Pakistan’s government is
preparing for Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s visit to Washington, D.C. this
month. But with representing his country during a period of military growth in
Pakistan, who is in charge of the country remains in question.
When Sharif took office in 2013, one of his first acts to assert power was to
build political consensus for a paramilitary operation against the criminal
gangs and terrorist groups that had brought Karachi to a standstill.
Karachi, a megalopolis consisting of almost 20 million people, began its descent
into hell in 2007 when it entered a protracted period of assassinations, rampant
extortion, frequent acts of terrorism, and politically motivated violence. Now,
thanks to Sharif’s security onslaught, crime is down 70 percent and security
forces have wrested control over areas once held by terrorist organizations.
While Karachi’s rehabilitation can be credited to Sharif’s political concord,
that tenuous amity is breaking down as the political elites of the city bicker
and questions crop up over who is really in control and for what motivations.
The consensus for the military involvement began to unravel when the Karachi
operation was expanded to include politically connected groups — such as the
Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) and Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) — that were
involved in extortion and other criminal activities. MQM chief Altaf Hussain,
exiled in London, thundered against the army via his telephonic addresses. Even
PPP co-chairman Asif Ali Zardari, a man who rarely lost his cool, railed against
the military establishment.
Both parties shared the same view: Sharif had given in to the security
establishment and ceded control of the military. The men in khaki uniforms were
using this operation to weaken political parties while using their rise in
popularity to tighten their grip over the country. Some analysts and scholars
have concluded that Sharif has ceded control of the country’s security policy to
Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff General Raheel Sharif.
While the military is dominating policy, the conclusion that it has sidelined
the prime minister is misguided. In fact, it is in the interest of Nawaz Sharif
and his ruling Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) party to allow the security
operation in Karachi to continue while maintaining some distance.
(1) Sharif’s whole ruling agenda centers around economic growth. Karachi is the
country’s financial heart and its largest port. Elites aligned with Sharif,
largely centered in neighboring Punjab province’s industrial centers, need a
safe environment in Karachi to grow their businesses and engage in trade with
the rest of the world. If Karachi is made secure and allowed to grow
economically, the economic core in Punjab from which Sharif draws his power from
prospers, thereby increasing his political fortunes.
(2) an ongoing security operation in Karachi keeps the two largest parties in
that province, the MQM and PPP, preoccupied with more local affairs, rather than
meddling in Sharif’s PML-N national agenda. With Imran Khan’s Pakistan
Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) failing to prove rigging allegations against the PML-N,
Sharif can guarantee relatively smooth sailing for himself by ensuring that the
PPP and MQM are kept on the back burner and forced to reorganize off the
national stage.
(3) Sharif recognizes instability and violence as Pakistan’s biggest challenges.
While he could have led from the front, Sharif has let the military take the
lead on this initiative. This may make him appear weak in the short-term as
General Raheel Sharif takes all of the praise. In the medium- to long-term,
however, this strategy could pay off for the prime minister. Come election time,
the prime minister can make the case that the peace came on his watch.
With the military taking such a visible lead on operations from Waziristan
against terrorists groups there to Karachi, any uptick in violence can be
deflected as a failed military strategy. The prime minister can then go back to
his initial stance and argue for a negotiations-based settlement to the
conflicts paralyzing Pakistan. A decline in the fortunes of the military would
further enable the prime minister to reach out to opposition parties and argue
that he was under pressure from a military keen to tighten its grip.
It is true that Pakistan’s military establishment, more popular than it has been
since the 1999 coup of General Pervez Musharraf, is riding on a high. But those
that remember their history would recognize that politicians have proven far
more adept at adjusting to the change in fortunes and public opinions. Musharraf
and his Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Kayani also had their moments of
soaring popularity, only to be disliked by their very own institutions. General
Raheel Sharif might be riding on that high, but that does not mean that the men
in uniforms have completely sidelined the prime minister. The ongoing security
operations have been given constitutional cover by the federal government, cover
that can be taken away should the political ground realities change. The power
to do so lies with the prime minister, which makes him far more than a lame
duck.