US-Saudi relations in the wake of US-Iran nuclear deal by

(Hina qureshi, Mardan)

Abstract
This research paper deals with the relationship of US-Saudi Arabia in the wake of US-Iran nuclear deal which is still under process .In this paper, I will discuss about the US-Saudi relations before the nuclear deal between US and Iran and after affects and implications of this deal on regional level and also discuss about the fears regarding safety and security of Saudi and Israel. This deal will turn the scenario of Middle East politics. In this I will discuss that how US can tackle the angry situation of Saudi Arabia on this nuclear deal and with the experience of the past, US can resolve this difficult situation.
Key words; Alliances, Al-Qaida, Gulf region, Germany, Games, Nuclear deal, GCC.

Introduction
Any possible nuclear deal between the United States of America and Iran is likely to result in giving a new curve to their bilateral relation. However, it will not only effect the relations of US-Iran but also enter into a new phase of world politics. As a matter of fact, this deal is most likely to send political sudden jarring impacts across the entire Middle Eastern political scene, which will affect Saudi Arabia and Israel standing as the most sensitive areas to bear its shocks and it makes them ready to go for an alliance against Iran, and by default, against the US ambitions as well.

Oil has always given the Gulf realm of huge power. But the US may be less dependent in future and the world is fast losing patience with Saudi Arabia’s stance on human rights and extremism. Will King Abdullah’s death and nuclear deal between USA and Iran change the nature of relationship between US and Saudia? Can US tackle Saudi’s anger over Iran’s nuclear deal? USA can continue to negotiate nuclear deal with Iran without exploding relations with Saudi Arabia. Iran-US nuclear talks can pursue Saudi Arabia and Israel into an unlikely alliance.

1. Relationship with the west: Even after several wars between Israelis and Arabs, in Afghanistan and in Iraq (twice), the relationships with west have survived. The alarming majority of Saudi nationals involved in the 9/11 attacks and the rise of Al-Qaeda, indulgence of serious bribery and corruption scandals, diplomatic hindrances , recurring oil crises, high concerns over Saudi funding for extremist religious teaching and its links to terrorism , the oppression of women, and most recently, the Syrian disaster and the dominance of the black-shirted head-cutters of Islamic State were ,all of these factors were extremely highly intense in violation of human rights .But on what cost it has still survived ?For many years in Britain and the US (which, post-1945, gradually assumed Britain’s geostrategic role in the Arabian peninsula, as elsewhere), the rationale binding western interests so closely to the Saudi state is no longer obvious, convincing, welcome or easily justified. (Gerhzoy, 2015)

Before Abdullah’s death, the American author Stephen Kinzer warned that the basis of the west’s relationship with the Saudi government was shifting in original ways, while Saudi Arabia’s position in a region overwhelmed by rebellion and civil war was ever less secure.“The most intriguing candidate for collapse is Saudi Arabia,” Kinzer wrote,
“For more than half a century, Saudi leaders manipulated the United States by feeding our oil addiction, lavishing money on politicians, helping to finance American wars, and buying billions of dollars in weaponry from US companies. Now the sand is beginning to shift under their feet”.

In the past the Saudis and OPEC intentionally motivated an economic crisis in the west in vengeance for US aid to Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur war that has still annoying memories .Exploitation of the oil price for political ends has been a common event since. In 2008, as the world financial crisis hit, former US president George W Bush personally requested Abdullah to cut off prices, and was unconditionally rejected. Regarding human rights, the concept has also changed. In 1980, a British television documentary, Death of a Princess, based on the true story of Princess Misha’al and her lover, who was publicly executed for adultery, led the Saudis to expel Britain’s ambassador and impose sanctions, much to the London establishment’s discomfiture. Many countries bowed to intense Saudi pressure not to broadcast the film. Nowadays such bullying is not so easy. (Tisdal, 2015)

2. Saudia a regional ally: The process of re-negotiations has already started, and the fact that the US will be re-negotiating its own relations with her key regional allies is quite evident from the agenda John Kerry forwarded during his recent visit to Saudi Arabia. The most important factors due to which John Kerry visited Saudia was not only to finalize the deal but also the US wanted to make sure that in every matter of regional importance, Saudi will support him. Convincing Saudi Arabia to accept any agreed nuclear deal is important to President Barack Obama because he needs Riyadh to work closely with Washington on a host of regional policies and to maintain its role as a ‘moderating’ influence in oil markets.

3. Shi’ite regional influence: While the main critics of the US push for a nuclear deal with Iran are Israel and Congressional Republicans. Sunni Muslim powerhouse Saudi Arabia is also concerned that an accord would allow Iran to divert more cash and energy to Shi’ite proxies in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen, and in Saudi Arabia itself, which might lead to a serious escalation of conflicts on regional level that can be of religious and non-religious nature.

