In the article “Negotiations
and the Anti-Taliban Counter insurgency in Pakistan”, Abbas Zaidi engages
readers with the inclination of Pakistani government to negotiate peace
settlements with Taliban activists. This negotiation is a primary element in
their COIN (counter insurgency) policy. These peace settlements have been
constantly out of order that is intensifying an underlying spiral of violence.
This COIN strategy has been seen United States as a symbol of hope for militants
to reform. This article contextualizes peace processes achieved by negotiations
of Pakistani government with the militants. This negotiation projects successful
COIN policy voiced at the practical level. Unmanned drone attacks are relevant
to this COIN strategy. There are signs that drone attacks have been carried out
with the permission of the state, but Pakistani politicians are constrained to
oppose. United States has become dominant in defense of violation of territories
for fighting terrorism.
The Aryana Institute for Regional Research and Advocacy (AIRRA) conducted a
survey which research teams visited Waziristan. Questionnaire was the
methodology for the survey. 650 respondents were included. Questions related to
drone attack were asked.
Results found that there are prevalent expressions voiced by media and
politicians. Victim population does not seem too unhappy about drone attacks
taking out taliban, as they see the state is unable to do so. They believe that
attacks are accurate in their strike and anti-American feelings have been
increased but not t the great extent. In the future, there may be the case that
jointly controlled drone operations would be carried out by Pakistanis and
Americans, as the state of affairs seems to be moving in this direction. In
order to contain insurgency, Pakistan-specific national COIN strategy needs to
be planned and shared with the public, to take an active part in negotiations.
In the article “WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE TALIBAN?” Rubin talks about 9/11
attacks. The 9/11 attacks on New York City and Washington focused American
attention on Afghanistan for the first time. For them the origin and rise of
these Talibans became a subject of immense interest. Taliban have become rivals.
The “blowback” argument says that 1980’s Central Intelligence Agency policies
are directly responsible for the rise of these Taliban. Pakistan backed radical
Islamists to protect itself from Afghan nationalist claims related to Pakistani
territory. Islamabad was feared that it might be pulled apart. Indeed, at the
time independence, in first three decades, nationalist “Pushtunistan” posed a
direct threat to Pakistani territorial integrity.
Article says “where does Usama bin Ladin fit into the picture?” as Taliban and
Usama bin Ladin’s al-Qa’ida network remained distinctive identities. In fact, in
1996 Usama bin Ladin moved from refuge, with Sudanese government, to Taliban’s
Afghanistan. Osama caused a contradiction for Afghanistan watchers. Conversely,
Taliban continued to shelter Usaman, even after his participation in 1998
bombings of U.S embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. Media turned its attention to
Afghanistan after 9/11 incident. By commentating as why the Taliban continued to
support Usama.
Observing World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks, it is easy to condemn
Washington’s narrow view. However, United States is not without fault.
Washington has more efficiently pressured Pakistan to tone down her support for
Islamic fundamentalism, after the rise of Taliban. Instead, Washington yielded
her responsibility and granted Pakistan a sphere of power in Afghanistan,
unlimited by other foreign pressure.
In the book “The Taliban: War, Religion & the New Order in Afghanistan”, Marsden
argues that Taliban represents a preface to the constant tragedy of Afghanistan
and to the specific character of the movements related to Islamic politics.
Those acquainted with it; consider it o be another expression of the expansion
of radical Islam, worldwide. This movement includes those factors primary to
their rise to political and military dominance. Shape of this movement is caused
by the influences stemming from Afghanistan as well as the radical Islamic
trends from neighbors i-e Iranian and Arabs.
Marsden sets his report in the context of Afghanistan’s contemporary history and
the composite mosaic of Mujahidin movements and groups, which opposed Soviet
military involvement. One expert views this writing as going beyond negative
stereotypes of radical Islam because this representation involves unique
characterization of an Islamic revivalist movement i-e Taliban. It argues that
international responsibility must be devised in situations of chronic conflict
originating from external interference. It presents that humanitarian agencies
need to assist difficult political and human rights contexts for which they
work. And it examines that cultural conflict between Taliban’s interpretation of
Islamic values and Western thinking.
