On December 16, 1971, the
official Pakistani media in West Pakistan continued to look normal and
unconcerned to Pakistan's political and military debacle in East Pakistan. For
days, people in West Pakistan did not believe the foreign media reports of
Pakistani troops surrendering to Joint Eastern Command of Indian and Bangladeshi
Armed Forces led by Lt. Gen. Jagjit Singh Arora. In fact, Lt. Gen. Amir Abdullah
Niazi, Martial Law Administrator Zone-B and Commander Eastern Command signed the
instrument of abject surrender before Gen. Arora in the presence of a seemingly
large hostile Dhaka crowd, chanting slogans against Pakistan. It was only a few
days before, Gen. Niazi had spoken of defending Dhaka until last soldier
standing and over his dead body. However, he seemed to have lost faith after an
Indian MIG war plane dropped bombs on Governor House, Dhaka. Subsequently, he
started impressing upon the GHQ, the need for an early cease-fire or surrender
to avoid bloodshed. He was also encouraged in his pursuit by the then Governor
East Pakistan by conveying similar themes to President Gen. Yahya Khan at
Rawalpindi. Gen. Niazi who had lost all hopes; spoke to Gen. Hameed, then Chief
of General Staff in GHQ on the night falling on 13/14 December asking him for
impressing upon President Yahya to move swiftly regarding his so called proposal
for a cease-fire. Brig. Siddique Salik, then Chief of ISPR in Dhaka, through his
eye-witness-account, as quoted in his book, described the details of the lost
wisdom of Lt. Gen. Niazi. Brig. Salik was visibly surprised over certain very
ill-conceived moves of Gen. Niazi, which led to abject surrender and killing of
a large number of innocent West-Pakistanis, Beharis and other loyal Bengali
citizens at the hands of Indian saboteurs and Mukti Bahini insurgents. A few
hundreds and thousands Behari Pakistanis still languishing in Bagladeshi Refugee
Camps. The fact may not be ignored that India was secretly conspiring to
dismember Paistan since the new born state came into being after an agreement
between the three stake holders in British India i.e., Lord Mount Batten the
Britsh Viceroy, Indian National Congress led by Jawahar Lal Nehru and handi Ji
and Muslim League led by Quaid e Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah on 3rd of June, 1947.
Since India failed to achieve its objective in 1965 war, the two sides held a
Summit Conference at Tashkentand signed an agreement on 10 January, 1966. The
two sides agreed that both sides willcreate good neighbourly relations in
accordance with the United Nations Charter. It was agreed upon that relations
between India and Pakistan shall be based on the principle of non-interference
in the internal affairs of each other. However, after singning the Tashkent
declaration India started interfering in the internal affairs of East Pakistan
through Agarthala Conspiracy in June 1968. Mr. Mujeeb ur Rehman never denied its
links with Indian Agencies in his life time, while her daughter Hasina Wajid,
the current Prime Minister of Bangladesh has also verified in ne of her recent
statements that his father (Mujeeb ur Rehman) had a detailed meeting with RAW
(Indian intellence) in London and finalized stretegy for the creation of
Bangldesh. India helped organize ‘Mukti Bahini’ for acts of terrorism in
formerly East Pakistan who were trained at Establishment Base-22 Comando
Training base in Chakrata Deradoon. Sheikh Mujeeb ur Rehman was, however,
released without trial after the creation of Bangladesh but Hasina Wajid
continued punishing Pakistan supporters even after 43 years of the creation of
Bangladesh.
Coming back to the events of the sordid history, In fact, President Gen. Yahya
did not endorse the cease-fire/surrender plan put forward by Gen. Niazi to GHQ.
However, as testified by Brig. Salik, a telegram dated December 14, 1971,
received in Dhaka at 1730 hours, Gen. Yahya reportedly supported the idea for
local ceasefire and finding a solution for the safety of Armed Forces personnel,
the people of West Pakistan serving in East Pakistan, Beharis and other loyal
Bengali citizen. But due to the inept handling of the crisis management, Gen.
Niazi ignored the instructions for ensuring the safety of all concerned,
resulting in large scale killings of West Pakistanis, Beharis and the loyal
citizen by the Mukti Bahini insurgents. Gen. Niazi also failed to issue any
notice to West Pakistanis and loyal citizens to move to Cantonment areas, before
proposing a so-called cease-fire to Gen. Manak Shah. So much so that many of
these loyal citizens came to know about the abject surrender through All India
Radio, and when they tried to move towards Cantonments, many of them were
brutally killed by the Mukti Bahini terrorists.