Saudi concerns with regard to this deal are not based upon the possibility of Iran enjoying better relations with the US; Saudi concerns are largely related to her own position in the region following this deal; for, Iran does have enough politico-military and economic potential to counter-balance Saudi led “Sunni” states in the Middle East and beyond. It is precisely for this very reason that Saudi Arabia’s anxiety about an agreement has fueled a flurry of intense diplomacy in recent days to bolster unity among “Sunni” states in the Middle East in the face of “shared threats”, especially those emanating from Iran.

4. Secret talks between US-Iran: In other words, the central issue between Saudia and USA on the one hand and the US and Israel on the other hand, is not the deal itself, it is the place Iran would have in the future Middle East. And, the very fact that the US officials are unwilling to outline what strategies might curb Iran’s regional influence in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, where armed Iranian allies have since flourished and been resisting Saudi backed proxy clique which has caused Saudi Arabia and Israel great anxiety. As US is playing a double role in paving for itself a way entry into Middle Eastern politics, this adds fear into anxiety as well. As a matter of fact, Saudia’s trust in Washington during the Iran talks is still recovering from the sudden move in late 2013 towards a nuclear deal, when Saudi officials, as also Israel itself, were blindsided by the disclosure of months of secret talks between the US and Iran. At that time, for Saudia, the main issue was surely preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Now that the deal between the US and Iran is preventing the latter from developing Nuclear weapons, Saudia too has made a re-assessment of the possible threats and challenges Iran can and is causing in the region. Saudia, as such, now sees Iran’s involvement in Arab countries, particularly its backing of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, its support for Iraqi Shi’ite militias and its ties to the Houthi group that has seized control in northern Yemen, as a more urgent problem, resolution of which requires a “grand alliance.”

5. Sunni Alliance: It is against this background that the Saudi King Salman is working to fake a “united front” among “Sunni” states against what Riyadh sees as grand threat from Iran. Over the last few weeks, Salman has met the leaders of all Saudi Arabia’s Gulf Arab neighbors, the king of Jordan and the presidents of Egypt and Turkey, the two most populous and militarily powerful Sunni states in the region. Mustafa Alani, an Iraqi security analyst with ties to the Saudi Interior Ministry said, “The understanding is that we will face a more aggressive Iran if they sign an agreement. All the restrictions on it will be lifted and it will be much stronger. This is an issue that needs some sort of unity,” (Sheikh, 2015).
One of the consequences of U.S. nuclear negotiations with Iran has been the increased tensions with U.S. allies in the region. Most dramatically, Saudi Arabia has signaled its displeasure at U.S. diplomacy with its Iranian rival by threatening to acquire nuclear weapons from Pakistan. Over the years, Washington’s strategy has been to reassure Saudi Arabia. For instance, in 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton promised that if Iran acquired nuclear weapons, the U.S. would shield Saudi Arabia with a “defense umbrella.”Unfortunately, this approach hasn’t succeeded at relieving tensions. Most recently, Saudi King Salman pointedly declined to attend a Camp David security summit meant to reassure anxious Persian Gulf nations. Some analysts argue that U.S. diplomacy with Iran will inevitably make conflict with U.S. alliances in the Middle East, and that the U.S. should placate its allies by revising the current nuclear deal or abandoning negotiations altogether in favor of a military strike .But historical precedent suggests that the U.S. can manage unhappy reactions from its allies without abandoning sensible diplomacy with its adversaries. By exploiting Saudi Arabia’s military dependence, U.S. policymakers can keep its ally from pursuing nuclear weapons while at the same time advancing Washington’s broader regional agenda. (Gerhzoy, 2015)

6. GCC and its reaction: Indeed, Saudi is undertaking a process of realigning the geopolitical map of the Middle East - but the time that this process will take remains to be seen. There are mixed reactions in the Gulf towards the Iranian nuclear deal. Those who support a deal any deal, they argue that it would prevent the region from sliding into a destructive nuclear arms race that would deplete everybody. But others say the deal will have a number of negative consequences for the Gulf. The secretive nature of the talks made many uncomfortable about the outcome, as did the absence of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members. Wisdom has it that if you do not have enough cards on the negotiating table, you may not get everything you want, but if you are not even present, you will certainly get nothing. In Geneva, everybody concerned was present except for the Gulf states, which would be directly impacted by any kind of agreement in their backyard. (Al-Marzouki, 2015)