Taliban’s behavior has generated a set of responses among the country’s
neighbors and in the West. It has conflicting agendas working within every
neighboring state. In the view of Marsden, many influences both religious and
cultural have appeared that have fashioned Taliban policies and their
implementations.
In the article “Reconciling with the Taliban: Toward an alternative grand
Strategy Afghanistan”, J. Tellis argues that the alliance military operations in
Afghanistan has motivated a search for new solutions to this conflict. Among the
more challenging ideas is the notion of promoting settlement with Taliban.
United States defeated Taliban and threw them out of Afghanistan in anger
because Taliban refused to surrender. U.S was angry at the mastermind of
al-Qaeda who directed the 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington.
Many in Europe and United states, after several years of struggle, believe that
resolving the stability problem of Afghanistan problems may necessitate
negotiating with the Taliban insurgents to end the. Reunion with Taliban is a
deceptively appealing strategy for pacifying Afghanistan. It has failed
presently not only because Taliban leadership is uninterested in such
conciliation but President Hamid Karzai’s interest is covered with his bid for
reelection and his fears of rejection by United States.
As a result, any attempt at settlement, involving a negotiated bargain, focused
on formal commitment between the insurgents and the government would not occur.
Reconciling with Taliban is both unnecessary and premature for the success of
western aims in Afghanistan. Lastly, the situation in Afghanistan is very
serious but it s not hopeless. It can be recovered through modification of
current NATO strategy that includes resuming counter insurgency operations.
Successful reconciliation can be achieved only through the coalition of
political-military victory.
Article argues three issues. Taliban do not control Afghanistan, and they have
build up a challenge to Kabul through hit-and-run attacks. In NATO’s struggle
against Taliban, the United State and the coalition are neither occupiers of
Afghanistan nor viewed as such. Finally, afghan public is still very much
opposed to Taliban, as they view them country’s biggest threat.
In the article “The Taliban”, Program for culture and conflict studies gives
ideology of Taliban and what they stand for. It states that Taliban have been
tagged as Americans and Afghanistan’s government greatest enemy. This notion is
partially true. Taliban are not as united as they are thought to be. Their
partition proves their downfall. Opposed to their rapid power in 1990’s, Taliban
currently are committed to “Protracted war”. The ideology of Taliban is a
schizophrenic deformation of “Pashtunwali” and fundamentalist Islam. Taliban
themselves confuse the two as whether they belong to pashtun tribe or the
jihadist organization. Their mythology quotes their creation as the response to
the injustices that carried out during mujahedeen era of Afghan politics.
Taliban is driven by two interests competitive to one another: firstly, the
desire to conquer Afghanistan, secondly, the desire to begin caliphate.
Conquering is pashtun-centered and the caliphate is Al-Qaeda inspired. The
danger in each wing is that Pashtun-centric may be open to new Afghanistan and
the jihadists, with more global view, may be marginalized into simple terrorists
and criminals. These divergent interests cause friction in Taliban tactics;
whether they are insurgent force or a terrorist organization. Ideally it is
thought that they would act as insurgent but this force lacks support and
resources to make it possible. After 2001 reorganization was called within
Taliban leadership. They were knocked out of government and not even the local
population could support them. So since 2001, Taliban have relied a great treaty
of terrorist diplomacy. This has contributed to the cooperation between Al-Qaeda
and Taliban as they share tactics.
First suicide attack took place on September 9, 2001 in Afghanistan. Taliban are
forced to be seen as a terrorist organization after 2001. Cue Guevera has given
Taliban trajectory. Stage-1 is utopia. Stage-2 includes high-level of state-like
functions i-e Pashtun nationalism. Stage-3 is the notion of world wide jihad and
creation of the caliphate. What Taliban wants in return to pre-9/11 status lies
in stage-2. After 9/11 it used terror tactics i-e stage-4. It has moved
gradually to stage-3 where terror tactics are employed, but here the movement
begins to identify itself with pashtun base to cultivate help.
