There are three competing
narratives about Afghanistan’s situation.
NATO’s narrative is that it has done enough, and is working on a gradual but
flawed transition to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). It sees the Afghan
government as a viable partner, even though it is under enormous stress,
constantly pushed and pulled by internal and external forces.
The Afghan government’s narrative is vague, confusing and unconvincing. The
government hopes to hold elections in 2014, fill the vacuum of a reduced NATO
presence, ensure a degree of good governance, fight the country’s endemic and
widespread corruption, keep reaching out to the Taliban, and, above all, get
ready for a political transition. But despite its rhetoric, the government is
deeply involved in unhealthy politicking and managing internal chaos.
Finally, the Taliban’s narrative: By protracting the insurgency and bogging down
the ANSF, it has increased the cost of war and security for NATO and the Afghan
government. It has not yielded to military pressure, has rejected talks, and
continues to preach victory.
This is clearly a strategic deadlock.
The aim of NATO’s troop surge in 2010 was to either defeat the Taliban or push
it into irrelevance. What seems to have happened is a half-accomplished mission
leaving the ANSF in charge of the stabilisation and consolidation of the gained
areas. This signifies the beginning of a defence phase for NATO/ANSF, and of an
offensive by the Taliban. The continuation of night raids and special operations
targeting mid-level operators and Taliban commanders will not change the
strategic calculus.
U-turn unrealistic
The only game changer will be a U-turn in Pakistan’s policy, closure of Taliban
sanctuaries and a reformed Afghan government. It doesn’t sound realistic,
though, to expect Pakistan to change now, when memories of 9/11 seem so distant
and NATO prepares for a massive reduction in troops. Pakistan once again
portrays the Taliban as a reality on the ground, a policy line similar to that
taken during the 1990s.
Most indicators show Pakistan as a declining state. Yet in one area,
Afghanistan, Pakistan has outsmarted and outmanoeuvred everyone. Pakistan has
kept the Taliban alive and deadly, and continues to keep the US as an ally with
deep pockets under any circumstances.
A decade ago the ISAF/NATO mission was simply to decrease the size of the “black
space” and increase the size of the “white space”. Thanks to their efforts, the
democratic space is acknowledged by all of us. But the harsh reality is the
emergence of a vast grey space and an increasing size of the black space.
This “grey area” consists of complex layers of corruption, bad governance,
unemployment, political disunity, alienation and poverty. Against this backdrop,
the democratic space is too fragile and vulnerable.
So who will overcome the deadlock and how?
The Taliban seems to follow a strict insurgency script by encircling big cities
and dominating its base areas with intimidations and executions. They also count
on NATO’s impatience, Pakistan’s resilience and the weakness of the Afghan
state.
The fate of the capital city, Kabul, is an example of the Taliban’s encirclement
strategy. While NATO keeps handing over security responsibilities to the ANSF,
the Taliban has managed to maintain its presence in all directions surrounding
Kabul. The districts of Uzbeen, Tagab and Kohe Safee in the east; the provinces
of Logar and Wardak in the south; several pockets in Ghorband district; where
last month a woman was shot to death for alleged adultery; and in the north –
all have a significant Taliban presence. These Taliban-controlled pockets will
logically try to connect to each other when the bulk of responsibilities fall on
the ANSF.
The counter-measure against this is the long-term presence of the US military in
Afghanistan, which has agreed to provide tactical and strategic assistance to
the ANSF.
Obviously the Taliban is not capable of a military breakthrough at this point.
It will continue to strengthen its presence in remote areas. It will continue to
launch spectacular attacks in major cities to register its strength, infiltrate
the ANSF, and create world headlines. The Taliban won’t try to consolidate its
gains by administering base areas and creating hierarchical structures at the
local level. This will create a financial burden and make them vulnerable to
NATO/ANSF military attacks.
Instead, the Taliban seems to be flexible in planning and conducting operations,
and to be hierarchical in leadership. For the Taliban, there is no “moment of
ripeness” in sight at this point. It has occasionally agreed to talks merely to
gain further legitimacy, boost the morale of its supporters, and gain
international recognition. But it won’t conduct any meaningful negotiations
until it sees itself as a dominating force.
A peripheral force
Despite their gains, the Taliban are still considered a peripheral military
force. Its utopian moment may never come, but they solidly believe in it.
Unfortunately, the Taliban is still able to mire the country in a stalemate,
frighten investors, and reduce the confidence of the small and anxious middle
class.
Can the Afghan government break the stalemate without selling out its values and
reversing democratic gains? To be able to do so, the Afghan government will
continue to ask for more financial support from donors as the cost of security
and development rises.
The Afghan government’s continued hat-in-hand approach will cause fatigue,
depression and blame both inside and outside Afghanistan, and will be accused of
irresponsible spending. While the Afghan government will be pre-occupied with
meeting donors’ expectations and politicking, the democratic opposition will
continue to apply pressure, demanding space for itself.
A handful of well-educated technocrats equipped with modern knowledge may be
able to create a fancy façade for Afghanistan, but the task of absorbing tens of
thousands of low-quality degree holders, hundreds of thousands of unskilled,
unemployed youth, and an ever-increasing ethnic quota in civil service and
development projects will be monumentally difficult. This internal stress can
only be overcome if Afghanistan diversifies its income sources and expands its
extractive industries.
This, however, may only add one more layer to the conflict’s complexity if deals
benefiting the ruling clique continue.
To counter the Taliban effectively at the community level, the Afghan Local
Police should be strengthened, and receive better training and equipment, but be
insulated from political influence of current government stakeholders. Many
consider the ALP a political cash cow if the current approach continues.
Ideally, the Afghan National Army should become a strategic asset at the theatre
level and be relieved from the current level of stress it is now under.
At the macro level, unifying and rallying the Afghan population in an organised
way against the Taliban, whom they largely hate anyway, requires national
consensus and ending the politicisation of the security forces and the
judiciary. State institutions should be seen as platforms for promoting the
national interest of Afghanistan, not for the protection of narrow interests.
A number of opportunities are waiting to be taken, such as the still-generous
support of the international community, the thirst of the Afghan people for
reform and good governance, the country’s untapped underground resources, and
above all the universal rejection of extremism by Afghans of all ethnic groups.
None of these opportunities exist for the Taliban. Their rejectionist and
reclusiveness has reduced them to the status of a militant group at best.
But abundant resources are never a guarantee of success. Exploiting talent and
intelligently applying tools and resources can change the situation. For
countries like Afghanistan, management means doing more with less. That is an
art the current administration lacks.