Hussain Nadim
War between the United States and Pakistan is imminent, if one goes by the talk
in DC at every other forum on the subject. There is a strange tendency in
think-tank and policy circles to sensationalize U.S.-Pakistan relations, at
times giving the bilateral relationship far more significance in U.S. foreign
policy discourse than what it deserves. In the midst of the frenzy in
U.S.-Pakistan relations, there is a serious need to ask what exactly has gone
wrong beyond the over-discussed and obvious “trust deficit,” “Haqqani network”
and the “transactional” nature of the relationship—all of which is the product
of the underlying problem, not the root cause.
The answer might be less sensational, and have more to do with bureaucratic
failure in the relationship. Based on my experience in the government of
Pakistan, and through interviews with key civil and military officials in
Pakistan and discussions with American officials, I have been able to flesh out
what drives U.S.-Pakistan relations to the edge—those little bureaucratic things
that don’t come to the surface and are not so interesting to discuss at forums.
The first issue is ruptured communication and messaging on both sides, which
leads to misplaced expectations, double-talk and unneeded suspicion. It almost
appears that U.S.-Pakistan relations suffer from a chronic oversized bureaucracy
that is unable to coordinate messaging—not just between the two countries, but
also between the institutions within the two countries, driving relations to the
edge over every strategic or ideological clash in the war on terror. Officials
on the Pakistani side complain of receiving mixed signals from the United
States, with the State Department saying one thing and the Pentagon saying
another. Officials cite how within the span of a single day, different branches
of the U.S. government have a different take on Pakistan’s role in the war on
terror, fluctuating anywhere from “appreciation” to “do more” and
“backstabbing.” Moreover, lack of clarity on America’s Afghan peace strategy,
according to senior Pakistani military officials, also creates a communication
gap that quickly escalates into suspicion. Lack of clarity on aid is also a
concern, where the U.S. Congress takes Pakistan to task for taking so much money
and not delivering enough, without going into the details of how much aid
actually gets delivered to Pakistan and what really is its effectiveness. Too
much talk on aid and pressing Pakistan on the subject is another irritant that
constantly puts Pakistan on edge while raising expectations in the United
States.
The sentiment is the same on the American side, which finds itself frustrated
over Pakistan’s duplicity. The frustration is not only due to Pakistan’s support
for the Haqqani network, but even more so because Pakistan has been going in
circles over its position on the Haqqani network for a long time. Pakistan’s
complete silence regarding its obvious support for the Haqqani network has not
only allowed the lobbies in Washington, DC, to frame Pakistan as directly
involved in the loss of American lives, but more importantly convinced American
officials not to expect honest talk from its major ally in the war on terror.
The absence of blunt and candid conversation between the two sides has immensely
complicated the relationship, which now requires a full reset. It is deplorable
that the United States and Pakistan, engaged together in a long war, have ceased
to talk and listen to each other directly and instead either rely on
intelligence snooping or else let think-tank reports and discussions build
perceptions about each other. There may be a need for both sides to have a track
2 dialogue, to bring the governments back to the same page and build trust
measures.
The second issue in U.S.-Pakistan relations is a result of serious political and
bureaucratic failures by the government of Pakistan, which lacks a vision and
policy for its relations with the United States. While the United States has a
clear policy and knows exactly what it wants from Pakistan—to ensure its support
in Afghanistan, reduce the risk of nuclear fallout and push the government to
eliminate militancy in its borders—the government of Pakistan does not know what
it wants from its relations with the United States, both in the long term and
the short term. Given the fact that America has been Pakistan’s closest and
oldest ally, having no extensive policy on the United States from the civilian
political leadership and the bureaucracy is a reflection of incompetency. The
only strand of policy on the United States is that developed by the Pakistan
military in the context of security and the ongoing war. However, even that
policy is little more than a wish list of F16s, hardware and other equipment,
with a vague sense of how to enable American support against India and
Afghanistan. Period.
