951Prime Minister killed at Rawalpindi by Islam League fanatic. No rpt
no internal disturbances reported. … Embassy informed Cabinet meeting tomorrow
to be presided over by Governor Gen. who will probably step down as GG and take
over temporarily as PM. Reference EmbDesp 409 October 4. Confidential Telegram
from Karachi Embassy, Oct. 16, 1951Although popular information attributes
assassination to Khaksars, high authority in Government informs Embassy that
killer Syed Akhbar, was an Afghan national and was motivated by (1)
Pukhtoonistan sentiment and anger over political detention of his brother and
(2) resentment over Pak Govts cautious attitude toward Kashmir. Killer had
participated in Kashmir war. Source says connection with Pukhtoonistan will not
rpt not be released to press. Killer left his home in Abbotabad for Rawalpindi
on 14th. Emergency meeting of available Cabinet Ministers with Secy Gen Mohamed
Ali presiding just concluded. No rpt no indication successor; decision probably
not rpt not made. Confidential Telegram from Karachi Embasssy, Oct. 16,
1951Government press information department is now telling press that assassin
was Afghan national. Press information officer now says identity established as
member of Jagran tribe. Present state of public opinion indicates strong
possibility of public demand for war if this information accepted by public.
Confidential Telegram from Karachi Embasssy, Oct. 17, 1951
The Situation in Pakistan, Oct. 17, 1951
Comment on the Assassination of the Pakistani Prime Minister, Oct. 17, 1951
The Assassination of the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Oct. 18, 1951
Special Note: The Assassination of the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Oct. 18, 1951
(11 pages; William Langer’s name appears on report)
Overt Activities by Communists and Other Former Security Prisoners, Nov. 16,
1955
Misc Political
Political, Press and Economic Developments for the Period Ending April 29, 1953,
May 1, 1953
Political, Press and Economic Developments for the Period Ending April 21, 1953,
April 22, 1953
The subject of U.S. military aid to Pakistan remained the dominant political
theme during the week. On December 19, 1953, the Government of Pakistan
presented a note to the Soviet Embassy in Karachi replying to the Soviet note of
November 30 which demanded “clarification” of the press reported on the subject
of “American military air bases” in Pakistan. … The Indian National Congress
party’s drive to arouse public opinion in India against US military aid to
Pakistan evoked a bitter reaction in Pakistan. Public opinion media referred to
it as a “hate campaign” and held it to be particularly significant as it was
government sponsored. Weekly Summary of Political Events for Week Ending
December 24, 1953, Dec. 24, 1953
Weekly Summary of Political Developments for Week Ending December 19, 1953, Dec.
19, 1953
Summary of Political Developments for the Week Ending June 19, 1953, June 20,
1953
Weekly Summary, Political and Economic Events 29 October thru 4 November 1953,
Nov. 5, 1953
Weekly Summary of Political and Economic Events, Sept. 24 through Sept. 30,
1953, Oct. 1, 1953
Weekly Political and Economic Report, Jan. 25 – Feb. 1, 1953, Feb. 2, 1953
Political and Economic Developments for the Week August 10-16, 1952
Political and Economic Developments July 15-21, 1952, July 21, 1952
Political and Economic Developments July 8-14, 1952, July 14, 1952
Political and Economic Developments for the Week Ending April 3, 1952, April 3,
1952
Political and Economic Developments for the Week Ending, March 20, 1952, March
20, 1952
Anti-Ahmadiya Agitation in Lahore, March 10, 1953
Confidential Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Feb. 28, 1953
Political and Economic Developments in East Pakistan During Week Ending March
14, 1952, March 15, 1952
Political and Economic Developments in East Pakistan During Two Weeks Ending
March 7, 1952, March 8, 1952
Weekly Summary Dec 15-21, 1952, Dec. 22, 1952
Weekly Summary, Dec. 1-16, 1952, Dec. 8, 1952
Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Jan. 16, 1953
Confidential Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Feb. 18, 1953
The Islamic Constitution of Pakistan, Jan. 11, 1954
Brief resume of talks between the Honourable Prime Minister and the
Vice-President of U.S.A., held on 7-12-53, July 12, 1953
Memorandum of Conversation with Yusuf Haroon, April 3, 1954
The Pakistan National Alliance: Participants and Prospects, circa Aug. 1977
OPERATIONAL THEMES: … To link communism with imperialism by demonstrating that
the original meaning of the word is being used as a cloak for planned conquest.
… To show the communists as anti-God and therefore a threat to the continued
existence of the Muslim world as a free and independent religio-political
entity. … To promote the Islamic socio-economic concept under which there will
be freedom and dignity for the individual and which will provide for the
elimination of economic disparities and inequities. Coordinated Program for
Combatting Communism in East Bengal, Aug. 7, 1951
Pakistan’s Problems, Jan. 8, 1979
The World Muslim Conference (Motamar-e-Alam-e-Islam) in Karachi sponsored a
meeting on February 23 in observance of “Hasan-el-Banna Day” which was presided
over by the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem and addressed by El-Amiri and Syed Ramazan;
the latter was termed the son-in-law of Hasan-el-Banna, the founder of the
Muslim Brotherhood. Although the Secretary of the World Muslim Conference in
conversation with officers of the Embassy evinced little interest in the
formation of the Brotherhood, it is possible that the Motamar will support the
embryonic organization. Formation of Muslim Brotherhood Branch in Pakistan, Feb.
28, 1952
Matta Riot
Suhrawardy Scores Victory Over Leftist Opponents in East Pakistan, June 16, 1957
[...]It was learned within Pakistani Foreign Office that while UK pressing
Pakistan for support re Iran, US demanded Pakistan exploit influence with Iran
and support Iran transfer oil fields to US. Liaquat declined request. US
threatened annul secret pact re Kashmir. Liaquat replied Pakistan had annexed
half Kashmir without American support and would be able to take other half.
Liaquat also asked US evacuate air bases under pact. Liaquat demand was
bombshell in Washington. American rulers who had been dreaming conquering Soviet
Russia from Pakistan air bases were flabbergasted. American minds set thinking
re plot assassinate Liaquat. US wanted Muslim assassin to obviate international
complications. US could not find traitor in Pakistan as had been managed Iran,
Iraq, Jordan. Washington rulers sounded US Embassy Kabul. American Embassy
contacted Pashtoonistan leaders, observing Liaquat their only hurdle; assured
them if some of them could kill Liaquat, US would undertake establish
Pashtoonistan by 1952. Pashtoon leaders induced Akbar undertake job and also
made arrangements kill him to conceal conspiracy. USG-Liaquat differences
recently revealed by Graham report to SC; Graham had suddenly opposed Pakistan
although he had never given such indication. [...] Cartridges recovered from
Liaquat body were American-made, especially for use high-ranking American
officers, usually not available in market. All these factors prove real culprit
behind assassin is US Government, which committed similar acts in mid-East.
“Snakes” of Washington’s dollar imperialism adopted these mean tactics long time
ago. Confidential Telegram No. 1532 from New Delhi Embassy, Oct. 30, 1951
Copyright Paul Wolf, 2003-2004. No copyright to original government works. For
educational use only.
Resignation of Pakistani Prime Minister Suhrawardy, Oct. 12, 1957
I have just talked with Ghulam Mohd who asked me to send you his affectionate
greetings. He said he is bearing up very well under shock of Liaquat’s death and
necessity for taking immediate decisions that have resulted in his appointment
and Nazimuddin’s Premiership. They are being sworn in tomorrow afternoon at
four. Confidential Telegram from Karachi Embasssy, Oct. 18, 1951
This p.m. I had tea with Ghulam Mohammed following his arrival from Rawalpindi
by train. He stood journey without undue fatigue and his convalescence does not
appear to have been retarded by shocks of last 2 days. He will take oath of
office as Governor General tomorrow at 4 p.m. and will immediately swear in
Nazimuddin as PM. Announcement of new Cabinet will not be made immediately.