In the article “THE TALIBAN’S WAR ON WOMEN: a health and human Rights Crisis in
Afghanistan”, Physicians for human rights (1998) documents three-month study
results of conducted for women’s health and human rights conditions. The degree
to which Taliban regime has endangered human rights of Afghan women is
matchless. Their policies related to the discrimination against women are
seriously undermining the health and comfort of Afghan women. Such sufferings
and discrimination represent an insult to the worth and dignity Afghan women,
and the humanity. One of the first laws issued by Taliban, in power, was to
forbid women and girls from attending school. Education was limited to the
Qur’an only. PHR team while visiting Kabul saw women beggars, once been teachers
professionally, women were found in streets begging, wearing burqas.
The survey conducted in Kabul included three components: a women’s health and
human rights of 160 women, 40 case testimonies and interviews with 12 civilized
assistance providers, experts and health personnel. In addition, the direct
observations of PHR’s investigator have enhanced the documentation. The sphere
of investigation included status of physical health and access to it, mental
health standing, war-associated, experiences of being abused by Taliban, and
attitudes toward their human rights.
The results of the survey the sample of 160 women show that the extension of
Taliban’s authority has had unbearable consequences for health and human rights.
71% subjects reported a decline in physical health, over the past two years. 77%
subjects reported poor access to health care. 53% subjects described that at
certain occasions they were unable to seek medical care. Of the sample of 40
women, interviewed, 87% reported a decline in access to health services. The
reasons given were restrictions on mobility, refusal of hospital in providing
care, unavailability of female doctors and economics. 12 civilized personnel
described that facility in Kabul lacked basic medical supplies and no medical
attention is granted.
In the article “Struggle for Kabul: The Taliban advance”, ICOS (2008) state that
Taliban have been experiencing a renaissance that has gained momentum since
2005. According to the research by ICOS (The International Council on security
and development) Taliban has a lasting presence in almost 72% of the country.
For analyzing this maps were collected as to see Taliban’s presence from
2007-2009 in Kabul and Afghanistan.
Results found that in 2007, Taliban had the capability to interrupt security in
just over half of Afghanistan. In this year 54% attacks were not publicly known.
In 2008 it is evident that the attacks follow main route from the south of
Afghanistan. Taliban were active and disruptive in the traffic flow of these
roads. In January 2008, it is indicated in the map that kidnapping and civil
casualties were on the rise. Map of Kabul indicates that the criminal activity
has been given more space. Three of the four doors of Kabul were compromised by
Taliban activity. These doors were connecting Afghanistan with the world for
certain purposes. With the passage of time Taliban presence became profound.
They were using the tactic of winning hearts and minds.
In this article “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S.
Policy”, Katzman (2011) states two high-level policy reviews on Afghanistan in
2009, and December 2010. In the review Obama administration claims that it
follows a well-resourced military-civilian strategy to pave the way for gradual
shift to Afghan leadership. The shift began in July 2011 and would be accomplish
by the end of 2014. U.S. officials describe that U.S is intended for a long term
relationship with Afghanistan, including U.S military involvement after 2014.
The policy ensures that Afghanistan would not become a base for terrorist
attacks against U.S. Simultaneously; there is a debate within the administration
and between Pakistan and United States over whether the war effort should be
broadened to include attacks on Afghan militants inside Pakistan. It raises a
question of the extent to which Pakistan visualizes Afghanistan as part of its
strategy. Pakistan wants to avoid pressure from its rival India. Afghanistan is
achieving higher degrees of political and economic incorporation with its
neighbors in Middle East and Central Asia.
Review, December 2010 consider the impact of the addition of U.S troops to
Afghanistan in 2009 and 2010. 51,000 additional U.S forces have brought troop
numbers to the current level of 98,000 in September 2010, with the partner
forces adding about 41,000. It has been reported that the top U.S./NATO
commander in Afghanistan, General David Petraeus, and his links believe that
insurgent thrust has been blunted. One positive indication is that insurgent
commanders are discovering terms through which they might integrate again in the
society. Some experts remain pessimistic, emphasizing that the insurgents have
prolonged their existence in northern Afghanistan. Experts say that Afghan
government is lacking in effectiveness to be able to harden coalition security
gains. In order to achieve strategic breakthrough insurgent leaders require
negotiation for political settlement.