U.S.-Pakistan relations are bound to remain turbulent and transactional in
nature, not because both countries want it, but mostly because the government of
Pakistan is unable to come up with a strategic plan to engage the United States
on the civilian front and change the discourse from matters of security to
economics and trade. Pakistan, as a smaller partner in this relationship, has to
drive and push for its national interests vis-à-vis the United States instead of
the United States having to educate the government of Pakistan on what
Pakistan’s national security and economic challenges are. The reversed role that
the United States has been playing is well exemplified in the shape of the
Kerry-Lugar-Berman Bill—an American attempt to help Pakistan develop a good
five-year deal to develop itself.
The lack of homework on Pakistan’s side regarding its policy on the United
States, and the overwhelming expectations to deliver from the American side, set
the two countries off-balance on an already delicate relationship that is tied
to Afghanistan.
The third, and perhaps trickiest, issue is the lingering past and irritants that
shape the mindset on both sides. The Pakistani establishment is still overly
cautious in its relations with the United States due to its past experience of
being abandoned at the end of the Cold War and thrown under the bus by the
United States with the enforcement of the Pressler Amendment. There is a genuine
sentiment in the Pakistani establishment and the public at large that the United
States is going to withdraw from Afghanistan in haste, and abandon Pakistan to
deal with the mess alone. Pakistan’s move to bring China into the Afghan peace
process is precisely out of that concern: to have a backup in case the Americans
lose patience and abandon the region. No amount of assurance has been able to
convince Pakistan that the United States is likely to stay in the region and is
interested in a long-term alliance with Pakistan, especially when messaging from
the U.S. Congress continues to be dominated by threats of sanctions and putting
Pakistan on the State Sponsor of Terrorism list.
Then there is a constant irritant in the form of F16s, which have become a
domestic symbol of American duplicity in Pakistan. Given that there is an
impasse on the issue, Pakistan needs to leave the matter behind and move on. At
this moment, Pakistan needs to reduce as many irritants as possible, in order to
strengthen its relations with the United States. On the part of the United
States, it may also have to let go of the irritants it faces, which include
Pakistan’s previous efforts to cut deals with militant groups to prepare for a
political settlement, which the Americans have seen as Pakistan playing a double
game.
The fourth and last major issue is that of timelines—essentially the pivotal
issue that leads U.S.-Pakistan relations to rock bottom. Given that there is a
lack of communication and differences in strategic interests, the challenge,
according to almost all the military officials I interviewed in Pakistan, has
been to get America to agree on timelines. According to senior military
officials in Pakistan, the U.S. war against terrorism has been a victim of
American domestic electoral politics and timelines. The U.S. strategy in the war
has been to get quick results and move on, while Pakistan has continued to
advocate a long-term strategy that included a quick political settlement with
the militant groups, which the United States resisted to accept for a long time.
The issue of timelines is still a major thorn in the relationship, with the
Pakistani establishment viewing the killing of Mullah Akhtar Mansour in a drone
strike as a U.S. attempt to speed up the process because it was pressed on its
own timelines. As one senior Pakistani military general commented, “Wars are not
won during lunch breaks. It is won with patience that the American side lacks.”
If the two sides can agree on timelines, U.S.-Pakistan relations can show
significant improvement.
While the think tanks and the media in Washington and Islamabad predict a total
collapse in U.S.-Pakistan relations due to an impasse over the Haqqani network
and other issues, the relationship has endured for over six decades, with a
history of close cooperation on matters of security and intelligence. Relations
are suffering, not because of the inherently different interests or evil designs
between the two countries, but mostly because of the bureaucratic and logistical
issues that have risen due to deep engagement in a long war that is nowhere near
its end. In such circumstances, constant review of relations and blunt dialogue
is needed between the two sides to be able to remain on the same page, avoid
suspicion and, if need be, be able to reset relations to achieve their common
goal.
Hussain Nadim is currently the Senior Pakistan Expert at the United States
Institute of Peace. Previously, he worked in the government of Pakistan as an
advisor on security, foreign policy and development. He tweets @HNadim87.