The police infrastructure is
one of Pakistan’s most poorly managed organizations. It is aptly described as
ill-equipped, poorly trained, deeply politicized, and chronically corrupt. It
has performed well in certain operations; overall, however, that is a rare
phenomenon. Arguably, the primary reason for this state of affairs is the
government’s persistent failure to invest in law enforcement reform and
modernization. It is ironic that despite frequent internal crises since its
inception in 1947, ranging from ethnic confrontations and sectarian battles to a
sharp rise in criminal activity and growing insurgencies, both political and
military policymakers have never given this sector top priority. Hence, poor
police performance in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency is not surprising.
The fact that the police successfully challenged some militant religious groups
in Punjab and tackled an insurgency-like situation in Karachi in the late 1990s
shows that they do have the potential to deliver the desired results when
political support is present and resources are provided.