Liaquat’s cabinet will continue in their various port-folios for time being.
Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Oct. 18, 1951
The Pakistan government has identified the assassin of Liaquat Ali Khan, late
Prime Minister of Pakistan, as being Sayed Akber, son of Babrak Khan. If that
assertion is true, the above mentioned Sayed Akber, together with his brother,
[Za]marak, insurged against the government of Afghanistan in 1944 at a place
named Elmara in Jadran, situated in the southern province of Afghanistan. The
government forces defeated the insurrection and the two brothers escaped. After
wandering for some time, they surrendered themselves to the British frontier
authorities who interned them in Abot Abad, and granted them regular salaries.
After the partition of India, the said Sayed Akber was given asylum by the
Pakistan government. It is clear, therefore, that the said Sayed Akber had no
connection whatsoever with Afghanistan, which looks upon such activities with
great indignation. Official Afghan Reaction to Press Implications of Afghan
Complicity in Assassination of Pakistan Prime Minister, Oct. 18, 1951
Iskander Mirza Defense Secretary called on me yesterday morning before cabinet
meeting and asked my advice regarding Pak Govt attitude on publicity as to
Afghan nationality of Primins assassin, money found in his possession, etc. I
asked if facts were true and he said they were. I said that further publicity on
this line would have bad effect on popular mind and he apparently agreed.
Confidential Telegram from Karachi Embasssy, Oct. 19, 1951
Reliable source in Pak Intelligence Bureau reports that Pak Govt has been aware
intelligence activities of Afghan Consul in Peshawar for some time and that he
is known to have had recent and frequent contacts with Syed Akhbar, Assassin of
Primin. Secret Telegram from Karachi Embasssy, Oct. 19, 1951
Press reaction including Bengali to assassination Liaquat Ali Khan: papers
repeat GOI official’s remarks and expand expressions sympathy and condemnation
of violence in editorials. Moderation is keynote throughout with exception
extreme leftist press including Communist “Swadhinata” which states “Liaquat’s
death only reflects inevidable disaster that overtakes policy of playing lackey
to Anglo-American Powers,” also accuses Nazimuddin of “Western bias” and of
planning prevention improvement position Suhrawardy. … Speculation in Calcutta
tends emphasize probability assassination resulted same group (military) whose
planned coup March 1951 nipped by GOP. Sources think military extremists hands
strengthened. Restricted Telegram from Consulate General, Calcutta, Oct. 19,
1951
Afghan Charge handed Department October 18 translated communique from Kabul for
local press, stating in summary if GOP identification Liaquat’s assassin Syed
Akhbar as Afghan national correct, it was clear Akhbar and brother involved in
unsuccessful insurrection against GOA 1944 southern province following which
they interned India. Communique indicated GOA revulsion assassination. … Embassy
Kabul should seek occasion soonest convey substance above remarks Foreign
Office. While Department recognizes necessity Afghan pronouncement in answer
implications press reports, believes best interest both countries served by
limiting public discussion. Request earliest transmission fullest information
and Embassy comments re alleged 1944 insurrection and possibility Commie
instigation assassination. Secret Telegram from Secretary of State, Oct. 20,
1951
[] reports Afghan Consul Peshawar presently in Kabul. This confirmed by British
Embassy clerk who when on October 16 asked for transport in Egyptian Embassy
vehicle from Peshawar to Kabul was told seat was unavailable because Afghan
Consul had been promised transport to Kabul. Embassy feels Afghan Consul’s
departure not rpt not necessarily connected with assassination as no rpt no
information established connection available this time. Afghan press today
admits Liaquat assassin may have been one Syed Akbar from Khost Province in
Afghan but stated that he and brother Zamarak had fled to South Waziristan in
1945 after inciting unsuccessful rebellion and were later resettled in Abbotabad
and given pensions by British thus losing Afghan nationality. Consequently,
press maintains Afghan cannot rpt not be held in any way responsible. Other
source states assassin and two brothers (one named Izmair) were members leading
family Hjadran tribe in Khost Province and fled to South Waziristan when tribe
was defeated in 1945 uprising against Khost Provincial Government. Also states
assassin was member “Red Shirt” organization but affiliation two surviving
brothers, now residing Pakistan, unknown. Secret Telegram from Kabul Embassy,
Oct. 21, 1951
It seems generally accepted in [Rawalpindi and Peshawar] that Afghan Consul was
paymaster of assassin PAK PRIMIN. According to one story Consul made trip to
Afghan frontier in own car and upon arrival paid off his Pak chauffeur.
Chauffeur allegedly had no previous knowledge of trip or fact he was to be
dismissed and on return Peshawar spole of matter to friends and to Pak
Intelligence. In conversations with various non-official persons, including
Pashtuns, it was stated as self-evident fact that Pashtuns as group have always
provided assassins for suitable price. Pashtun racial background of assassin
SEYED AKBAR was accepted as wholly natural.Confidential Telegram from Karachi
Embasssy, Oct. 22, 1951
The Current Outlook in Pakistan, Oct. 22, 1951
In accordance GOP request Pakistan Press has refrained since October 19 from
referring to Afghan connections of assassin. Government has not released to
public information that assassin was in contact with Afghan Consul at Peshawar.
GOP has no information indicating any commie connection with assassination.
Secret Telegram from Karachi Embasssy, Oct. 23, 1951
Secret Telegram from Kabul Embassy, Oct. 23, 1951
Embassy today received Circular from Afghan Embassy containing following
remarks: Assassin said Akhbar and brother revolted against Afghan government
1944. After defeat rebellion they fled over border and finally gave up selves to
British authorities. For some unknown reason British gave them shelter in
Abbottabad, center of Hazara district, and also gave them money to live on.
After division Pakistan and India, Pakistan government, unconcerned about
international law or acknowledged neighborly behavior, have been investigating
against government of Afghanistan and, among other activities, have sought
services of this assassin. His late crime proves that assassin was not only
enemy of present regime Afghanistan but, through some other mysterious
machinations in Pakistan itself, he also became enemy of Pakistan government.
Government and people Afghanistan who could have possibly no connection with
assassin look upon such base and mean crime with abhorrence and disdain. Secret
Telegram from Moscow Embassy, Oct. 26, 1951
Under headline reading “Is Liaquat Ali Khan’s assassination result of a
deep-laid American conspiracy?”, leftist Urdu daily Bhopal named Nadeem
published article October 24 charging US with responsibility. Summary article
follows:
Recommend Department ignore article summarized in Delhi’s 1532. It is
compilation of utter falsehoods whose vituperation is some degree worse than
articles that appear from time to time in Bombay’s Commie-line “Blitz”. To issue
any statement labeling the facts in the article as lies will only give Nadeem an
importance it does not merit. The investigation into background of Liaquat’s
assassination is being conducted with extreme care and well guarded secrecy.
Gurmani tells me an intercept has been obtained which if backed up by further
material may reveal the assassination had some inspiration and followed the
pattern of Razmara’s assassination in Teheran. Confidential Telegram from
Karachi Embasssy, Oct. 31, 1951
Since article apparently not rpt not widely circulated, Department believes
preferable not rpt not issue public denial. In its discretion, however, Embassy
might informally mention case MEA with comment story so preposterous no rpt no
public denial intended. Would be interesting to know whether this story of
character which led adoption recent press law. Ownership management NADEEM
should be discreetly be investigated. Confidential Telegram from State Dept.,
Nov. 1, 1951
Soviet Press today carried Prague Despatch reporting Rude Pravo article based
Afghan press agency “Bahtar” information re assassination Liaquat Ali. Despatch
states after escaping Afghanistan due murders and other crimes “Said Akbar ran
to India and there under protection British authorities which gave him refuge in
Abbotabad and provided him money. After partition India Akbar remained in
Pakistan where he continued make use protection of certain British circles.”