7. Saudi Arabia and Israel into an unlikely alliance: Foreign ministers from Iran, the US and five other world powers including Britain were preparing for negotiations.US officials said that there will be talks in Lausanne over Iran’s nuclear programme. But as officials alternately expressed optimism and gloom over the prospects, two Middle Eastern countries were observing the apparent progress in Lausanne with grave alarm – and are moving towards cementing an unlikely alliance as a result. Both Israel and Saudia Arabia have repeatedly claimed that Tehran is intent on acquiring a nuclear arsenal, regardless of whatever pledges it makes, and that its hand will merely be strengthened by the lifting of economic sanctions as part of an agreement. Both see Iran with nuclear weapons as a direct threat to their existence which must be confronted.
8. Sunni countries Alliances: Co-operation between Israel and Sunni states in the region was already growing in response to Shia Iran’s expanding influence in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and, most recently, Yemen. But the Obama administration’s enthusiasm for the nuclear talks, plus its arms-length co-operation with Tehran in the fight against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, has done most to bring Israel and Saudi Arabia closer. In the run-up to Israeli elections, officials including advisers to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu were keen to stress the strategic advantage of their secret understanding with the Sunni bloc. One senior security official in Tel Aviv said.

“Necessity creates alliances. The necessity for us and the Saudis in particular – as well as the Gulf States, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, Jordan and Egypt – is to be on our guard against Iran, which is an aggressive, expansionist power. We think the nuclear ideal that the Iranians may persuade the international community to sign would make all of us vulnerable in this region, and so co-operation makes sense.”

Benjamin Netanyahu stressed the danger to the region that he said was posed by the terms likely to be agreed in Lausanne by the P5+1 group of the US, UK, France, Russia, Germany and China with Iran. The course of the talks, said the Israeli Prime Minister has “confirmed our concerns and proved to be even worse”. Israel was not the only country that would be in the firing line of Iranians, who wanted to “conquer” the whole of the Middle East. Mr. Netanyahu pointedly warned of an “Iran-Lausanne-Yemen axis”. Saudi Arabia has taken the lead against that “axis”, by forming a Sunni coalition against Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen, whom the Kingdom’s warplanes are currently bombing. Prince of Turkey Al-Faisal, a former head of Saudi intelligence and ambassador to Washington and London, warned that a deal with Iran could lead to nuclear proliferation.

“Whatever comes out of all these talks, we will want the same, if Iran has the ability to enrich uranium to whatever level , it’s not just Saudi Arabia that’s going to ask for that. The whole world will be shown an open door to go down that route.” (Gupta, 2015)

It is not, however, to suggest that Saudia and Israel would essentially adopt an anti-US strategic posture. What is becoming evident is that these three states will be re-negotiating the terms of their mutual relations to meet changing geo-political realities in a more ‘composite’ manner. This strategic negotiation is not, however, to be manned by the US itself, nor would it be playing the role of a crucial “balancer” between regional players. The US, in the contrary, would itself be a party to this process, and as such, would be more concerned about maintaining its own relations with Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia than about merely assuring Israel and Saudia about the ‘harmless’ nature of the nuclear deal with Iran. (Gerhzoy, 2015)

Case study of USA and West Germany
United States faced a similar dilemma of alliance management with one of its closest Cold War allies: West Germany. Much like the Saudis today, West German leaders were anxious throughout the 1950s and 1960s about the credibility of U.S. security patronage, and feared that domestic pressure to spend less on American troop deployments overseas would lead the U.S. to withdraw from Europe .West Germans were also angry over U.S. efforts in the 1960s to reach arms control agreements with the Soviet Union, including the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). And like the Saudis, German leaders sought to reduce their dependence on the U.S. by reaching out to other allies and by pursuing nuclear weapons. The West German government began negotiations with France and Italy in the late 1950s on joint production of nuclear weapons, as well as secret discussions in the early 1960s about financing French uranium enrichment efforts in the hope that France would eventually provide Germany with nuclear weapons of its own .Rather than abandoning negotiations with the Soviets to calm West Germany, U.S. policymakers adopted a strategy of coercive pressure. Specifically, President Kennedy threatened that if West Germany tried to acquire nuclear weapons, the U.S. would rapidly withdraw its military forces from German territory.

This led Germany to affirm its non-nuclear status in 1963 by disavowing nuclear cooperation with France and signing the Limited Test Ban Treaty. At the same time, managing West Germany’s anxiety required U.S. promises that nuclear restraint would be rewarded with continued military protection, a commitment embodied in the ongoing presence of U.S. troops on German territory and in German integration into NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group .Thus, to constrain West Germany’s nuclear ambitions while achieving broader U.S. foreign policy objectives, Washington employed both reassurance and coercion.

