Bushra Hyder & Fozia Niazi
In 1998 India tested five nuclear weapons and in response Pakistan also tested
six nuclear weapons. The Pak-India history is not impressive because after a
year of their independence, in 1947-48, they fought a war that claimed three
thousand to eight thousand soldiers. Ever since frequent border tensions between
the two countries have led to a number of military clashes. In 1965 War Pakistan
remained triumphant but in 1971, the war led to dismemberment of Pakistan and
East Pakistan was made Bangladesh. The bloody history shows that South Asia is a
tinderbox filled with tensions and danger.
Pakistan and India have different nuclear relations. The difference is very much
clear in the US-Soviet and Pak-India nuclear relations. The nuclear arsenals in
South Asia are likely to remain much smaller and less enlightened than the US
and Soviet arsenals. The Cold War-superpowers were involved in deep-seated
ideological rivalry, but held no disputed territory and no enduring history of
armed violence against each other. In India democracy prevailed while Pakistan
remained under the direct military rule for half period of its total age. In
Pakistan, military largely runs the nuclear program even during the civilian
government. Military influence during civilian rule played important role in the
decision of use of force.
In 1980, the Indian senior military leadership wanted to attack Kahuta,
Pakistan, but the strong institutionalized civilian government of Indira Gandhi
said to have rejected the plan. Afterwards the Brasstack (1986-87) crises
emerged when the Indian military forces initiated a massive military exercise;
Pakistan fearing the war games might turn into a large-scale attack, its
military forces also conducted war exercise along the borders. It resultantly
produced a flurry of diplomatic activity and resolved only through direct
highest political involvement. The traditional explanation of Basstacks was just
a misinterpretation. The Indian military chief said the exercise was to provoke
the Pakistan military. According to Lt Gen P N Hoon the Brasstack was no
military exercise, but it was a plan to build a fourth war with Pakistan.
The Kargil conflict began in May, when the Indian intelligence services
discovered what appeared to be Pakistani regular forces lodged in mountain
redoubts on the Indian side of the line of control. For almost two months,
Indian Army units attacked the Pakistani forces and Indian Air force jets bombed
their bases high in Himalayan peaks. The US spy satellites revealed that the
Indian tanks and heavy artillery were being prepared for a counter-offensive in
Rajasthan. The fighting ended in July, one thousand Indian and Pakistani
soldiers died in this conflict. The Pakistan side’s interpretation of the Kargil
crisis was that Nawaz Sharif lost courage and backed down unnecessarily. Now it
might be possible that the future military issues between Pakistan and India are
likely to be nuclear.
The dangerous pattern was repeated in the South Asian crisis that occurred after
the September 11, 2011 terrorist attacks and the December 13, 2001 terrorist
attack on the Indian parliament. In both cases the Pakistan government feared
that its nuclear forces would be attacked and therefore took measures to
disperse the nuclear weapons and missiles to new locations. President Musharraf
defused the crisis by deciding to abandon the support for the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan and to provide logistical and intelligence support for the US war
there. Organizational biases could encourage the worst-case assumptions about
the opponent aimed and pessimistic beliefs about the prospect for successful
strategic deterrence over the long term.
Nuclear South Asia will be a dangerous place, not because of ill will or
irrationality between government leaders, nor because of any idiosyncratic
cultural inhibitions against strategic thinking in both countries. Pakistan and
India face unsafe and risky nuclear future because they have become like other
nuclear powers. The leaders pursue security through nuclear deterrence, but
unsound humans inside imperfect organizations control their nuclear weapons.
Nuclear weapons will remain in Pakistan and India for the foreseeable future,
and the conflict over Kashmir will continue to smoulder, threatening to erupt
into a wider and more dangerous war.
The deep political tensions maybe someday resolved and the US encourages process
towards the end of tension because it will reduce the threat of war in South
Asia. Pakistan obviously needs nuclear weapons. When asked from former Prime
Minister Benazir Bhutto, she said “it’s our history of three wars with a larger
neighbour. In 1971, our country was disintegrated. So security is an issue of
survival for Pakistan. The obvious conclusion to draw from Kargil is that the
presence of nuclear weapons prevented the risk of war from a major skirmish to a
full-scale war.
This is in sharp contrast to the 1965 war where both were armed with
conventional weapons only. On the other hand Pakistan and India can control
firmly and safely deploying nuclear forces sufficient to deter. The stability of
nuclear deterrence between the East and West rested on the multitude of military
and political factors which in other regions are either totally missing or are
only partially present. Clashes between nuclear countries over peripheral areas
are hardly the exception. Presently, out of eight nuclear states, five have
fought their neighbors in the past half century, Russia, China, Israel, Pakistan
and India. India may want a peaceful Pakistan, but under the influence of India.
Trade is believed to be the only way to resolve the political and military
tensions, also normalize the relationship between them. In India mostly
political leaders cashed in on the Pakistan rivalry during the election
campaigns. All wars and conflicts showed the immature behaviour of Indian
leaders, more than that of Pakistani leadership, because all happened due to
their lack of control on the institution. Only the strengthened democracy will
help the both to use the nuclear weapons as a deterrent tool. The South Asian
nuclear crisis will only resolve just to normalize the relations between both
nuclear states. (Ends)
(The authors are Defence and Diplomatic Studies analysts, based in Islamabad)