“These facts adduced by Afghan press supporting position that murder Liaquat Ali
was result intrigue of imperialists in Asian countries.” Secret Telegram from
Moscow Embassy, Nov. 3, 1951 [only first page located]
The Embassy questions the premise stated in the first sentence of the Airgram
under reference (“Lack of spontaneous anti-Indian and anti-Afghan popular
outburst over both July war scare and Liaquat’s assassination suggests feeling
on Kashmir and Afghan disputes mostly government inspired.”) … The anti-Afghan
agigation that spontaneously sprang up on October 16-17 was effectively stopped
by the GOP’s prompt exercise of its official and unofficial powers of censorship
over the press, even to the extent of preventing reference after October 17 to
the assassin’s Afghan origin. Popular Feeling in Pakistan on Kashmir and Afghan
Issues, Nov. 10, 1951
With regard to the assassination of the Prime Minister in Rawalpindi, Colonel
Massart stated that he had not attended the meeting because of his UN position.
He stated that part of the public reaction was a great surprise to him, since he
found some of the non-commissioned officers nto expressing horror, but making
remarks, “He should have known better to come to Rawalpindi, where he should
have known that he would be shot.” The Colonel considers that Rawalpindi was a
center of “anti-Liaquat feeling.” Confidential Telegram from Lahore Consulate,
Nov. 14, 1951
Acting Foreign Minister Hussain informed me tonight in conversation called at
his request that Paks had recd information over past two-three weeks that Afghan
authorities rpt Afghan authorities had recently surreptitiously released from
incarceration over 120 known killers with orders infiltrate Pak and eliminate
Pak public men. At first Paks did not believe but Hussain states that
information has now reached Paks causing them consider reports beyond doubt. He
would not reveal sources of latter information beyond admitting that some came
from Pak Embassy Kabul but with most from many other sources. Added that if
other public men assassinated by suspected Afghan nationals government will be
unable hold people in check.Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Nov. 15, 1951
Liaquat Ali Khan was buried in the same manner (tomb) as Jinnah. In order to
accomplish this, a wall behind Jinnah’s grave was torn down and access to the
grave for the funeral procession was across a raised marble floor surrounding
Jinnah’s mazar to Liaquat’s grave in the rear. This has continued to be the
primary avenue to the grave of Liaquat used by the many mourners who still visit
there every day. It is reliably reported, however, that Fatima Jinnah ordered
the caretaker of Quaid-i-Azam’s mazar to rebuild the wall. She later repeated
the request to the Secretary of the Ministry of Works. The matter was put before
the Minister and on the same day orders were given to raise up the wall again.
However, shortly afterwards the new wall was torn down by what was variously
described in the press as a “bevy of All-Pakistan Women’s Association amazons”
to a “mob from Quaiddbad.” M.A. Zuberi, Editor of the Evening Star told an
officer of the Embassy that, in fact, two officers of the All-Pakistan Women’s
Association, of which Begum Liaquat Ali Khan is President, incited a group of
people at the mazar to tear down the wall. Public Role of Ms. Fatima Jinnah
Since Assassination of Liaquat, Nov. 17, 1951
The Commission inquiring into the security precautions taken at time of
Liaquat’s assassination reconvened Lahore Jan. 3. Among witnesses examined since
convening are Khan Najaf Khan, Special Police, and Anwar Ali, Deputy Inspector
General of Police, CIA (in “camera”). No conclusive findings made or announced
thus far. Political and Economic Developments for the Week Ending Jan. 8, 1952,
Jan. 8, 1952
Political Developments in Pakistan, Sept.-Dec. 1951, Jan. 30, 1952
The most significant internal development during the quarter, bearing on US
interests and objectives, was Liaquat’s assassination. Aside from being an
avowed friend of the US, Liaquat was a constructive factor of decision and
strength, both in government and party leadership. … It seems clear that Prime
Minister Nazimuddin, though basically friendly to the West, lacks the stubborn
firmness that served Liaquat, the Muslim League and the country as a whole in
its early formative years. Confidential Telegram A-251 from Karachi Embassy,
Feb. 11, 1952
Political Developments in Pakistan, January 1952, Feb. 25, 1952
Summary of report Liaquat assassination enquiry commission, released by GOP
yesterday, being sent in clear Embtel following. Emb believes commission report
which is vague and inconclusive leaves cabinet in more vulnerable position than
before enquiry started. Motive not established, according to released summary,
and GOP now wide open to accusations by its critics of suppression of info and
of not satisfying public demand, accusationswhich were made before release. It
seems possible that summary is much watered-down version of full report in hands
of GOP and that full facts will not be made public. Cabinet particularly
vulnerable on enquiry commission’s announcement that info would not be divulged
on three conspiracies uncovered.Confidential Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Aug.
18, 1952
Siddiq Wahab, one of speakers at public meeting August 14 addressed by Larachi
Muslim League dissidents, arrested by police Aug 18 for “promoting hatred
against Govt.” Emb local employees who attended meeting state that in addition
to demanding publication Liaquat assassination enquiry report Wahab accused
Nazimuddin and some of his cabinet of complicity in Liaquat assassination. Wahab
is a director of large Karachi Urdu daily Anjam. Begum Liaquat in statement
issued to press Aug 18 has strongly criticized published enquiry report. She
stated “anybody reading report will be impressed particularly by wise reserve
with which Commission left open the all important qusetion … that is, whether or
not act of assassin was individiaul act of Said Akbar or perpetrated by him in
pursuance of conspiracy,” and added “it is for nation now they have seen report
to judge for themselves whether they satisfied with steps so far taken to track
down hidden hand behind tragedy.” Confidential Telegram from Karachi Embassy,
Aug. 19, 1952
Speculation is wide that the assassination was part of a conspiracy involving
persons high in provincial or Central Govt. Khan Najaf Khan seems to be the
convenient scapegoat. In fact careful reading of report shows there was
negligent handling of security measures all down the line and at the inquiry
both the Punjab Govt. and the North West Frontier Province Govt. seemed far more
interested in passing the blame to each other and in covering up for their own
officials than in getting at the truth. NWFP is involved because the assassin
was under local detention in Abbotabad, NWFP, and was not supposed to make a
move without police permission. Political and Economic Developments for the Week
Aug 17-23, Aug. 25, 1952
Sudden death in air crash of GOP Inspector General of Police brought forth
revelation that he was to be officially assigned to case. Press sources claimed
he was already secretly working on it. H.S. Suhrawardy, head of opposition
Junnah Awami League called on GOP to compel Punjab Government to do its duty in
getting to the bottom of the assassination conspiracy. Political and Economic
Summary for Week Aug. 24-29, 1952, Aug. 30, 1952
The Inquiry Committee investigating the recent plane crash in which GOP
Inspector General of Police was killed has revealed that all the principal
documents relating to the Liaquat assassination investigation were on the plane
and had been received safely. It is believed here by some that this is another
link in the chain of suspicious events surrounding the assassination. Had the
plane burned on crashing, as tehre was good reason to expect, all the documents
would have conveniently disappeared and the investigation would have practically
come to an end. This of course has served to increase the rumors that high
officials are implicated in the assassination and are making every effort to
prevent an honest and efficient investigation. Political and Economic Summary
for Week August 30 – September 5, 1952, Sept. 9, 1952
The release of the report which hinted at dark conspiracies and accused several
police officials of derelication of duty in failing to take proper security
precautions, opened the dam for a flood of rumors, suppositions and
speculations. The most popularly accepted theory was that the assassination was
the result of a conspiracy in which high officials were involved and that
efforts had been, and were being made, to suppress an impartial and thorough
inquiry. The Inquiry Commission was appointed by the Punjab government and much
criticism was heaped on its head as a result of the report. Many demands were
made for the Central Government to take up the investigation. Soon after the
report was published, the Inspector General of Police of Pakistan was killed in
a freak air crash. In the plane wreckage were found all the documents pertaining
to the investigation. It thus leaked out that the central government had in fact