The U.S. experience with West Germany during the Cold War offers important lessons for its current approach toward Saudi Arabia. Just like West Germany, Saudi Arabia depends on the United States and its partners for arms, training, and support .As a result, Washington could credibly threaten a military embargo to deter Riyadh from acquiring nuclear weapons, exploiting Saudi officials’ existing anxieties about how committed the U.S. is to their country’s security. Moreover, an embargo threat would be backed by U.S. law, which forbids U.S. military or economic aid to any country that acquires nuclear explosive devices .In principle, Riyadh could try to discourage a military embargo by threatening to cut off or cut down the supply of oil to the United States. But rapid growth in North American hydro-carbon production has reduced U.S. dependence on oil imports, undermining Saudi Arabia’s economic leverage .To be sure, the two situations are not precisely the same. Unlike West Germany, Saudi Arabia does not rely on U.S. troops or nuclear weapons to protect its territorial integrity, and it can seek advanced armaments from suppliers other than the United States.

Finding adequate substitutes for U.S. conventional arms will be difficult, however, because Saudi Arabia’s existing stocks of U.S. military hardware are not necessarily interoperable with hardware from other countries. And because these systems rely on U.S. spare parts and technical assistance to remain functional, if the U.S. decides to end its military assistance and cooperation, it could cripple Saudi Arabia’s military forces. (Gerhzoy, 2015)

Implications
An Iranian nuclear deal with the P5 +1 will begin to put to rest an animosity that had run for over four decades. A superpower and an important regional power may settle in to a new, if undoubtedly, complex relationship.

a. Zero sum game

Moderates in Iran will be empowered, as will the extensive and talented Iranian expatriate community. These are all positive elements because they mean a greater probability for cooperation instead of conflict, as well as new directions for the evolution of the Islamic Republic, whose revolutionary zeal is now old .However, in the Middle East zero sum game, everything is viewed to be at the expense of someone else. One group's gain is inevitably seen as a loss for another or, at a minimum, generates a large harvest of spite. The Iran nuclear deal will be seen by Israel and some key Arab countries as a geopolitical loss, with consequences rising there from.

Of course, it does not help that Iran is involved to various degrees in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and possibly even Yemen. Whether that is seen as a necessary Iranian defensive strategy or a legitimate and sophisticated game of influence, it is perceived as a drive for hegemony by actors ranging from the president of Turkey to the king of Saudi Arabia, to many in between.

b. Iran's regional ambitions are clear and worrying

Beyond these perceptions, which are relevant because they will drive political action, what could events in the Middle East look like in the post-nuclear deal era? Iran is certainly well positioned to maintain primacy of influence in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, i.e. the northern tranche of states .It will not have an easy time in any of these countries, but its successful security nexus with Hezbollah, Shia militias, and a US focus on destroying ISIL will mean greater influence than others, certainly more than the fragmented and disunited panoply of Sunni actors.

c. Red line

For the time being, Saudi Arabia has shown that Yemen is a red line and, although total Saudi or GCC control of Yemen is unlikely, the rush for Houthi control of Sanaa and Aden may well have been arrested. This combined with the situation in Bahrain, and an incipient alliance with Egypt, Turkey, other Gulf states, means that southern tranche of countries in the region will be under the greater influence of Saudi and its key allies. The greater reality for both Iran and Saudi Arabia in this two-tiered Middle East will be that, ironically, they will have many problems wherever they hold greater influence. Iraq and Syria will not settle down and, most likely, nor will Yemen. In the game of spite, the two Middle East cold war powers will do their best at annoying each other through proxies and destabilization, and the people will suffer.

d. Wild card in the game

The wild card in the game remains Israel and its reactions to a new role for Iran. Suspicions are deep and Israel may not stand by and simply watch as the region is reconfigured. The recent clashes and attacks on the Golan may mean trouble; Israel may wish to send signals of strength and deterrence by fights on the northern or southern fronts, i.e. Gaza or Lebanon. But, at the end of the day, even such actions, like the conflicts in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria, will only increase destabilisation and misery.