The events in Dhaka verify that Gen. Niazi made hasty moves after receiving the
said telegraphic instructions from Rawalpindi. He ignored adequate planning, to
accopmlish the given task by GHQ in a befitting manner. Immediately after
receiving consent to his local ceasfire proposal, he rushed to U.S Consulate
General in Dhaka and sought help from the American Consul General for
facilitating contact with Gen. Manak Shah, ostensibly for immediate cease-fire,
thus opening the gate for abject surrender. According to some reliable reports,
the much baffled US Consul General, promised to help Gen. Niazi and informed
Washington about the amazing development, before communicating the same to Gen.
Manak Shah. The Indian General sensing moral collaspe of Gen. Niazi, responded
swiftly through his communication dated December 15, 1971, demanding immediate
ceasefire and surrender of Pakistani Forces before the so called Joint Indian /
Bangladesh Eastern Command. Gen. Niazi endorsed Manak Shah’s message to GHQ
wherefrom Gen. Hameed advised Gen. Niazi to deal with the cease-fire as a local
arrangement, if it fulfills his requirement, as the matter is before the United
Nations and as such the local arrangements of ceasefire will not be binding on
the Govt. of Pakistan.
The News about this ill-conceived request reached Washington at a time, when
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was confronting a tough Polish Resolution in the Security
Council forcing on Pakistan, a cease-fire demanding withdrawal of Pakistani
troops and handing over power to Bangladesh Leaders. Media reports at that time
suggested that United States Government was busy in consultation with UN
Security Council Members to elicit suppor for British / Italian Resolutions for
a cease-fire, but the onus was immediately shifted to a cease-fire on West
Pakistan borders when United States came to know about Gen. Niazi’s intention
for surrender. Mr. Bhutto was much baffled to know about the pitiable move and
it was in the backdrop of this move that Bhutto tore his papers and walked out
of the Security Council meeting refusing to become a party to the abject
surrender in former East Pakistan.
It appears from the relevant media record that the US Government was not happy,
the way Gen. Yahya’s government handled the crisis situation in East Pakistan.
Earlier, the then US Secretary of State William Rogers announced on December 05,
1971 that the deteriorating situation in the South Asia posed a threat to
international peace and security. Hence the United States joined other members
of the Security Council in requesting an emergency session of the Security
Council to discuss India-Pakistan fighting. The Security Council considered a
resolution duly supported by the United States asking for cease-fire and
with-drawl of troops. But the Soviet Union, holding a permanent right of veto,
negated the majority view. The matter was transferred to General Assembly, where
the sentiments of the member countries went in favour of the resolution casting
104 votes in favour and 11 against, with ten abstentions. But the General
Assembly resolution was not binding, so India took advantage of the situation.
A lot more has been said about the movement of 6th US Fleet during East Pakistan
crisis. Pakistani public opinion in those burning days had great expectations
from the United States and most of the populace in West Pakistan criticized
United States for not supporting Pakistan at the hour of need. But the fact of
the matter is that the then military leadership in East Pakistan, visibly
demoralized had failed to put up a bold face against insurgency with-in while
Indian Forces knocking on the borders. Gen. Niazi, in fact, proved an utter
failure. He could neither plan a proper war strategy to defend East Pakistan,
nor could save the innocent lives of loyal citizens. Gen. Yahya's military top
brass also failed to put up a bold show on West Pakistan front as well. Hence,
no plausible reason can be offered for territorial losses on West Pakistan and
Kashmir fronts. It seems that our war strategy was primarily based on US and
Chinese physical intervention in the conflict and was not based on our
determination to defend our country against heavy odds.
Pakistan should have learnt lessons that no country can fight for you a war when
you don’t have the will to defend yourself. As for as US 6th fleet is concerned,
the US nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Enterprise with a task force of several
amphibious ships and destroyers, did reach the Straits of Malacca Bay but by
that time Gen. Niazi had already surrendered. One purpose of the movement of 6th
Fleet towards East Pakistan could have been to counter the Russian Naval
presence in the area, while giving moral support to Pakistani defenders, another
to evacuate American citizens in case of emergency. However, Gen. Niazi’s
cowardly move to hastily surrender when not a single major town was conquered by
the Indian troops by then, and at a time when Enterprise was closing in to Bay
of Bengal and Bhutto trying for an honorable cease-fire in the Security Council,
dashed all hopes to nothingness. Pakistani troops surrendered and the US Naval
Fleet, after staying in the Bay of Bengal for about a month left for
Philippines, on January 11, 1972. Thus the East Pakistan chapter was closed once
forever leaving behind a chapter of sordid history.