been working on the case through a few days earlier the Prime Minister had
stated that it was a purely provincial matter. The rumor factories at once
linked the air crash with alleged attempts at suppression of evidence and
concluded that it was all part of a well laid plan. However, after a few days of
sensational reporting of the case the press did a black out and popular
curiosity seems to have died down. Bi-Monthly Political Report – July and
August, 1952, Sept. 12, 1952
Khan Najaf Khan, Police Official accused of negligence in failing to take proper
security precautions for the safety of Liaquat has reportedly answered the
charge sheet served on him. The burden of his answer is not yet revealed but it
is assumed by all he will plead not guilty to the charges. Begum Liaquat has
again charged that the government is dragging its feet in pressing the
investigation of the assassination. COMMENT: It is widely rumored here that the
charges against Najaf Khan are merely a cover for the parties really responsible
for the assassination. Bazaar rumors are to the effect that he will be
temporarily suspended but taken care of either financially or otherwise. Begum
Liaquat has not failed to point out the inconsistency of the claim made by the
GOP Prime Minister that the investigation was a purely provincial matter with
the later revelation that the GOP Inspector General of Police was investigating
the matter on behalf of the Central Govt and was conveniently killed in a recent
plane crash. It has also been statedsoto voce that the true instigators of the
assassination are the same persons behind the Rawalpindi conspiracy to overthrow
the government. A connection of some sort was hinted at in the official report
of the assassination investigation. The link, it is rumored, lies in the fact
that Liaquat was insisting on the death penalty for the conspirators and it was
therefore necessary to eliminate him. Whether this connection is true or not, it
is a fact that after Liaquat’s death the charges against the conspirators seem
to have reached a stalemate and there are recent consistent reports of their
impending release. ConGen officer was told by Finlay’s representative in Lahore
that his company had received a letter signed by “ex-Major General Akbar Khan,
Hyderabad Central Jail” inquiring as to prices of tractors and other
agricultural equipment and stating that the writer expected to engage in large
scale cultivation “within six months.” General Akbar Khan was the ringleader of
the Rawalpindi conspiracy, and this communication if true would seem to indicate
that at least the chief protagonist expects to be released in the near future.
Political and Economic Summary, September 29-October 6, 1952, Oct. 6, 1952
Unnamed spokesman for GOP answered Begum Liaquat’s charges that investigation
not pursued as actively as possible. He explained position of central govt. vis
a vis provincial govt as being limited by Constitution to that of providing
coordination and advice, but repeated that Law and Order are provincial subjects
under Constitution. Punjab govt appointed Justice Abu Akram of the Federal Court
of Pak to inquire into charges proferred against Khan Najaf Khan, police
official accused of negligence in assassination. Weekly Political and Economic
Summary, Oct. 6-12, 1952, Oct. 13, 1952
The formal inquiry before Mr. Justice Abu Saleh Mohammed Akram of the Federal
Court, against Khan Najaf Khan, police official accused of negligence, started
this week. It is being held in camera. Comment: It should be noted that a
Federal court judge has been selected to conduct the inquiry in order to avoid
the charges of provincialism which were levelled at the Assassination Commission
itself. Nevertheless confidential reports reaching ConGen are to the effect that
the present inquiry will be a whitewash and that Justice Akram is under the
influence of Chief Min. Daultana and was selected for this very reason. Weekly
Summary of Political and Economic Events, Oct. 20-26, 1952, Oct. 27, 1952
An unconfirmed news item appearing in the local press stated that the Punjab
Govt is considering taking action against Khan Najaf Khan, Police Official, who
has been accused of negligence in the Liaquat Assassination Commission Report. …
According to the report if Mr. Najaf Khan is found to have been guilty of
negligence he may appeal his case to the Central Govt as he in fact belongs to
the Pak Police Service and is only on loan to the Punjab. Weekly Summary of
Political and Economic Events, 18-25 January 1953, Jan. 26, 1953
The Punjab police have completed the inquiry into the assassiantion of the late
Prime Minister, Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, and now the scene of inquiry has been
shifted to the Frontier Province where the Inquiry Board consisting of Director
of the Intelligence Bureau and the Inspector-General of police of the Punjab and
the Frontier, will continue further investigations. Weekly Summary of Political
and Economic Events, Feb 23-3/1, 1953, March 2, 1953
According to a press report Khan Najaf Khan has been exonerated by the Pakistan
Public Service Commission. At the time of Liaquat Ali Khan’s assassination Najaf
Khan was Senior Superintendent of Police at Rawalpindi and was also acting as
the Deputy Inspector-General of Police in that area. Mr. Justice Abu Saleh
Mohammad Akram, a Judge of the Federal Court, had conducted an inquiry against
Khan Najaf Khan in connection with Liaquat Ali’s murder. Weekly Summary of
Political and Economic Events, June 18-24, 1953, June 25, 1953
The agitation to force the Government to publish the report of the commission
investigating former Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan’s assassination and to
induce the Government to adopt more stringent measures to apprehend the guilty
parties was continued during the reporting period. A DAWN suggestion that
Scotland Yard be called in to solve the murder elicited strong pro and con
feelings. Weekly Summary of Political Developments for the Week Ending October
30, 1953, Oct. 31, 1953
With considerable emotion, Begum Liaquat spoke about the assassination of her
husband, the late Prime Minister. She said it was fantastic that two years after
a murder in broad daylight before thousands of peopel, not one arrest had been
made. What harm could come from a thorough investigation? Witnesses had not been
questioned, no real attempt at investigation had been made, and yet when a
demand for this was made, the Government not only refused but “hired” the editor
of a paper who himself had been in jail under a previous Cabinet (Suleri of the
Times of Karachi) to campaign against Dawn and the people demanding an
investigation. Memorandum of Conversation with Begum Liaquat Ali Khan, Nov. 21,
1953
No, repeat no, objection Prime Minister announcing he intends request US aid in
obtaining services private, repeat private, investigator. You should make clear
to Prime Minister this assent does not guarantee success in finding satisfactory
person in US and that US Government participation would extend only to informal
aid in search for investigator as it has offered such aid to Pakistan on
previous occasions for technical experts. Secret Telegram from State Dept., Dec.
29, 1953
Nur Ahmed … urged that the appointment of a “foreign expert” to investigate the
murder of Liaquat Ali Khan be made before October 16, the anniversary of
Liaquat’s death. Nogum Nahie [?], Karachi Municipal Councillor, whose press
statements, like those of Nur Ahmed, appear with rather astonishing frequency,
asked on October 5th why the promised “foreign expert” had not appeared. “The
Prime Minister’s broadcasts say nothing about the matter nearest to every
Pakistani’s heart. Maybe foreign detectives are here and are at work.” Summary
of Political Events for Week Ending October 8, 1954, Oct. 9, 1954
Anniversary of the death of Liaquat Ali Khan - Begum Liaquat Ali Khan, newly
appointed Ambassador to the Netherlands and widow of the former Prime Minister,
assassinated on October 16, 1951, issued a 500 word statement from the Hague
calling for a solution to the crime and asking six leading questions: 1) “Why”
was Liaquat murdered at the height of his popularity, “on the eve of … important
policy decisions”; 2) “Why” was the assassin shot after he had already been
overpowered; 3) “Why” was the police official responsible (for shooting the
assassin) promoted instead of punished; 4) “Why” were “certain interested and
influential persons within the country … anxious to remove Liaquat”; 5) “Why” is
the Quad-i-Azam’s name “being subtly and unjustly ignored”; 6) “Why” are these
questions not answered. Liaquat’s son, Wilayat Ali Khan, also issued a statement
in which he pointed to the political and economic deterioration of Pakistan in
the past three years and called upon the Central and Provincial Governments to
cooperate with the newly appointed foreign expert, C.P. U’ren in his
investigation. The Karachi Muslim League organized a public meeting at Jehangir
Park, Karachi, to commemorate the anniversary. The principal speaker, Sardar
Abdur Rab Nishtar, spoke generally on the “economic deterioration” of the
country, provincialism, and eulogized the former Prime Minister. He claimed that
Liaquat had been pressing for certain reforms at the time of his assassination.