The best-case scenario is that, over time and with US involvement, some kind of balance of power framework, implicit or explicit, can be achieved, each key power with its zone of influence, and despite troubles, there will be relative stability .However, even this effort may be undermined by deeper problems, instability and poor governance within almost every single country in the region, including Saudi Arabia and Iran themselves .Indeed, the greatest mark of the region is not the geopolitics that gets all the attention, but the fact that the citizens there remain captive to the greed, corruption and hallucinations of all their leaderships, bar none.

e. Positive opportunities

The Iran nuclear deal may well mark the beginning of a new relationship with the US, improved relations with Europe and a slow re-entry of Iran into the larger community of nations. All this can present new and positive opportunities, including a potential lucrative exit for Iran from the quicksand of the Middle East

f. Saudi Arabia, Iran and the 'Great Game' in Yemen

However, in the region itself, all nations, including Iran with its presumptive rise, may well find that, despite the appetite for and illusion of control, they will be victims to a greater law: no one in the Middle East will agree to be ruled by another, and the instincts for detecting this are finely honed, bordering on the paranoid. No one can sit on the throne for long, and certainly not comfortably .The "Game of Thrones" and all its attendant, tricky, chatter, and analyses, may appear attractive on television, and in the halls of regional power, but it's a loser in the real world. This is especially the case in an era where economic, technological and cultural development, rather than control over your neighbour, defines influence and power .The reality, beyond the game, is that the 21st century is rolling forward without the Middle East, its geopolitics, and its victimized people (Bell, 2015)

g. Shifting realities

It is clear that a western recognition of Iranian regional influence would come at the expense of the Gulf states, given that they are the weakest link in the regional chain of influence. In the post-deal reality, there would be three regional powers: Iran, Turkey and Israel.From an economic perspective, any agreement between Iran and the West would certainly lead to the lifting of sanctions on Iranian oil exports that are estimated at between one and 1.5 million barrels a day.This would further flood the already saturated oil market with cheap Iranian oil, bringing prices even further down. If this persisted, it would have adverse economic consequences on the Gulf states, which are already financially overstretched. In light of these shifting realities, the Gulf Arab states may be wise to make a number of changes to preserve their long-term interests, including abandoning their military and security alliance with US in favour of their own joint military cooperation (Al-Marzouki, 2015).

Conclusion

The coercive strategy will not succeed without corresponding assurances. Specifically, the U.S. must promise its Saudi partners that in exchange for their acceptance of U.S. diplomacy toward Iran, Riyadh will receive national security benefits, including the provision of sophisticated armaments and training, cooperation against Iran’s regional provocations, and support for military operations that satisfy both countries’ interests .These assurances do not necessarily require the full commitment of a treaty, since the U.S. previously showed it would employ force to protect Saudi security during the Gulf War, and recently provided intelligence and logistical support for Saudi-led military operations in Yemen.

U.S. military dominance means that no substitute exists for these services. As a result, the Saudis must depend on the U.S. military, making it harder for them to hold out for stronger commitments .In sum, if U.S. policymakers believe that a framework agreement constraining Iran’s nuclear capabilities advances U.S. security interests in the region, they will be able to contain Saudi opposition by employing both reassurance and force. Doing so will enable the United States to deepen its relations with allies, engage in a pragmatic diplomacy with adversaries, and contain the spread of nuclear weapons (Gerhzoy, 2015)

Bibliography
1.Al-Marzouki, M. (2015, April 14). Aljazeera. Retrieved May 30, 2015, from Why Saudi Arabia and Israel oppose iran nuclear deal: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/04/saudi-arabia-israel-oppose-iran-nuclear-deal-150401061906177.html
2.Bell, J. (2015, March 30). Aljazzera. Retrieved May 28, 2015, from The Grreater reality for Iran and Saudia: https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/03/greater-reality-iran-saudi-arabia-150330051616953.html
3.Gerhzoy, G. (2015, May 22). The Washington post. Retrieved May 28, 2015, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/05/22/how-to-manage-saudi-anger-at-the-iran-deal/
4.Gupta, K. S. (2015, March 30). The Independent. Retrieved May 28, 2015, from Iran nuclear talks: Prospect of deal with Iran pushes Saudi Arabia and Israel into an unlikely alliance: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/iran-nuclear-talks-prospect-of-deal-with-iran-pushes-saudi-arabia-and-israel-into-an-unlikely-alliance-10145019.html
5.Sheikh, S. R. (2015, March 29). Global research. Retrieved May 28, 2015, from Unholy Alliances between Saudi Arabia and Israel: https://www.globalresearch.ca/unholy-alliance-between-saudi-arabia-and-israel-a-us-iran-nuclear-deal-would-trigger-regional-political-re-alignments/5439349
6.Tisdal, S. (2015, january Tuesday 9). The guardian. Retrieved May 28, 2015, from Saudi Arabia and the west: how a cosy relationship turned toxic: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/27/saudi-arabia-and-the-west-how-cosy-relationship-turned-toxic
 

Hina qureshi
About the Author: Hina qureshi Read More Articles by Hina qureshi: 2 Articles with 977 viewsCurrently, no details found about the author. If you are the author of this Article, Please update or create your Profile here.