Nishtar was followed on the platform by Mohsin Siddiqi, General Secretary of the
Karachi Muslim League adn by S. M. Taufique, President of the Karachi Muslim
League.Weekly Summary of Political Events for Week Ending October 23, 1954, Oct.
23, 1954
Ghulam Mohammed
Ghulam Mohammed says he has no intention of dying before his work of building
Pak has been reinforced and more progress made in organizing the Muslim world
against Communism. He wants you to know that Zafrulla, Gurmani and he have no
intention of allowing “India’s pin-pricks” to lead to an evolvement of war.
Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Sept. 7, 1951
Ghulam Mohammed emphatically repudiated the insinuation in some sections of the
press that the help received by Pakistan from foreign countries had any
political strings. He stated that “Pakistan’s freedom and independence were not
for barter – but that it was an Islamic obligation to acknowledge kindness with
gratitude.” Weekly Summary of Political and Economic Events – May 14-20, May 21,
1953
The subject of the Eyes Only telegram No. 341 of November 2 from Karachi on the
question of the dangers of Pakistan constitutional development along theocratic
lines was handled in the following manner. … The President did not refer
directly to the question of religious influence referred to above but by his
questions let it be known that we in the United States had an interest in seeing
Pakistan work out her problems so that she would have an effective
constitution.Discussion with Ghulam Mohammed, Nov. 13, 1953
Regarding Kashmir, I apprehended trouble from Nehru and he is now trying to use
the American aid to us as an excuse for going back on international stipulations
and obligations. We took a calculated risk in these two matters depending on
your word and promise. I do hope you will stand by us so that Nehru is not
allowed to get out of international obligations and is not able to throw dust in
the eyes of the world over Kashmir on the excuse of American aid. I appreciate
the delecacy of the situation, but I feel that my country can rely on your
promise to ensure justice for us. Letter from Ghulam Mohammed to John Foster
Dulles, March 23, 1954
The Embassy desires to emphasize again that these documents were given to the
Ambassador in the strictest confidence and any revelation of the source would
seriously damage relationships with the Governor General. … “I have in the
course of my discussions regarding Arab countries joining USA and other
countries in a plan for mutual defense, felt that there is a wave of opposition
in some Arab countries and that others are lukewarm. My discussions have shown
that this opposition proceeds from the causes set out below which need early
attention …Transmittal of Revised Document Received from the Governor General,
May 21, 1954
I told the Governor General that he was being credited by the U.S. with having
been helpful in bettering relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States
during the Haj visit, whereupon the Governor General said the King was just like
a nephew to him. Memorandum of Conversation with Governor General Ghulam
Mohammed, Nov. 4, 1954
Pakistan’s Leaders Face Difficulties in Achieving Political Stability, Feb. 4,
1955
Ghulam Mohammed has in fact assumed virtual dictatorial powers. Embassy
convinced however Department’s assumption correct that immediate motive is to
serve administrative convenience. … Re Callahan’s predictions concerning
indefinite deferral democracy, Embassy considers these observations indicate
failure understand real nature of problem here. Fact of matter is Pakistan lacks
most of essential elements which provide basis for democratic government in
Western countries and effort to judge developments here by degree which they
approximate standards appropriate these countries altogether unrealistic and
almost totally irrelevant. Secret Telgram from Karachi Embassy, March 30, 1955
According to a usually reliable source in the Governor-General’s household,
Ghulam Mohammed kept General Mirza and Chaudhri Mohammad Ali on tenterhooks for
several days as he refused to sign the resignation prepared for him. He was
rational for several days preceding the ceremonial ten described in the
referenced despatch but “childishly” stubborn about signing away the last
vestige of his rule. His daughter’s and son-in-law’s entreaties failed, but an
aide finally persuaded him to sign by promising him a trip to his favorite
Muslim shrine near Lucknow, India. The source, a layman, described Ghulam
Mohammed’s mental affliction as a failure of blood supply to one portion of the
brain. This condition is permanent; Ghulam Mohammed’s health continues to
improve but he will never again have the full use of his faculties. For almost
two months after his stroke on June 27 Ghulam Mohammed’s utterances were 90
percent irrational; the proportion is now reversed. Ghulam Mohammed’s
Resignation, Sept. 23, 1955
Iskander Mirza
Lt. Col Iskander Mirza, Secy of Defense Ministry, today asked Emb Army Attache
pass following to me: Major General Akbar Khan “is 100 percent Communist” and
has been in contact with Communists since he recently took up his job as Chief
of Staff at Rawalpindi. In personal opinion Col Mirza, conspirators motivated by
dissatisfaction with GOP handling of Kashmir issue and feeling that Pak should
turn away from Western powers and toward Soviet Union. In addition to those
whose arrest has been announced, Air Commodore Janjua, senior Pak airman
recently returned from school in UK is under house arrest. Janjua is known to
have been in contact with conspiring army officers. Two unnamed communists,
presumably civilian, are being sought but have gone underground. Brigadier
Hussain, Director Interservices Intelligence, expressed opinion to Army Attache
that there is some unrest in Pak Army especially among junior officers and
enlisted men, because of failure to settle Kashmir issue. Some members of Army
strongly believe a change in Govt is only solution. Secret Telegram from Karachi
Embassy, March 10, 1951
When I called upon Sec Def (Mirza) this date on the MDAP matter he volunteered
the following information which he asked me to pass on to the American
Ambassador: a. Major General Akhbar Khan, senior military man involved in the
conspiracy, is 100% communist. When he came to Rawalpindi as Chief of General
Staff he contacted the communists of the Punjab. b. In addition to the people
mentioned in the paper as having been arrested, the senior Pakistani Air
Officer, Air Commodore Jinjua, recently returned from UK is in “house arrest.”
He had conferred with the defecting army officers. c. In the opinion of Colonel
Mirza, dissatisfaction with the handling of the Kashmir affair is probably
behind this affair. He thinks that these officers wish to change their
governments orientation from the West to Russia. d. He thinks that the Russian
Embassy to Pakistan had something to do with the plot. He said that the Embassy
had spent considerable money in the Punjab, to the extent of giving cameras to
people.Secret Memorandum for the Record, March 10, 1951
Colonel Mirza, GOP Defense Secretary, stated to ConGen while visiting Lahore
that Martial Law should be continued for a considerable period, in order that
the politicians woudl understand that they had a duty of patriotism toward the
country and could not act for their own selfish purposes. He did not indicate
what period of time Martial Law would remain in force. He also stated that it
was necessary that the civilian authorities did not revoke any of the Court
Martial sentences. Without making a statement to that effect, he gave the
impression that he was of the opinion that Daultana should be removed. Weekly
Summary of Political and Economic Events, March 12-18, 1953, March 19, 1953
[emphasis in original]
I am convinced that at the present time the Government of Pakistan is being
influenced strongly by a group of civil servants who have the backing, if not
the actual participation, of the Pakistan Army. As far as I can determine, the
definite members of this clique are Iskander Mirza, Akhtar Husain, and Agha
Hilaly. Inasmuch as it is almost impossible for anything to happen at the
secretarial level without the knowledge of the Cabinet Secretary, Aziz Ahmad,
and inasmuch as he attended the Cabinet meeting on the night of February 26 at
which the decision was taken to act firmly in the religious agitation, it is
more than probably that Aziz is a participant. More than likely his brother,
Ghulam Ahmad, the Interior Secretary and Intelligence Chief, is also involved. …
I do not believe the group has influence or power enough yet to dictate
political decisions to the Prime Minister. … AS you will recall from my
conversation with General Ayub, I was told by Ayub that while he was reluctant
to enter politics, he would take “no nonsense from the Center.” That, of course,
was before the declaration of martial law in Lahore. Iskander Mirza subsequently
told Col. Ashworth that as long as the Central Government proceeded in the right
direction it would have Army support. He, too, implied that they would step in
if there were signs of deviation from the present firm policy. Top Secret Office
Memorandum of Karachi Embassy, April 6, 1953
Gen. Iskander Mirza leaves tonight midnight for Dacca to assume Governorship
East Bengal tomorrow. … Impossible predict reaction East Bengal; violence
certainly may occur. Mirza emphasizes has no desire rule by military force alone
recognizes necessity establish clean administration. At same time he may be
ruthless toward Communists. Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, May 29, 1954
PriMin asked me to see him this morning. He said in view close relationships our
two countries he was telling me in greatest confidence that decision had been
taken impose Governor’s rule East Pakistan. Governor would be Iskander Mirza who
was summoned from London and who will leave for Dacca tomorrow. … PriMin stated
first act of Governor would be to arrest known communists. … PriMin stated
intensified activity would proceed two fronts, psychological and economic. GOP
plan establish two new radio stations East Bengal, step up informational program
to high degree. On economic front Governor would see that peopel received cheap
necessities of life, namely food, cloth, kerosene, mustard oil and salt. Secret
Telegram from Karachi Embassy, May 29, 1954
Iskander Mirza sworn in as Governor East Bengal 1800 hours. N.M. Khan Chief
Secretary GOEB. Section 92-A (Governor’s rule) effective 1800 hours. IG police
states District Magistrates to be given free hand for arrest “subversives”.
Minister Sheikh Mujibir Rahman will be arrested immediately. Confidential
Telegram from Dacca Consulate, May 31, 1954
“The present Governor of East Bengal has for private and personal reasons
expressed a desire to be relieved of his office. It has therefore been decided
to replace him by Major General Iskander Mirza who will be sworn in today.”
Telgram from Karachi Embassy, June 1, 1954
Mirza said the only way for the US to stiffen Ali’s spine was to tighten the
windscrew of economic and military assistance, making such assistance clearly
dependent upon assurances of sane govt in Karachi. Mirza strongly recommended
this course of action to US and stated his belief that Ali would respond
favorably. Secret Telegram from London Embassy, Oct. 4, 1954
Mirza says he refused urgent calls return Karachi from London to await Primin.
Believes Sunday’s action in best interests country, especially retaining Primin.
Asked whether he expected trouble Mirza replied “We will make trouble,” meaning
guilty would be punished. Said much to be cleaned up; for example Primin now
finally recognized Mirza right in asking punishment corrupt Bengalis. Secret
Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Oct. 26, 1954
Major General Mirza has said that democracy ran riot during the last seven
years. It was not democracy but the denial of democratic rights that was
responsible for the harm that has been done to our dear country. Had democracy a
fair play, the evils would have been corrected long ago. UF Statement on General
Mirza, Nov. 19, 1954
Comment on future form of government in Pakistan, Dec. 24, 1954
According to the Gazette of Pakistan dated January 21, 1955, Major General
Iskander Mirza, C.S.P., retired from Government Service with effect from October
24, 1954. In effect this post-dated action removes from General Mirza the onus
of having been appointed to a Cabinet post while still a member of the Civil
Service. Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Jan. 25, 1955
Pakistani government will ignore challenge to its legality, Feb. 12, 1955
Iskander Mirza speaking February 15 to newly-organized West Pakistan Brotherhood
praised Armed Forces highly and denied they taking active interest politics, and
said “they have never taken part in politics nor is there any danyer that they
will do so.” Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Feb. 17, 1955
Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, March 11, 1955
NSC Briefing: Background — Estimated Balances in Pakistan Politics, June 12,
1956
Secret Letter from Ambassador Hildreth to John Foster Dulles, Sept. 20, 1956
April 1953 Coup
Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, April 18, 1953
Confidential Telegram from Karachi Embassy, April 19, 1953
It becomes clear that Nazimuddin dismissal was planned and accomplished through
combined efforts of Army leadership (specifically Def Secy Iskander Mirza and
C-in-C Gen Ayub) and Gov Gen himself. Frustration which EMB has reported over
past few months grew to exasperation at weakness and vascillation of Nazimuddin.
Without doubt action by Iskander Mirza to declare martial law in Lahore Mar 6 in
spite of PRIMIN objections saved country from what might have become national
disaster. Mirza has apparently been in close touch with Gov Gen. Decision was
taken by Gov Gen himself that PRIMIN could not be successfully managed and
dismissal was planned. EMB believes very few people in Govt were privy to this
decision – perhaps no one except Mirza and Ayub. … EMB believes unity now exists
in country which has not prevailed since assassination Liaquat. Army is in firm
position and will brook no nonsense. Whether Mohammad Ali will be able rise to
demands of situation is not entirely certain and it is possible stronger leader
such as Qayyum may take over at later date. EMB believes that in this favorable
situation, US faces great opportunities develop closer relations with Pakistan
and influence PAK policy toward settlement outstanding issues and toward firmer
commitments to free world. Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, April 20, 1953
Perhaps this is the true picture: the Governor-General, Mr. Ghulam Mohammed
could never have dared to dismiss a Ministry which had appointed him, had he not
have had the support of the Army. The Army would take its cue from the Defense
Secretariat. Therefore this is in fact a coup d’etat by Mr. Iskander Mirza and
the Army, which has nominated Mr. Mohammed Ali as its agent. The Army (which
includes Mr. Iskander Mirza) would not have been encouraged to do this, if it
was not certain that the new dispensation would have the support of the
Americans, on whom today Pakistan is almost wholly dependent for its food
requirements, and to carry on the ordinary expenses of the Administration. We
can give this credit to the Army that it, like other common citizens, saw that
the country was going to the dogs, that the prevailing regime had lost the
confidence of the people, that it had not the capacity to remedy the existing
state of affairs, and that at the same time it could not carry the people with
it in any of its measures. The Army, too, may have started getting ideas after
its contact with the people and the civil administration in Lahore. The
Americans must have been in contact with the Army, and the coup d’etat must have
had their blessings. The Americans must have found (i) That there was no point
in butressing an unpopular Ministry. (ii) There there was no point in giving
supplies to an incompetent Ministry which would dissipate those supplies. (iii)
That there was no hope of getting appropriation from Congress unless it was
satisfied that the Ministry in Pakistan had popular support and Army support.
(iv) That an unpopular Ministry cannot succeed in inducing the people to accept
its policy in international affairs, and hence such a Ministry is useless to the
Americans if they want Pakistan to accept the international policy of America.
That is to say an unpopular Ministry in Pakistan cannot deliver the goods and is
therefore useless for the American global strategy. The change in the
Administration is therefore a result of American plus Army maneuvers, born of
the conviction, for which there is every justification, that Nazimuddin’s regime
was thoroughly unpopular and incompetent. Letter from H.S. Suhrawardy, April 21,
1953
Reversing their earlier critical attitude toward Nazimuddin, [the Awami League]
are now shedding crocodile tears over his removal from the Prime Ministership,
asserting that GHULAM MUHAMMED and his cronies from the Punjab had determined to
eliminate Nazimuddin because he supported the provision in the BPC Report for
“parity” between East Bengal and the rest of Pakistan in representation in the
National Legislature. Political, Press and Economic Developments for the Week
Ending June 24, 1953, June 25, 1953
Constititional Coup of September 21, 1954
Confidential Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Sept. 22, 1954
Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Sept. 25, 1954
Pakistan Political Crisis, Sept. 25, 1954
Unsigned Top Secret Telegram #74, Sept. 25, 1954
Top Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Sept. 27, 1954
The “Constitutional Coup” in the Constituent Assembly, Oct. 2, 1954
Divestment of Governor General’s Powers by Constituent Assembly, Oct. 3, 1954
Reftel and other recent Karachi messages seem clearly imply new group may well
try seize control GOP within next few months. Motives and character Consembly
rebellious element indicate new govt would be more to right than current clique
with conservative “old Moslem leaguers” in dominant position but with little
chance of communist or other leftist influence. Dept concedes good possibility
such group might be less cooperative, less friendly to United States than
present PriMin. Secret Telegram from John Foster Dulles, Oct. 6, 1954
While agree change Govt would not increase Communist leftist influence,
situation East Bengal different from that West Pakistan. Commies stronger East
Bengal would exploit instability which might result. Secret Telegram from
Karachi Embassy, Oct. 7, 1954
Mohammed Ayub Khan
The Department of Defense has reported that the Military Attache in Karachi has
recently recommended the award of the Legion of Merit to the Commander-in-Chief
of the Pakistan Army, General Mohammed AYUB Khan, stating that this
recommendation is strongly supported by the Ambassador. Secret Telegram from
Department of State, July 10, 1951
General Ayub stated that he had been talking to the leading politicians of
Pakistan, and had told them that they must make up their mind to go
whole-heartedly with the West. … He stated that the Pakistan Army will not allow
the political leaders to get out of hand,and the same is true regarding the
people of Pakistan. He stated that he realized that the Army was taking on a
large responsibility, but that the Army’s duty was to protect the country.
Secret Telegram from Lahore Consulate, Dec. 23, 1952
The Commander-in-Chief stated that he felt that there was no danger, from either
politicians or the public, to overthrow the present Government, but in case
there was such an attempt the Pakistan Army would immediately declare martial
law and take charge of the situation. If the situation was critical, the Army
would declare a Military Government in order to secure stability for Pakistan.
He stated the Pakistan Army would not allow either politicians or the public to
ruin the country. Top Secret Despatch from Lahore Consulate, Feb. 13, 1953
He said that the army was not interested in going into politics but that he had
no intention of letting things get out of control. He said the army was a
stabilizing force in Pakistan and that he would take no nonsense from the
politicians. … I got the distinct impression from Ayub and from subsequent
conversations with his senior officers who were in Lahore at the same time, that
the Pakistan Army is definitely ready to take control should Civil Government
break down, although they would be reluctant to do so. Memorandum of
Conversation with General Mohammad Ayub Khan, Feb. 28, 1953
I took General Ayub for cocktails last evening and he is very much discouraged
with our Number One guest who arrives in Washington this afternoon. He thinks
there may be repercussions along the lines of your recent cables but expresses
no alarm as far as the country as a whole is concerned. He is terribly confident
of the ability of the Armed Services to step in any time as, if and when
necessary. Secret Telegram from State Department, Oct. 14, 1954
NSC Briefing: Pakistan, Oct. 29, 1958
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
It will be noted that he was accused inter alia of incitement of the masses to
violate law and create disorder, violation of Secton 144, speaking so as to
excite disaffection with the GOP, and disclosures of state affairs regarding
weapons supply. Grounds for Detention of Bhutto, Dec. 4, 1968
MI officer told him that 24 officers arrested had been plotting to assassinate
President Bhutto at Lahore People’s festival (revival of old Lahore horse show)
when he attended as chief guest on March 31. Report of Military Assassination
Plot Against President Bhutto, April 2, 1970
Central Intelligence Bulletin, Dec. 24, 1971
On February 7, I made a routine call on Rao Rashid, Deputy Director of
Intelligence. … It was tragic, mused Rao, to have a man at the helm who despite
all the blunders he committed, refused to step aside to the end, even though the
nation was being destroyed. Political Notes, Feb. 17, 1972
Level of political violence and shrillness of political rhetoric has been on
increase recently. Apart from Sind language riots, there have been disorderly
political incidents in Lahore, Rawalpindi and elsewhere. Heightened political
atmosphere has coincided with Bhutto’s greater involvement in grass-roots
politics in wake Sind riots. While regime’s miscalculations and oppostion
irresponsibility have contributed to new atmosphere, it seems also to reflect
degree of return to pre-1971 “politics as usual.” Although disquieting, trend
toward violence does not yet threaten Bhutto regime. Main present danger is that
regime will be goaded into more repressive measures which could feed still more
violence. Domestic Political Violence on Increase Aftermath Sind Disturbances,
Aug. 4, 1972
Pakistan: Factionalism in Bhutto’s Party, July 1, 1975
Jamaat-e-Islami
Jamaat-e-Islami, which translated literally means “Islamic Organization,” is a
Mullah-led, reactionary Islamic political party. Prior to partition the Jamaat,
founded in 1941, was an inactive religious group without major interest in
politics. However, since partition it has assumed an active part in politics and
has gained strength, although it still plays a minor part in Pakistan politics.
… At the annual meeting of Jamaat-e-Islami held on November 10 through 13, party
leaders displayed an interesting combination of reactionary religious ideology,
communist line propaganda and ideas of the welfare state. The meeting was
attended by delegates from all over Pakistan. … Certainly not a powerful force
in Pakistan politics today … the party is significant as an example of
reactionary Islam in Pakistan politics. Annual Meeting of Jamaat-e-Islami,
Pakistan, Nov. 28, 1951
The information contained in this report is from Ghulam Mohammed, Secty. Karachi
Jamaat-i-Islami. He was anxious to get information on this organization into the
hands of the American Embassy, he stated, because the organization “is
misunderstood by foreign embassies and is the target of false propaganda from
the Muslim League.” Jamaat-i-Islami (Islamic Party) was established in
pre-partitioned India in 1941. Its main object is “revival of Islam, in both
letter and spirit. We believe Islam is a complete code of life. We believe in
democracy, with some changes regarding the limits of legislation. We believe
that the government should be run by the people, but that the representatives
are duty-bound to fulfill the laws written in the H.Q. Confidential Embassy
notes, author unknown, circa 1951
Thirteen members of the Jamaat-e-Islami have been taken into custody by the
Martial Law Authorities in Lahore including Maulana Maudoodi, Mian Tufail
Mohammad and Maulana Amin Ahsan Islahi. Eighteen other Jamaat-e-Islami members
were arrested outside the Lahore Martial Law area under the Provincial Public
Safety Act. Comment: Maulana Maudoodi was one of the few prominent religious
leaders who had escaped arrest during the general round-up of extremist Mullahs.
He has now been arrested on the strength of a pamphlet which was just published
in which Maudoodi tried to attack the Ahmadiyas by clever implications without
indulging in open incitation. Martial Law authorities howwever felt that he had
overstepped and thereupon arrested him. Weekly Summary of Political and Economic
Events, March 26-April 1, 1953, April 2, 1953
Maulana Maudoodi, leader of Jamaat-i-Islami, arrested Mar 28 during
anti-Ahmadiya agitation in Lahore, found guilty of complicity in riots by
military tribunal May 11, and sentenced to death.Confidential Telegram from
Karachi Embassy, May 12, 1953
Following the protest meeting and strike on the 14th occasioned by the sentence
of Maulana Maudoodi reported in the Consulate’s despatch 96 dated May 14, 1953,
an effort was made to organize a Maudoodi Day on May 22. Whereas the first
demonstration was organized by Ulemas, the one scheduled for the 22nd was
sparked by political opposition groups headed by the Awami League. Political,
Press, and Economic Developments for the Week Ending May 27, 1953, May 28, 1953
Congen has no rpt no information to confirm GOI intelligence report that
Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) groups planning attacks on Indian diplomats. Although prior
to partition, JI supported Congress Party and opposed creation of Pakistan, JI
has adopted anti-Indian position since partition. Its leaders, including
recently retired Maulana Maudoodi, have advocated both moral and secular
legality. Report of Planned Terrorist Attacks on Indian Diplomats, Nov. 7, 1972
Muslim Brotherhood
The Embassy’s confidential source stated that the organization was almost
still-born, with no activities and few members. It is believed, however, that a
recent conference of world Muslim divines held in Karachi may have given a
fillip to the branch. In addition to Mahmoud Sawwaf there were several Middle
Eastern Akhwan leaders at the conference. Hassan-ul-Hudeibi, the president of
the Brotherhood did not come from Cairo but sent as his deputy Allama
Mahmood-uz-Zubairi of Yemen. As-Syed Baha El-Amiri, the erstwhile Syrian
Ambassador to Pakistan, fired from his job as a result of differences with
Colonel Shishakly, was at the conference as Syrian delegate. Before his
diplomatic appointment, El-Amiri was an officer in the Syrian Brotherhood.
Another Akhwan leader, Sheikh Syed Ramazan of Egypt was also in attendence.
The Anti-Christian Riot at Matta, Aug. 28, 1951
Memorandum of Conversation with Rev. Frank Llewellen, Aug. 16, 1951
Of the 22 defendants, two were sentenced to death and 10 were sentenced to 19
years. The drafting officer has spoken to a few lawyers in Lahoer regarding
these sentences. All were of the opinion that the two sentenced to death would
have their sentence commuted to 15 years, and the others to 5-8 years by the
reviewing court. The Christian missionaries with whom the drafting officer has
spoken in regards to the trial all feel satisfied that justice was done – even
if the sentences are commuted. Confidential Despatch from Lahore Consulate, Dec.
21, 1951
Anti-Communist Program in East Pakistan
PURPOSE: To destroy Communist influence and develop a positive (counter) program
based on the new national ideals of Pakistan. … Collaboration between the USIS
and the Government of East Bengal is to be kept secret. To this end every
attempt will be made to keep knowledge of the program confined to the three
officers of the American Consulate and the three officers of the Government of
East Bengal whose concerted effort is necesssary to the formulation of plans and
policies.
Developments in Iran and Egypt are seriously affecting Pakistan popular position
reference United States and we should now expect period of critical attitudes.
This change may imperil parts of information program. Clearly any revelation of
my private understanding with top GOP officials will create greatest
embarrassment to them. … View GOP changing position it is most imperative that
all discussion be halted bringing GOEB personnel to Washington for discussion
this highly delicate operation. If information officer GOEB is later sent to US
as Leader Specialist, he should be given leader itinerary treatment and should
not repeat not be consulted about policy matters affecting cooperation East
Pakistan. We must assume he does not know of my overall understanding. Secret
Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Nov. 5, 1951
Re Leader-Grant for either GOP or GOEB official, Department merely indicated
availability of Grant in relation to request contained in Dacca Despatch 13;
with assumption Embassy retaining actual perogative of nominating whomever
desirable. If Embassy does desire send any official as straight leader-grantee,
special project will not be discussed in Washington as you recommend.Secret
Telegram from State Department, Nov. 16, 1951
Department will not invite GOEB official for purpose discussing subject your
Despatch 13. However, ordinary leader-grant can at some future date be offered a
Dacca journalist or even GOEB official, under normal Embassy selection
processes. Secret Telegram from Secretary of State, Nov. 17, 1951
Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Feb. 23, 1952
Confidential Telegram from Dacca Consulate, Feb. 28, 1952
Chief Minister Nurul Amin attended a meeting of the Mymensingh District Muslim
League workers on June 14 and addressed the conference at some length. He
reviewed the origins of, and government action during the Dacca riots in
February, and announced that he had conclusive proof that these groups of
people, viz. communists, other foreign agents, and political mal-contents had
conspired to subvert the state from within. As for the communists, he quoted
from a Calcutta communist paper which boasted of the party’s assisting the
Language Movement in the right direction. As to the foreign agents, he
dramatically flourished a secret document which he said was a circular of
February 12 of an organization with headquarters outside Pakistan calling upon
its members in East Pakistan to exploit the Language Movement. The name of the
organization he withheld in the public interest. As for the disgruntled
politicians, he observed that they are well known, and their motive in mising
into the Language Movement and the riots was to split East and West Pakistan (he
did not refer to the United Bengalers as such, but he evidently had them in
mind). Confidential Telegram from Dacca Consulate, June 21, 1952
Confidential Telegram from New Delhi Embassy, Feb. 27, 1953
Telegram from New Delhi Embassy, May 6, 1954
Political, Press and Economic Developments for the Week Ended May 21, 1953, May
22, 1953
Telegram from Karachi Embassy, May 26, 1954
Political Developments for the Two Weeks Ending December 16, 1953, Dec. 17, 1953
Meanwhile there remains somewhat uncomfortably in my mind real concern over the
Governor General’s attitude and approach to affairs these days. … I certainly do
not see how running around East Bengal smashing Commies has much relation to
what happened to the League in that province. Of course I see where a good
Commie campaign might help disrupt the UF — but then what? Governor’s Rule?
Martial law? The League has some hard lessons to learn. I hope the price won’t
be too high or the instruction period too long. Secret Telegram from State
Department, April 27, 1954
Agitation in East Bengal Schools and Colleges, Sept. 29, 1955
Political Attitudes and Opinions, East Pakistan, April 28, 1955
Gov. told me today will outlaw commie party East Bengal tomorrow. Said requested
authorization from Center mid-June but only answer to date is under
consideration. Thus, following abortive commie attempt few days ago blow up main
bridge into Dacca he has decided to proceed [unilaterally]. Center as yet
uninformed but will receive telegram from Gov. simultaneously with announcement
of demarche. Confidential Telegram from Dacca Consulate, July 6, 1954
Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Sept. 19, 1955
Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Aug. 12, 1955
Current Position of Communism in Pakistan, July 10, 1953
APPENDIX B
Sunday, December 5, 2004off the shelf
Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan and Partition
V. N. DattaDear Mr Jinnah: Selected Correspondence and Speeches of Liaquat Ali
Khan, 1937-1947edited by Professor Roger D. Long with a foreword by Stanely
Wolpert. Oxford University Press, Karachi. Pages 328. Price not stated.
This compilation of selected correspondence and speeches of Liaquat Ali Khan,
that comes with a foreword by Stanely Wolpert, well-known Jinnah biographer,
focuses on highly significant issues and events which proved crucial in the
creation of Pakistan. Of special interest to the reader is the author’s
prefatory notes.
The period (1937-1947) chosen by Professor Long is momentous in the making of
Pakistan. In the pre-1937 period, the Muslim League was a weak and inert
organisation, destitute of leadership, funds and the press. It was seen as a
coterie of toadies and sycophants basking in the sunshine of British patronage,
passing stereotyped, mild resolutions for the protection of Muslims interests
and making speeches in the Assemblies and at the Muslim League annual sessions.
Mohammad Ali Jinnah then counted nowhere. He was rebuffed by the stalwart Muslim
leader, Fazl-I-Husain in Punjab, and distrusted by the Congress. The British
ignored him.
By 1939, the Muslim League became a strong and spirited organisation,
and in March 1940, it demanded a separate homeland, an independent, sovereign
Pakistan State, and by 1945, Jinnah emerged as the sole spokesman of the
Muslims, who made high bids and vetoed all constitutional proposals suggested by
the Congress and the British government. He scuttled the Simla conference in
June-July 1945 and asked for parity with the Congress in the Viceroy’s executive
council.
Source: www.RupeeNews.com